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PREFACE 
he scope and the enforcement of copyright in the digital environment 
have been among the most complex and controversial issues for law-
makers all over the world for the last decade. Due to the ubiquitous 
use  of  digital  technology,  modern  regulation  of  copyright  inherently 
touches  upon  various  areas  of  law  and  social  and  economic  policy, 
including communications privacy as well as Internet governance.  
As  recently  shown  by  the  European  Parliament’s  rejection  of  the 
Anti-Counterfeiting  Trade  Agreement  (ACTA),  the  issue  of  online 
copyright enforcement is politically so sensitive that it can easily lead to 
strong clashes between the EU institutions, potentially frustrating years of 
policy-making and international negotiations. At the same time, legislative 
improvements in the area of online enforcement risk becoming useless if 
the conditions of licensing of copyright are not smooth and transparent for 
both  rights-holders  and  users  of  creative  content  in  an  increasingly 
borderless  digital  environment.  This  objective  has  proven  to  be  hard  to 
achieve in the EU, where copyright law is still  regulated as a territorial 
right at national levels, and ownership regimes and licensing practices vary 
considerably from one country to another in spite of the various directives 
that have harmonised national laws in the last 20 years. A more efficient 
and transparent framework for the licensing of digital uses of copyrighted 
content would certainly place creators, content producers and commercial 
exploiters in a much better position to develop new business models.  
The purpose of the CEPS Task Force on Copyright in the EU Digital 
Single  Market  was  to  develop  a  dialogue  among  stakeholders,  EU 
institutions, consumer advocates, civic society organisations and academics 
on the future of copyright in the EU Digital Single Market and in a fully 
globalised economy. In the aftermath of the ACTA rejection, CEPS’s Digital 
Forum conceived and developed a multi-stakeholder dialogue on today’s 
major  challenges  for  copyright  law  in  the  online  content  sector.  In 
particular, the Task Force participants and guest speakers were invited to 
examine and openly discuss three main topics: 
Tii | PREFACE 
1.  Licensing  rules  and  practices  in  the  online  music  and  film  sectors 
(chapter 2), 
2.  The  definition  and  implementation  of  copyright  exceptions  in  the 
digital environment (chapter 3) and  
3.  The present and future of online copyright enforcement in the EU 
(chapter 4). 
The composition of the Task Force reflects the attempt by CEPS to 
form a balanced and authoritative group of participants, which was joined 
by distinguished scholars with different backgrounds and opinions. Taking 
advantage of the various threads developed in the Task Force debate, the 
report  goes  beyond  a  mere  recapitulation  of  opposing  arguments  and 
positions, drawing conclusions and making policy recommendations that 
ultimately reflect the personal views of the rapporteur.   
Giuseppe Mazziotti 
CEPS Research Fellow and  
Co-Manager of the CEPS Digital Forum 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY* 
Highlights 
The CEPS Task Force on ‘Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market’ dealt 
with the most relevant issues that EU decision-makers have recently taken 
into consideration in order to boost the creation and development of EU-
wide or multi-territorial markets for copyright works: i) the collective and 
individual  licensing  of  national  copyright  titles,  ii)  the  definition  and 
implementation of copyright exceptions in the digital environment and iii) 
the types of online enforcement measures that member states have to make 
available to rights-holders as a result of the transposition of EU copyright 
directives.  
Despite inevitable clashes between opposing groups of stakeholders 
trying to protect competing interests and significant disagreements among 
the scholars and guest speakers involved in the discussion, the Task Force 
identified  topical  issues  in  each  of  the  examined  fields  and  developed 
discussion threads that the rapporteur has followed closely in drawing his 
own conclusions and making his policy recommendations.  
As far as licensing is concerned, in the absence of unified (i.e. EU-
wide)  copyright  entitlements,  multi-territorial  licenses  are  the  only 
instrument  enabling  cross-border  exploitation.  The  Task  Force  took  the 
online music and film sectors as examples, since these sectors clearly show, 
although in different ways, that the territorial nature of copyright is not the 
                                                   
* This Final Report of the Task Force on Copyright in the EU Digital Single Market 
of  the  CEPS  Digital  Forum  brings  together  insights  from  the presentations  and 
discussions  at  the  Task  Force  meetings  and  the  rapporteur's  own  research  and 
analysis. The Report does not represent the views and/or positions of all the Task 
Force's participants or the institutions they represent. It contains conclusions and 
policy recommendations drawn by the rapporteur after the discussions during the 
Task Force meetings, and reflects the rapporteur's views only. The participants of 
the Task Force are listed in Annex II.  2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
only element that triggers a strongly predominant national dimension of 
markets  for  digital  content  in  Europe.  Cultural  diversity  and  linguistic 
specificities as well as factors such as still unequal penetration of Internet 
broadband services and varying per capita income from one member state 
to another strongly encourage ‘country-by-country’ exploitation and still 
make such exploitation more profitable for rights-holders, in spite of the 
borderless nature of the digital environment.  
In the film sector, for instance, where the centralisation of all rights in 
the hands of film producers would place them in a position to easily issue 
individual  multi-territorial  licenses,  it  is  mostly  because  of  the 
aforementioned non-copyright factors that cross-border exploitation is still 
underdeveloped and country-by-country exploitation deemed to be more 
profitable.  This  report  shows  that  simplification  of  licensing  in  the  film 
sector is possible even though, in order to preserve contractual freedom of 
both content owners and commercial exploiters, EU legislative measures 
cannot  deprive  copyright  holders  of  the  opportunity  to  target  a  specific 
public and to make licensing fees for online exploitation proportionate to 
the particular audience reached by content transmissions.  
Conversely,  in  the  music  sector,  fragmentation and  territoriality  of 
management stem mostly from the existence of a plurality of rights-holders 
(i.e.  authors  and  publishers,  record  producers  and  music  performers), 
distinct assignments of online rights (which include both mechanical and 
public  performance  rights)  and  from  a  strictly  national  collective 
management of the global music repertoires by collecting societies on the 
grounds of so-called ‘mutual representation’ agreements. As the Task Force 
acknowledged, at least until the adoption of non-legislative measures by 
the European Commission since 2005, the activities of collecting societies 
did  not  contemplate  multi-territorial  licensing  and  gave  rise  to  a  well-
established territorial partition of the music rights management businesses. 
In this regard, the Task Force unanimously agreed that the creation of 
a common playing field for collective societies at EU level is needed and 
that  the  licensing  of  copyright should  be  modernised  and  become more 
efficient, accurate and transparent for both copyright holders and users. For 
all  these  reasons,  the  Task Force  welcomed  the  European  Commission’s 
Proposal on Collective Rights Management of July 2012 (which is currently 
under  examination  by  the  European  Parliament  and  Council)  and 
expressed a largely positive opinion on the purpose of aggregating music 
repertoires through the creation of one-stop shops for multiple repertoires COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 3 
and  on  the  goal  to  reduce  the  number  of  licenses  that  online  music 
providers have to negotiate and conclude.  
Not surprisingly, the legal treatment of copyright exceptions at EU 
level  was  the  most  controversial  subject  in  the  whole  work  of  the  Task 
Force.  All  copyright  holder  representatives  firmly  reject  the  idea  of  any 
kind  of  legislative  reform  at  EU  level  that  could  lead  to  a  more  open, 
technologically  neutral  and  effectively  harmonised  legal  framework  for 
copyright exceptions. In particular, creative industries firmly oppose the 
idea  of  a  ‘flexibility  clause’  under  EU  law  that  would  place  courts  in  a 
position  to  estimate  fairness  of  a  given  use  when  such  use  is  not 
contemplated in the existing closed list of copyright exceptions. Book and 
newspaper publishers, in particular, claimed that more room for copyright 
exceptions  would  inevitably  stifle  innovation  and  would  endanger  the 
sustainability of new business models and online deliveries relying on the 
widespread use of digital rights management (DRM) systems and so-called 
‘rights expression languages’ (i.e. technologies that are able to map usage 
rights  and  express  them  in  machine-readable  formats).  Following  the 
various threads developed in the Task Force debates, the report mentions 
advantages and disadvantages of both the actual system of exceptions and 
a  more  flexible  legal  framework.  In  the  section  on  policy  conclusions, 
despite  the  strong  disagreement  of  copyright  holders,  this  report 
recommends  a  careful  reflection  about  how  the  existing  categories  of 
exceptions have been implemented by courts so far and, on the grounds of 
such reflection, consideration for the adoption of a technologically more 
flexible and legally more harmonised framework.  
Equally  controversial  was  the  discussion  on  the  private  copying 
exception under EU law and on the implementation of copyright levies in 
those  EU  member  states  where  this  (optional)  exception  exists. 
Representatives  of  copyright  holders  claimed  that  unauthorised  copying 
has  eventually  proliferated  in  the  digital  environment  and  that  levies 
should continue to compensate the added value that creative content brings 
to  the  use  of  copying  devices  and  media  by  consumers.  In  particular, 
individual  rights-holders  (i.e.  authors  and  performers)  stressed  the 
quantitative relevance of the financial revenue coming from levies and the 
fact  that  this  remuneration  right  cannot  be  validly  relinquished  under 
national law and constitutes a source of guaranteed income for individual 
rights-holders  with  little  bargaining  power.  Manufacturers  of  consumer 
electronics and consumers, obviously, expressed the opposite view arguing 
that,  at  a  time  when  licensing  and  automated  rights  management 
opportunities for rights-holders have increased significantly, levies are no 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
longer  justified  and  should  be  eventually phased  out.  In spite  of strong 
disagreement about these radical and opposite scenarios, most of the Task 
Force participants agreed on the necessity to improve the functionality and 
transparency of national levy systems and to reduce their effects of heavy 
market distortion through EU harmonisation measures. The report briefly 
reviews such measures and endorses most of the recommendations made 
in  the  context  of  a  mediation  process  that  the  European  Commission 
recently brought to an end. In addition, in its policy conclusions, the report 
suggests that future decisions should be ultimately based on the grounds of 
the  welfare  effects  of  copyright  levies  estimated  through  independent 
studies that draw on solid economics-based evidence.  
Finally,  the  Task  Force  dealt  with  the  complex  issue  of  online 
copyright enforcement measures in the EU after the rejection of the Anti-
Counterfeiting  Trade  Agreement  (ACTA)  in  2012  and  in  light  of  a 
completely new political and media-related dimension of the debate on this 
subject. The discussion and the analysis of the recent case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) helped point out several areas of 
tension  between  copyright  enforcement  measures  and  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and communication and 
Internet user privacy.  The Task Force clearly emphasised the weaknesses 
of excessively broad provisions on enforcement that might easily be found 
in conflict with human rights law. In this respect the members of the Task 
Force widely agreed on the suitability of uniform enforcement standards 
like  ‘notice-and-takedown’  proceedings  and  injunctions  against  online 
intermediaries. The report considers and draws on recent judgments of the 
CJEU  to  conclude  that  measures  such  as  website  blockings  or  online 
content  removals  triggered  by  rights-holder  notifications,  in  their 
respective fields of application, should ultimately comply with a principle 
of proportionality to the gravity of infringements. Last but not least, the 
report  draws  on  the  Task  Force  discussion  to  point  out  the necessity  to 
create  a  uniform  interface  at  EU  level  between  the  protection  of  user 
privacy and the implementation of copyright enforcement measures in the 
context of civil proceedings.  
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Policy Conclusions and Recommendations  
ow can the EU make copyright fit for purpose in the Internet age? 
What are the most suitable and realistic policy options in order to 
achieve  the  objective  of  a  Digital  Single  Market  in  the  creative 
content sectors? This report tries to give a comprehensive response to these 
questions, dealing with three main areas of copyright law that are crucial 
for  the  development  of  digital  markets:  licensing,  exceptions and  online 
enforcement.  The  three  are  inevitably  intertwined  and  their  inter-
relationships raise problems that cannot be tackled effectively without an 
overall examination of the whole copyright framework.  
1.  Licensing 
This report shows that the territorial nature of copyright is not the only 
element  that  triggers  a  strongly  predominant  national  dimension  of 
markets for digital content in Europe. The picture that policy-makers have 
to consider while pursuing that visionary goal is definitely a wider and 
very complex puzzle. Several factors prevent Europe from establishing the 
Digital Single Market for creative content that the European Commission 
envisions. Individual creators, content licensors and commercial exploiters 
are strongly encouraged to take a ‘country-by-country’ approach in their 
respective  businesses  because  of  Europe’s  cultural  diversity,  linguistic 
specificities and digital divides. These conditions are caused by an unequal 
penetration of Internet broadband services and varying per capita income 
from one member state to another. The task of EU policy-makers is thus far 
from  easy.  However,  a  re-consideration  of  several  aspects  of  copyright 
licensing, as recommended below, might facilitate market integration in the 
online environment.  
Recommendations 
  When thinking of how best to foster the development of a Digital 
Single Market for creative works, EU harmonisation measures should 
be  viewed  as  a  second-best  means.  Unification  through  an  EU 
regulation  granting  uniform  copyright  titles  throughout  the  EU 
would certainly be a more adequate choice to reach that ambitious 
objective.  A  regulation  based  on  Article  118  TFEU  is  the  only 
legislative tool capable of overcoming the obstacle of territoriality and 
of giving rights-holders and commercial users the opportunity to take 
H6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
advantage of the single market as a whole. However, considering the 
cultural  and  linguistic  barriers  that  characterise  the  EU,  unlike  the 
homogeneity of the US market, this policy option should not hinder 
local or small-scale exploitation or make them legally questionable or 
economically not viable. A unified copyright system could be based 
on unitary titles that would automatically replace national titles or on 
optional EU-wide titles that might co-exist with distinct national titles 
(which  would  continue  to  enable  purely  local  exploitation). 
Obviously, this would be a long-term solution that should be studied 
and pondered carefully since it would entail a radical or significant 
change of the existing national copyright sub-systems.  
  Fostering the growth of cross-border online exploitation of creative 
content is much easier and legally plausible in sectors in which rights 
ownership is centralised and one single entity can freely decide the 
territorial  reach  of  licenses  for  online  uses  (e.g.  films,  software, 
videogames).  In  the  online  music  sector,  fragmentation  of  rights 
ownership,  i.e.  the  split  of  rights  between  authors  and  publishers, 
together with the territorial character of copyright and the existence 
of  multiple  layers  of  rights  to  clear  for  the  use  of  recordings,  i.e. 
authors’,  performers’  and  record  producers’  rights,  has  largely 
hindered  solutions  based  on  multi-territorial  licensing.  To  remove 
disparities  at  local  level  and  enable  the  development  of  uniform 
ownership  regimes  for  the  same  type  of  content,  EU  law  should 
harmonise  distinct  copyright  contract  laws  at  national  levels. 
Narrower legislative measures touching just on management-related 
rules,  i.e.  without  making  any  changes  in  the  structure  of  rights 
ownership,  are  clearly  insufficient  to  achieve  the  purpose  of  an 
effectively EU-wide or multi-territorial exercise of rights.  
  As  stated  in  the  report,  stakeholders  and  EU  decision-makers 
unanimously  emphasised  the  essential  role  that  interoperable 
identification  systems  and  repertoire  databases  will  play  for 
copyright works. Initiatives such as the Global Repertoire Database 
(GRD), the Linked Content Coalition (LCC) and Accessible Registries 
of  Rights  Information  and  Orphan  Works  (ARROW)  will  greatly 
simplify, modernise and improve the conditions of licensing in the 
digital market. Innovation of this kind is likely to benefit all players 
and  promote  the  creation  of  a  level  playing  field  for  all  content 
licensors and licensees. The use of rights management information 
technologies is also the most realistic approach to ensure long-term 
sustainability and availability of professional content. For markets in COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 7 
intangibles like digital works to function properly, full disclosure of 
all necessary information about copyright and the identity of rights-
holders  and  licensors  is  indispensable.  To  this  end,  the  European 
Commission, which is currently monitoring the development of the 
above-mentioned initiatives, would have to ensure that rights data 
and  metadata  are  effectively  made  available  by  their  respective 
holders  to  commercial  and  non-commercial  users  and,  more 
generally, to the public. Such data and metadata should ideally be 
released under licences that guarantee open access and facilitate full 
interoperability  through  the  adoption  of  non-proprietary  and 
standardised formats.   
  The category of rights covering online exploitation, i.e. ‘online rights’, 
should  be  clearly  defined  at  EU  level  with  a  subsequent 
relinquishment  of  the  application  of  old-fashioned  categories,  i.e. 
mechanical  and  public  performance  rights,  in  digital  settings.  The 
simultaneous  application  of  these  rights  for  both  download  and 
streaming  exploitation  in  sectors  like  the  online  music  market 
increases transaction costs dramatically since mechanical and public 
performance titles can easily belong to distinct rights-holders. EU law 
already provides for a right of making content available to the public, 
which  the  Information  Society  Directive  specifically  conceived  in 
order to cover web-based interactive exploitation. However, this right 
was not conceived or implemented as an independent right of online 
transmission, i.e. a right that would have absorbed, legally speaking, 
the  acts  of  reproduction  that  are  technically  necessary  to  enable 
online  communications.  A  clear  and  independent  definition  of  the 
scope of online rights would simplify licensing and would guarantee 
that each license granted by a copyright holder enables a concrete 
and autonomous type of use.  
  The  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  Collective  Management  of  the 
European Commission, as it stands, would certainly have a positive 
impact on the functioning and modernisation of collecting societies. 
From a purely service-related perspective, the likely adoption of this 
Directive  will  considerably  improve  the  overall  business  of  such 
entities and will force them to gain the technical ability to respond 
promptly to requests of customised licenses coming from providers 
of new digital content offerings. However, there are several aspects of 
the  proposal  that  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council,  currently 
engaged  in  examining  the  text  and  defining  their  first  reading 
positions,  might  consider  amending.  The  following  remarks  and 8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
recommendations  concern  both  the  section  of  the  proposal 
embodying governance, membership and transparency rules and the 
section on multi-territorial licensing in the online music sector. 
  Definition  of  ‘collecting  society’.  The  proposal  provides  a 
definition  of  ‘collecting  society’  that  presupposes  the 
assignment or licensing of rights by a plurality of rights-holders 
and a form of ownership or control by its members. This means 
that  the  rules  of  the  proposal  on  membership,  organisation, 
relations with users, duties of transparency and reporting will 
not apply to mono-repertoire licensing vehicles that large music 
publishers  recently  set  up  in  cooperation  with  the  biggest 
collecting societies in Europe. In its impact assessment of the 
proposal,  the  Commission  considered  such  corporate  sub-
entities as licensing agents of single rights-holders and not as 
collecting societies. If such licensing bodies were not subject to 
the governance, organisation and transparency obligations laid 
down in the future Directive, collecting societies might have an 
incentive to entrust rights (and repertoires) to these corporate 
sub-structures  in  order  to  circumvent  the  application  of  the 
obligations for any of their licensing activities. This is clearly a 
risk that should be avoided. To this end, then, the definition of 
‘collecting  society’  could  be  amended  in  order  to  extend  the 
application  of  the  proposal  obligations  to  mono-repertoire 
licensing bodies. 
  Representation power on the grounds of the economic values of rights. 
The  proposal  aims  at  obliging  collecting  societies  to  take  the 
economic value of the rights they administer into account as an 
objective  criterion  for  the  exercise  of  voting  rights  in  their 
general  meetings.  This  rule  is  a  direct  challenge  to  the 
preservation of the principle of solidarity among rights-holders, 
i.e. a key principle for most European collecting societies, and 
strongly affects the representation power of authors, especially 
the  owners  of  small  or  niche  repertoires.  Moreover,  the  fact 
that,  under  the  proposal,  resolutions  on  the  allocation  of 
revenues  coming  from  statutory  remuneration  rights  (like 
revenue  from  private  copying  levies)  will  also  be  taken  on 
grounds  that  the  commercial  value  of  rights  might  easily 
frustrate  the  ultimate  purpose  of  statutory  remuneration,  i.e. 
subsidising individual creators (rather than subsequent rights-
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preferably leave national collecting societies with the freedom 
to choose whether and how the economic value of rights should 
be taken into account to determine voting rights, especially for 
those resolutions that concern statutory rights revenue. 
  Exclusivity  of  the  assignment  of  rights.  The  expansion  of  the 
rights-holder freedom to withdraw any categories of rights – 
including offline rights – challenges the principle of exclusivity 
of mandates. The proposal allows copyright holders to split the 
management of their rights and to assign different categories of 
rights  to  distinct  societies  or  licensing  bodies.  This  solution 
facilitates fragmentation of rights management and makes the 
activities of collecting societies more difficult and burdensome, 
endangering  the  efficiencies  stemming  from  their  position  in 
their countries of establishment. To enable the development of 
one-stop  shops  for  online  uses  of  multiple  repertoires,  the 
possibility of withdrawal should be confined to online rights. 
  European Licensing Passport. The Passport requirements, which 
collecting  societies  wishing  to  grant  multi-territorial  licenses 
should meet, are of a purely technical nature, e.g. capability of 
efficient and transparent data processing, usage monitoring, e-
invoicing,  etc.  EU  law-makers  might  consider  adding  certain 
law-related requirements that would help achieve public policy 
objectives. To ensure legal certainty, for instance, the Passport 
could require societies to offer complete packages of rights for 
online uses (e.g. this requirement would not be met by licensing 
bodies offering just mechanical rights). To ensure consistency of 
the  digital  copyright  system,  the  Passport  could  also  require 
collecting societies to compile and make updated data available 
to interested parties with regard to all works in their repertoires 
that progressively fall in the public domain and become freely 
accessible  and  usable,  especially  in  the  context  of  online 
repositories such as Europeana. An additional requirement for 
collecting societies wishing to obtain the Passport might be the 
release of data and metadata concerning their own repertoires 
under  open  access  licences  and  through  non-proprietary 
formats that would facilitate the further development of rights 
management  information  and  tools  such  as  the  Global 
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  Authority granting the Passport. How should compliance with the 
Passport requirements be verified? What type of authority or 
institution  should  perform  these  supervisory  tasks?  The 
proposal is too vague about such a crucial aspect of the new 
system of multi-territorial licensing for online music rights. It 
refers  to  ‘competent  authorities’  of  member  states  without 
clarifying whether or not member states should be obliged to 
establish  a  system  of  supervisory  authorities  and  of 
authorisations  enabling  collecting  societies  to  operate,  as  has 
already  happened  in  certain  member  states  like  Germany.  It 
would  be  wise  to  amend  the  proposal  on  this aspect  and  to 
centralise this function: the scrutiny of a European institution 
would  ensure  a  uniform  enforcement  of  the  Passport 
requirements.  
  Clarification on collecting societies’ freedom to provide services on a 
cross-border basis. The proposal does not create an interface with 
the 2006 Services Directive in order to clarify whether collecting 
societies  should  be  free  to  provide  their  services  on  a  cross-
border  basis.  In  particular,  it  is  unclear  whether  or  not  the 
authorisations granted by supervisory institutions for collecting 
societies to operate in certain member states would have extra-
territorial  effects.  For  the  whole  system  of  multi-territorial 
licensing to work, without creating a regulatory vacuum for the 
cross-border activities of a non-negligible number of societies, 
EU  law-makers  might  consider  amending  the  proposal  to 
provide  explicitly  that  the  2006  Services  Directive  applies  to 
collecting  societies.  Obviously,  centralising  the  process  of 
Passport granting at EU level, as recommended above, would 
also solve the problem of how to make national authorisation 
systems compatible with the cross-border reach of online music 
licenses.  
  ‘Tag-on’  regime  and  the  creation  of  one-stop  shops  for  multiple 
repertoires.  The  ‘tag-on’  regime  will  make  it  possible  for  less 
developed collecting societies (not holding a Passport) to ask an 
authorised  society  to  include  their  repertoires  in  the  multi-
territorial licenses that the requested society will offer and grant 
for its own repertoire. This important corrective measure aims 
at  facilitating  the  aggregation  of  musical  repertoires.  The 
proposal makes it clear that all aggregated repertoires will have 
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of non-exclusive representation agreements for multi-territorial 
licensing  of  online  rights.  This  means  that  the  requested 
Passport society under the tag-on regime will have to behave as 
a manager of a ‘neutral’ rights hub through which commercial 
users of digital music will be able to gain access to all gathered 
repertoires under the same contractual conditions. This system 
clearly  paves  the  way  for  the  creation  of  a  reasonably  small 
number  of  one-stop  shops  for  multiple  repertoires,  which,  in 
terms of structure, look like the regional hubs that collecting 
societies  have  already  established  in southern  Europe  and  in 
the  Nordic  countries  for  the  online  licensing  of  their  own 
repertoires. It  is unclear,  however,  what  the  future  of  mono-
repertoire online licensing will be and whether the co-existence 
of traditional collecting societies and of the licensing agents of 
large  music  publishers  might  trigger  competition  between 
repertoires in this business. This is certainly an issue that the 
European  Commission  should  monitor  carefully,  following 
market  developments  after  the  (possible)  adoption  and  entry 
into force of the Directive.  
  The  report  focuses  on  the  main  factors  that  end  up  restricting  or 
slowing down the availability of legitimate online film offerings on 
both  national  and  multi-territorial  basis.  Certain  factors  relate  to 
copyright, whereas other obstacles derive from cultural and linguistic 
diversity and by commercial decisions.  
As far as copyright is concerned: 
  Creation of a ‘digital single area’ for online film exploitation. Film 
producers,  in  the same  way as  holders  of  exclusive  rights  in 
sport events, would already be in a position to treat the EU as a 
Digital  Single  Market,  being  free  to  determine  the  territorial 
reach of their online licenses. The fact that content owners make 
these  types  of  audio-visual  content  available  on  a  strict 
‘country-by-country’  basis  is  due  to  legitimate  business 
decisions and (especially in the case of sports events) to a lack 
of consumer demand. Film producers have traditionally aimed 
at  maximising  the  profitability  of  their  content  exploitation, 
targeting at different audiences, tastes and specificities through 
optimisation  of  content  offerings,  e.g.  through  different 
language versions. The borderless online environment certainly 
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content offerings of audio-visual content, although cultural and 
linguistic diversities persist and matter in spite of technological 
developments. 
In the absence of a unified legal framework for copyright, 
to facilitate multi-territorial licensing EU policy-makers might 
consider  proposing  the  extension  of  the  principle  of  ‘country  of 
origin’  to  the  realm  of  online  film  deliveries,  in  a  sector-specific 
way.  This  principle  is  embodied  in  existing  EU  Directives 
dealing with digital TV services and satellite transmissions, and 
in  the  online  environment  would  need  to  be  shaped  as  a 
‘country  of  emission’  (or  ‘country  of  upload’)  principle.  The 
purpose of this policy option is that of making transmissions of 
copyright  works  subject  to  just  one  single  law  (instead  of 
making them subject to the laws of all countries where content 
is  received  and  enjoyed,  as  a  consequence  of  territoriality  of 
copyright). However, law-makers should take the economics of 
such a policy change into careful consideration, leaving content 
owners  and  commercial  users  with  the  contractual  freedom  to 
calculate license fees on the grounds of the audiences reached 
by the online services and to determine their territorial reach, 
e.g. through geo-localisation tools.  
  Separate licensing of rights in the film soundtrack. The only legal 
aspect that currently raises territorial barriers to multi-territorial 
licensing  of  online  films  is  the  separate  licensing  of  public 
performances of film soundtracks by local collecting societies. 
Several  copyright  laws  in  EU  member  states  treat  music 
performances  of  soundtracks  delivered  to  user  computers 
through download or streaming film offerings in the same way 
as performances taking place in cinema theatres. So far this rule 
has obliged providers of online film services (including start-
ups with limited resources at their disposal) to obtain a license 
from  collecting  societies  on  a  ‘country-by-country’  basis. 
Unfortunately the Proposal on collective management does not 
touch  upon  this  specific  aspect.  EU  policy-  and  law-makers 
might consider solving this problem in order to simplify and 
modernise the licensing of online film exploitation. This result 
could be achieved through a harmonisation measure aimed at 
either confining the scope of this right to offline exploitation or 
tying its exercise to that of the related film (or  remunerating 
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Obviously, intervening in this field without having harmonised 
authorship  rules  with  regard  to  films  might  raise  disparities 
with regard to the position and legal protection of soundtrack 
composers in the various member states.  
As far as other types of obstacles are concerned: 
o  Demand  for  EU-wide  licenses.  The  real  problem  for  the 
Digital Single Market in the field of audio-visual content, 
and film content in particular, is that there seems to be no 
demand  for  EU-wide  licenses.  In  spite  of  their  current 
availability,  e.g.  in  the  field  of  football  event  rights,  no 
commercial exploiter is willing to pay for pan-European 
licenses, not only in the broadcasting businesses but also 
in  the  online  environment.  There  are  barriers  for  the 
creation  of  single  markets  that  are  both  cultural  (or 
linguistic) and commercial. In particular, due to the very 
heterogeneous  nature  of  EU  national  markets,  the 
economic sustainability and profitability of online content 
offerings  largely  depends  on  knowledge  of  potential 
advertisers and customers and marketing initiatives and 
investments  made  at  local  level.  EU  law-  and  policy-
makers should take economic and cultural realities into 
account. Still, they should also pay attention to the slow 
and progressive erosion of full enforcement of licensing 
agreements  that  tend  to  restore  divisions  between 
national markets. The case law of the CJEU has shown 
that the application of EU competition law  (the Premier 
League case) and of the exhaustion principle (the UsedSoft 
case) in digital settings might trigger largely unexpected 
consequences for commercially significant content sectors, 
i.e. sport events and software, which might also extend to 
videogames.  
o  Contractual  arrangements  concerning  the  film  majors’ 
productions.  Cinematographic  production  is  a  complex 
process that entails an articulated fund-raising activity in 
both the studio system developed by the Hollywood film 
majors  and  in  the  European  film  sector.  Funds  and 
resources,  however,  are  of  a  different  nature.  To  fund 
their  productions,  US-based  film  majors  fully  rely  on 
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license  it  by  territory,  by  linguistic  version  and,  more 
rarely, on a multi-territorial basis. The purpose of these 
pre-production  arrangements,  which  also  include  the 
creation of ‘windowed’ releases (e.g. exploitation through 
DVDs, pay TVs, free-to-air TV after release in cinemas), is 
that of placing a film in the best competitive position in 
order to cover the costs and gain profits. Obstacles to a 
wider online availability of majors’ film productions stem 
from  release  windows  and,  in  some  cases,  from  the 
exclusive assignment of rights by territory, which include 
both  broadcasting  and  online  exploitation  rights,  to 
companies that do not exploit (or underuse) them on the 
Internet. 
As acknowledged in the Task Force debate and in 
this report, windows are currently shrinking in order to 
meet consumer expectations and different release systems 
(e.g., premium on-demand services) might emerge soon 
as a result of the progressive involvement of prominent 
online film service providers (e.g. Netflix) in the context 
of  pre-production  arrangements.  Fast-changing  market 
conditions  in  countries  where  online  rights  have  been 
included  in  broad  packages  of  territorially  exclusive 
broadcasting rights might easily persuade film majors to 
stop this practice and to start licensing their content more 
broadly  and  to  the  best  (or  most  promising)  online 
exploiters. In any event, to ensure a wider availability of 
the  mainstream  film  content  on  the  Internet,  and  to 
reduce  the  appeal  of  online  piracy,  the  European 
Commission  should  keep  an  eye  on  excessively  broad 
licensing practices that, in certain member states, end up 
restricting  the  development  of  new  online  markets.  If 
necessary,  the  Commission  could  use  its  competition-
related powers.  
o  Contractual restrictions in the European film sector. European 
film productions benefit widely from subsidies granted at 
national  level  by  governments and  other  public  bodies. 
Limitations  or  barriers  to  online  exploitation  stem 
normally  from  old-fashioned  administrative  regulations 
that  apply  to  funding  agreements  or  co-production 
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owned broadcasters, which normally acquire rights that 
they are either unwilling or commercially unable to use 
for online exploitation. EU policy-makers could usefully 
intervene in this area by proposing amendments to the 
current  framework  on  state  aid  to  the  cinema  sector 
aimed  at  making  subsidies  conditional  on  the  effective 
online  release  of  subsidised  movies  shortly  after  their 
release in cinemas and TV.  
2.  Copyright exceptions and private copying levies 
The advent and the very fast development of the digital environment seem 
to  have  considerably  strengthened  the  need  for  democratic  and  open 
societies to balance copyright protection with the preservation of freedom 
of  expression  and  communication,  broadly  speaking.  The  Task  Force 
debate focused mostly on whether courts would need to have a nuanced, 
modern  and  more  flexible  regime  of  exceptions  or  limitations  at  their 
disposal  to  be  able  to  assess  fairness  and  legitimacy  of  new  (and 
unpredictable)  unauthorised  uses  of  protected  materials.  The  actual  EU 
system of copyright exceptions is extremely narrow and looks at exceptions 
from  a  pure  Internal  Market  perspective,  failing  (paradoxically)  to 
harmonise  sufficiently  the  various  categories  of  unauthorised  uses 
permitted  by  law.  The  system  stemming  from  the  Information  Society 
Directive (a piece of legislation prepared and discussed in the late 1990s) 
seems unsustainable in the long run, especially if one considers that it has 
become very hard (or almost impossible) for the courts, due to an outdated 
set of provisions, to understand and regulate technology-enabled uses that 
escape the traditional contours of copyright.  
Drawing on the Task Force debate, this report pointed out that there 
are entire classes of economically relevant digital uses (including any sort 
of automated processing of protected works for purposes of data mining, 
computational analysis on texts and automated extraction of data) whose 
legal treatment is very unclear under the existing legal framework. Uses 
like the ones occurring in the context of mass digitisation projects (from 
search and indexing to data mining and text analysis) are undertaken by 
machines to the benefit of machines and for reasons that are not (directly) 
associated with enjoyment and consumption of works by humans. These 
are all activities that are beneficial to both commercial and non-commercial 
users who treat copyright materials not as ‘works’ but as ‘data’, in order to 16 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
extract, collect and re-use a vast array of useful information for different 
purposes.  
The  Task  Force  evaluated  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the 
possible  introduction  of  a  more  flexible  and  up-to-date  legislative 
framework  concerning  copyright  exceptions.  Moreover,  discussants  and 
participants focused on the boundaries and the implications for the Digital 
Single  Market  of  the  private  copying  exception  and  of  different  levy 
systems at national level that cause heavy distortions on the markets for 
levied devices and media.  
Recommendations 
  The  current  system  of  EU  copyright  exceptions  and  limitations  is 
technologically outdated and, to a large extent, does not harmonise 
national laws with regard to important (and constitutionally relevant) 
categories  of  traditionally  permitted  uses  that  are  increasingly 
undertaken on a cross-border basis. National courts, when examining 
unauthorised  uses  that  are  not  included  in  today’s  closed  list  of 
exceptions, would certainly take advantage of the introduction of a 
‘flexibility clause’ that could be modelled on the requirements of the 
three-step  test.  In  the  same  way  as  in  the  US  fair-use  doctrine, 
however,  courts  should  be  free  to  estimate  fairness  using  the 
requirements as non-cumulative criteria. The co-existence of classes 
of specific exceptions with a new ‘flexibility clause’ would give rise to 
a mixed system where courts could permit uses that are similar (but 
not identical) to the ones expressly enumerated by the law.  
  Before considering a possible legislative reform aimed at enabling a 
higher degree of flexibility in this area of  copyright, a comparison 
between the outcome of fair-use cases in the US and the settlement of 
identical or similar cases by European courts would be very useful. In 
this regard, EU decision-makers might commission an independent 
study or do a review of the relevant case law and the literature in 
order  to  clarify  whether  or  not  the  existing  provisions  of  the  2001 
Information Society Directive place courts in a position to ensure a 
progressive  understanding  and  adaptation  of  exceptions  and 
limitations  to  technological  changes.  If  the  comparison  eventually 
showed  that  the  existing  provisions  are  flexible  enough  to  allow 
European courts to achieve results comparable to those reached via 
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be  limited  to  a  re-formulation  of  the  wording  of  these  provisions 
aimed at ensuring technological neutrality.  
  EU  policy-makers  might  also  consider  proposing  the  creation  of 
additional  exceptions  in  order  to  ensure  a  nuanced  and  balanced 
legal treatment at EU level of technology-enabled uses (e.g. text- and 
data-mining) for which exceptions and licensing schemes could be 
complementary. In such cases, exceptions might apply to non-profit 
uses, whereas licensing schemes might be developed for uses that are 
directly  or  indirectly  commercial.  Confining  the  scope  of  a  certain 
copyright exception to the realm of non-profit (i.e. neither directly 
nor indirectly commercial) uses is a criterion that EU law has already 
embraced  under  the Information  Society Directive  (cf.  Art.  5)  and, 
more  recently,  under  the  Orphan  Works  Directive  (cf.  Art.  6). 
Following  the  same  criterion  with  regard  to  future  exceptions 
permitting certain technology-enabled uses seems a suitable policy 
option.  
  If additional exceptions were created in order to allow technological 
uses where copyright materials are treated not as works but as data 
(or  information)  to  be  processed  automatically  by  computers  or 
machines, the system of copyright exceptions in the amended version 
of the Information Society Directive would need to be coordinated 
with that of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, in 
relation  to  the  extraction  of  data  from  non-original  databases  (i.e. 
mere  aggregation  of  data)  currently  protected  by  an  exclusive  sui 
generis right (cf. Art. 7). 
  The proposed reform of EU copyright exceptions would be based on 
the  assumption  that  certain  exceptions  (i.e.  especially  the  ones 
enabling transformative or productive uses of copyright materials or 
encouraging  innovation)  should  be  made  mandatory  for  member 
states  since  they  aim  at  preserving  values  such  as  freedom  of 
expression  and  information,  online  media  freedom,  teaching  and 
research purposes. In the same way as exceptions laid down in the 
special  legal  framework  of  the  EU  Software  Directive,  such 
exceptions  should  also  be  made  non-overridable  through  contract 
under national laws.  
  As  regards  private  copying,  it  is  (and  it  will  be)  very  hard  and 
unlikely to make this exception mandatory for all EU member states, 
especially at a time when some of them have been re-considering the 
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e.g.  whether  fair  compensation  to  copyright  holders  should  be 
provided through levies or state funds. Nonetheless, in those member 
states  where  the  exception  applies,  the  codification  and  the 
application  of  the  following  measures  and  criteria  seem  to  be 
necessary or highly desirable:  
o  A  uniform  concept  of  harm  caused  by  unauthorised  private 
copying  to  rights-holders  should  be  adopted  at  EU  level  in 
order to enable an economics-based calculation of levies. The 
recommended criteria to estimate the harm to be compensated 
financially could be that of ‘lost profit’ and the economic value 
that  consumers  attach  to  private  copies,  i.e.  the  consumer’s 
willingness  to  pay  for  the  making  of  subsequent  copies  for 
personal  use  diminishes  progressively  and  significantly.  This 
approach would allow a more precise definition of the scope of 
application of levies, avoiding their proliferation and creating a 
de minimis threshold that clearly indicates that certain private 
copies cannot be remunerated.  
o  If the harm were calculated through economics-based criteria, 
and  such  criteria  were  made  uniform  at  EU  level  as 
recommended  above,  it  should  not  matter  logically  whether 
copyright holders are remunerated through levies or through 
state funds. Still, if national levy systems were harmonised and 
improved,  as  advocated  here,  it  would  be  unwise  to  leave 
member states with the freedom to opt for a system of state 
subsidies.  
o  Copies  falling  within  the  scope  of  application  of  private 
copying and levy systems cannot be validly licensed by rights-
holders  and  become  an  alternative  to  levies  before  their 
phasing-out. Otherwise consumers would end up paying twice 
for the same copies. 
o  There  should  be  a  link  between  the  application  of  the  levy 
intended  to  finance  fair  compensation  and  the  deemed  use  of 
levied equipment and media for purposes of private copying. 
As held by the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) 
in  Padawan  v.  SGAE,  this  means  that  private  copying  levies 
cannot  be  applied  with  respect  to  equipment  and  media  not 
made available to private users and clearly reserved for uses 
other than private copying, e.g. professional uses.  COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 19 
o  Legitimate private copying can only come from a legal source, 
i.e.  a  lawfully  acquired  copy  of  the  work;  otherwise  the 
exception would not pass the three-step test (in particular the 
second  step,  which  restricts  uses  in  conflict  with  the  normal 
exploitation  of  the  protected  work).  Even  though  the 
requirement  of  ‘lawfulness  of  the  source’  seems  to  clearly 
emerge  from  the  existing  legal  framework,  its  future 
codification  would  clarify  that  law-makers  and  national 
authorities are not entitled to take unlawful private copies (e.g. 
downloads from peer-to-peer networks) into consideration for 
determining the amounts of levies.  
o  As stated in the report, not surprisingly studies commissioned 
by interest groups or stakeholders reach opposite conclusions 
with regard to the welfare effects and ultimate desirability of 
levies for rights-holders, manufacturers of consumer electronics 
and  consumers.  Such  uncertainty  seems  to  call  for  a  fully 
independent and economics-based study on the welfare effects 
of  levies  and  on  their  real  influence  on  retail  prices.  The 
European Commission has the resources and the expertise to 
undertake  this  kind  of  study  before  taking  any  decisions  on 
whether and how to intervene in this complicated field.  
  Various  recommendations  made  in  the  context  of  the  mediation 
process  on  levies  launched  by  the  European  Commission  in  April 
2012 and concluded in January 2013 also emerged from Task Force 
debate.  The  list  below  contains  the  mediator’s  proposals  or  ideas 
whose implementation seems to be desirable: 
  Levies should be applied (only) in the country of destination of 
levied products in case of cross-border transactions, as already 
clarified in the case law of the CJEU. This principle is based on 
the assumption that the levy is a form of recompense for the 
harm  that  the  consumer’s  private  copy  causes  to  copyright 
holders. Charging the levy in the country of residence of the 
consumer is therefore consistent with the idea of providing fair 
remuneration where the harm occurs.  
  Shifting the liability to pay the levy from the manufacturer (or 
importer) level to the retailer level would solve the problem of 
products  that  are  levied  twice  (in  both  the  countries  of 
manufacture/importation  and  of  destination)  and  of  the 
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strengthen and clarify the principle of country of destination, 
but it would also avoid the risk of charging undue levies in case 
of cross-border sales of consumer electronics from a member 
state adopting levies to a levy-free member state.  
  Targeting  the  retailer’s  level  would  presuppose  a  drastic 
simplification of the applied tariffs, which should be reduced to 
a very limited number so as to give retailers the opportunity to 
reasonably  handle  this  new  task,  together  with  that  of 
providing customers with a receipt where the levy is visible for 
the consumer.  
  As a result of the liability shift, the persons who are liable under 
the  current system  (i.e.  manufacturers  and  importers)  should 
inform  levy  collectors  (i.e.  collecting  societies)  about  their 
transactions  concerning  levied  products  in  order  to  place 
collectors in a position to deal with and monitor a much bigger 
number of newly liable parties (i.e. retailers).  
  Certain recommendations of the mediator appointed by the European 
Commission do not seem to be adequate to achieve the objective of 
improving  the  current  scenario  significantly.  In  addition,  the 
mediator  showed  an  incomprehensible  reluctance  to  propose 
effectively pan-European solutions. 
  The  mediator  recommended  that  products  (or  classes  of 
products)  to  be  levied  should  continue  to  be  identified  at 
national  level.  According  to  the  mediator,  an  individualised 
approach would seem to be justified by the fact that choosing 
which products are subject to levies would allow member states 
to  quantify  the  concept  of  ‘harm’  in  a  way  that  reflects  the 
different purchasing power of consumers residing in different 
member  states.  That  policy  goal  could  still  be  achieved, 
however, by letting only tariffs be set at national level.  
  The  mediator  was  also  of  the  opinion  that  a  mechanism  of 
identification of the levied products at EU level would be too 
burdensome. Such risk could be easily avoided by giving an EU 
institution  or  agency  the  task  of  making  such  EU-wide 
determinations  and  ensuring  a  periodic  and  technology-wise 
update of the list of levied products.  
  In conclusion, consideration should have been given to the fact that, 
as far as EU law stands, the choice about whether and how a levy 
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on the discretion of national law-makers. Member states appeared as 
uninvited guests in the mediation process. This was surprising if one 
considers  that,  before  the  start  of  this  process,  several  EU 
governments had already expressed their intent to radically reform 
their levy systems or not to introduce levies despite the introduction 
of a new private copying exception. It has to be seen how the private 
copying dossier will develop now and whether the Commission will 
continue  to  seek  an  apparently  impossible  agreement  among 
stakeholders on very critical issues for the Internal Market that would 
require  independent  policy  decisions  based  on  economic  evidence 
and a sufficiently wide democratic consensus by EU law-makers. At a 
time when the debate on EU digital copyright policy has become so 
turbulent, the issue of copyright levies would certainly require more 
than a mediation attempt and a clear EU-wide solution.  
3.  Online copyright enforcement  
Due to its potentially ubiquitous application, copyright has become much 
easier to infringe by the average Internet user and its modern regulation 
inevitably  touches  upon  digital  communication  policy  and  Internet 
governance,  from  both  economic  and  social  perspectives.  The  political 
debate  about  the  Anti-Counterfeiting  Trade  Agreement  (ACTA)  clearly 
evidenced  that  balancing  copyright  enforcement  measures  with  the 
protection  of  fundamental  rights  and  civil  liberties  and  of  Internet 
architecture will be the main challenge for law-makers in the near future. 
Such a challenge is even bigger in a context, like the EU, that is politically 
and legally fragmented and where national courts still grant different types 
of online enforcement measures and evaluate the potential conflict between 
copyright and human rights according to distinct criteria and priorities. 
Recommendations 
  EU  law  should  place  national  courts  in  a  position  to  balance  the 
protection  of  digital  copyright  and  of  other  fundamental  rights  in 
order  to  ensure  proportionality  of  enforcement.  The  existing 
legislation  requires  EU  member  states  to  make  several  measures 
available  to  copyright  holders:  ‘notice-and-takedown’  proceedings, 
injunctions  against  online  intermediaries,  disclosure  of  information 
on  the  origins  and  distribution  networks  of  infringing  goods  and 
services, etc. However, these measures have proven to be ineffective 22 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
in  several  member  states  where  EU  Directives  on  electronic 
commerce, copyright and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
have not been implemented in a coordinated and uniform way. As a 
result,  national  courts  have  also  followed  and  guaranteed  diverse 
online enforcement standards. A review of existing legislation and, 
possibly,  the  start  of  infringement  procedures  against  those  states 
whose  laws  still  do  not  comply  with  the  EU  acquis  fully,  seem 
necessary  for  the  creation  of  a  common  playing  field  in  this  area. 
Ideally,  to  ensure  a  higher  degree  of  effectiveness  of  copyright 
enforcement, national courts would need to have different types of 
tools at their disposal. As the recent case law of the CJEU suggests, a 
combined  implementation  of  proportionate  enforcement  measures 
would  enable  judges  to  balance  copyright  protection  with  the 
protection  of  freedom  of  expression  and  communication  and  of 
Internet user privacy. 
  The  recent  case  law  of  the  CJEU  made  it  clear  that  today’s  EU 
legislation  should  be  implemented  so  as  to  ensure  that  online 
copyright enforcement measures are proportionate to the gravity of 
infringement.  To  ensure  balance  between  copyright  and  the 
protection of other fundamental rights and goals associated with the 
specificity of the Internet’s architecture, a correct interpretation of the 
liability exemptions created by the Electronic Commerce Directive for 
the  storage  and  transmission  of  infringing  content  is  essential.  In 
particular, the CJEU has recently shown that, as things stand, the only 
insurmountable  barrier  for  copyright  holders  wishing  to  enforce 
copyright is the principle that restricts member states and national 
courts from imposing on internet service providers (ISPs) and online 
hosting  providers  general  obligations  to  monitor  online  content 
transmissions.  This  means  that  injunctions  requested  by  copyright 
holders  that,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  future  online 
infringements, would require the installation of permanent filtering 
systems  or  technologies  by  ISPs  and,  for  instance,  social  network 
operators, would not be legitimate. This means also that other types 
of injunctions that do not conflict with the aforementioned principle 
can  be  targeted  at  online  intermediaries  –  irrespectively  of  their 
liability  –  in  so  far  as  injunctions  constitute  the  only  (or  most 
effective) measure to bring high-volume copyright infringement (e.g. 
through ‘structurally infringing’ sites) to an end. Considering their 
potential  side  effects  on  the  communication  of  lawful  or  free 
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viewed  as  ultimate  measures  to  be  used  cautiously  whenever 
standard  ‘notice-and-takedown’  proceedings  are  ineffective  or 
inadequate.  
  As acknowledged also by the European Commission, it has become 
evident  that  Directive  2004/48  on  the  enforcement  of  intellectual 
property rights (IPRED) was not designed to cope with the challenges 
posed  by  the Internet  to  copyright  enforcement.  IPRED  has  had  a 
limited application in trials concerning online infringements and it 
seems  advisable  to  adapt  its  enforcement  measures  to  the  online 
environment.  However,  after  the  rejection  of  ACTA,  the  political 
challenges  that  a  re-opening  of  this  Directive  would  raise  are  a 
serious obstacle, at least in the near future. From a legal point of view, 
two  amendments  in  particular  would  be  useful  in  order  to  make 
copyright enforcement proceedings more effective and to target the 
money supply of infringers on a commercial scale: 
a.  In order to confer effectiveness on one of the most important 
provisions of IPRED (namely the right to information on the 
origins  and  distribution  networks  of  infringing  goods  or 
services in response to a justified and proportionate request, see 
Article  8)  EU  law  should  create  a  uniform  interface  between 
copyright enforcement proceedings and the protection of user 
privacy  in  electronic  communications.  This  interface  should 
ensure that copyright and user privacy are fairly balanced also 
in the context of civil proceedings. The Promusicae v. Telefonica 
judgment of the CJEU was (and still is) a strong encouragement 
to EU law-makers to legislate in this field. The aforementioned 
right  to  information  will  remain  an  empty  promise  in  all 
jurisdictions where the law does not allow courts to restrict user 
privacy  rights  when  the  processing  of  personal  data  is 
necessary for the judicial protection of digital copyright.  
b.  What is also missing in the IPRED framework is a provision 
giving copyright holders the possibility of blocking payments 
addressed  to  individuals  and/or  entities  carrying  out  online 
infringing activities on a commercial scale. The underlying idea 
is  that,  by  preventing  high-volume  infringers  like  owners  of 
structurally infringing sites from collecting payments through 
cooperation  of  intermediaries  such  as  payment  system 
operators,  incentives  to  infringe  copyright  would  be  greatly 
reduced. Such a new remedy could be incorporated in a newer 24 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
version of IPRED. The remedy could either follow the model of 
the ‘notice-and-takedown’ mechanism adopted for ISP liability 
under the Electronic Commerce Directive or that of injunctions 
targeted at online intermediaries under the Information Society 
Directive (see. Art. 8(3)). Under a notice-and-takedown scheme, 
rights-holders might be required to send a notice to a payment 
system  operator,  who  would  inform  their  clients  and  would 
evaluate  rights-holder  notices.  Funds  deriving  from  illegal 
activities could be put in escrow accounts, whereas the accounts 
of infringing clients might be closed if such measure was found 
appropriate and/or justified. Obviously, a right to a fair trial 
should  be  granted  to  the  parties  that  this  additional 
enforcement  mechanism  might  affect  dramatically.  From  this 
angle, the alternative of enabling blocking measures concerning 
payment systems through injunctions might be preferable, since 
it would immediately entail a judicial review of rights-holders’ 
claims and would provide a stronger right of defence.  
  In  its  recent  case  law,  the  CJEU  held  that  online  enforcement 
measures should not be unnecessarily complicated and costly for ISPs 
and  hosting  service  providers  (like  a  social  network  deviser)  to 
implement.  However,  EU  policy-makers,  while  monitoring  online 
market  developments,  should  consider  that  an  excessively  broad 
protection  of  freedom  to  conduct  online  business  would  severely 
impair the implementation of copyright enforcement measures. (For 
instance, online content removals undertaken as a result of ‘notice-
and-takedown’  proceedings  where  the  volume  of  notices  is  high 
might  seem  excessive  for  some  ISPs  and  might  therefore  be  more 
easily contested.) 
  For  injunctions  against  online  intermediaries  and  ‘notice-and-
takedown’ procedures  to  be  fair,  these  remedies should  always  be 
accompanied  by  the  possibility  –  for  the  ISP,  the  hosting  service 
provider  or  whoever  has  posted  allegedly  illegal  content  that  has 
been  removed  –  of  reacting  and  defending  themselves  in  order  to 
prove  that  the  removed  content  is  lawful.  From  a  more  general 
perspective, there undoubtedly exists a problem of a lack of clarity 
under EU law about how a fair trial should be guaranteed by member 
states  in  the  context  of  ‘notice-and-takedown’  proceedings.  This 
problem arises from the Electronic Commerce Directive (see Article 
14), which does not specify how (i.e. by means of what type of notice) 
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knowledge) of the storage of illegal content on their servers in order 
to  expeditiously  remove  or  disable  access  to  that  content.  The 
European  Commission  might  consider  taking  steps  to  uniformly 
require member states to clarify that infringement notices can be sent 
by means of simple and informal notices (and not through judicial 
orders, as required in certain member states). However, a right to a 
fair trial before a judicial authority should be guaranteed to parties 
that might be affected by abusive or mistaken notices and content 
removals in the context of ‘notice-and-takedown’ proceedings. 
  Last  but  not  least,  before  undertaking  a  reform  of  the  current 
legislative framework in order to improve copyright enforcement and 
facilitate  the  development  and  growth  of  EU-wide  digital  single 
markets,  law-  and  policy-makers  would  need  to  consider  an  issue 
that is more political and sociological than legal. This issue consists of 
how  to  explain  and  justify  to  an  increasingly  vocal  part  of  public 
opinion  the  various  forms  of  content  control  and  restrictions  that 
copyright  entails  in  order  to  motivate  and  reward  professional 
content  creation  and  foster  new  online  business  models.  Online 
copyright  enforcement  should  certainly  be  improved  and  made 
uniform at EU level and copyright-related restrictions should comply 
with  a  principle  of  proportionality  aimed  at  preserving  Internet 
freedom.  However,  from  now  onwards,  law-  and  policy-makers 
should consider that infringing content is always ‘one click away’ for 
Internet  users,  and  enforcement measures  cannot  (and should not) 
become ubiquitous. This means that the future of digital copyright 
law  will  have  to  rely  not  only  on  much  more  developed  and 
accessible  lawful  online  content  offerings  but  also  on  a  wider 
consensus  of  society  that,  in  the  long  run,  might  require  a  more 
general re-consideration of this body of law. | 26 
 
1.  A ‘DIGITAL AGENDA FOR EUROPE’ 
AND TODAY’S TRACKS OF ACTION ON 
COPYRIGHT 
he  creation  of  the  EU  Digital  Single  Market  is  a  policy  objective 
rooted  in  the  ‘Digital  Agenda  for  Europe’,  an  initiative  that  the 
European  Commission  launched  and  defined  in  May  2010.1  The 
Digital Agenda aims at delivering sustainable economic and social benefits 
from  a  digital  single  market  based  on  fast  and  ultra-fast  internet  and 
interoperable  applications,  thus  implementing  one  of  the  seven  flagship 
initiatives included in the EUROPE 2020 Strategy (COM/2010/2020). The 
Agenda comprises seven pillars and 101 actions. In particular, Pillar I of the 
Agenda contains 21 actions with the goal of creating a digital single market 
by removing all barriers that might hamper the free flow of online services 
and entertainment across member state borders, thus fostering a European 
market for online content, establishing a single area for online payments 
and protecting EU consumers in cyberspace.  
On 18 December 2012, the European Commission published a ‘to-do’ 
list, disclosing new digital priorities for 2013-14. Priority number 5 aims at 
updating the EU's copyright framework, which is considered a key issue to 
achieve the goal of a Digital Single Market.2 The Commission is currently 
working on this action plan by developing two parallel tracks of action. The 
first  track  concerns  the  efforts  undertaken  to  review  and  modernise  EU 
                                                   
1  See  the  “Digital  Agenda  for  Europe”  website  (http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/digital-
agenda-europe). See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the 
Regions,  “A  Digital  Agenda  for  Europe”,  COM(2010)  245  final,  19  May  2010  (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245:EN:NOT).  
2  See  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  Content  in  the  Digital  Single  Market, 
COM(2012)789  final,  18  December  2012  [hereinafter  Content  in  the  Digital  Single  Market] 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/121218_communication-
online-content_en.pdf).  
TCOPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 27 
copyright legislation, whose most tangible results to date have been the 
2012  Orphan  Works  Directive3  and  the  proposal  on  collective  rights 
management.4  The  second  track  is  the  creation  of  a  multi-stakeholder 
platform  (‘Licences  for  Europe’)  that  should  help  develop  industry-led 
solutions to a number of issues for which rapid progress seems necessary 
and  possible  without  legislative  changes.  Interestingly,  Michel  Barnier, 
European Commissioner for the Internal Market, announced the launch of 
this  initiative  in  the  course  of  delivering  the  keynote  speech  at  the 
inaugural event of the CEPS Task Force on Copyright in the EU Digital 
Single Market on 7 November 2012.5  
As  regards  the  first  track,  since  2011  the  Commission  has  been 
reflecting on how to create a Single Market for intellectual property rights 
in  order  to  boost  creativity  and  innovation.6  Unification  of  legislation 
through  a  regulation  is  certainly  the  best  option  for  single  markets  to 
materialise and to develop fully in the various sectors. Unification seems 
also an irreversible trend at EU level after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which facilitates the creation of unitary intellectual property rights.7 
For several reasons, however, the EU has a long way to go before it can 
establish a unified legal framework in the field of copyright. The fact that 
copyright is the only field in the domain of intellectual property where a 
                                                   
3 See Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 on certain permitted uses of orphan works, OJ L 299/5, 27 October 2012, [hereinafter 
Orphan Works Directive]. 
4  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical 
Works for Online Uses in the Internal Market, COM(2012) 372 final, 11 July 2012 [hereinafter 
Proposal  on  Collective  Management]  (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ 
management/com-2012-3722_en.pdf). 
5  See  M.  Barnier  (2012),  “Making  European  Copyright  Fit  for  Purpose  in  the  Age  of 
Internet”,  Speech  12/785,  Centre  for  European  Policy  Studies,  Brussels,  7  November 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-785_en.htm?locale=EN).  
6  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European Commission, 
“A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights - Boosting creativity and innovation to 
provide  economic  growth,  high  quality  jobs,  and  first  class  products  and  services  in 
Europe”,  COM(2011)  287  final  Brussels,  24  May  2011  [hereinafter  A  Single  Market  for 
Intellectual  Property  Rights]  (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ 
ipr_strategy/COM_2011_287_en.pdf). 
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unification process has not yet started (and is unlikely to start in the near 
future) is not coincidental. 
EU  policy-makers  are  still  reflecting  whether  copyright  should  be 
modernised  through harmonisation  (i.e.  a  comprehensive  codification  of 
the present body of EU copyright Directives) or unification measures (i.e. 
the creation of a unified legal framework granting uniform pan-European 
entitlements  that  could  either supersede  or  co-exist  with  national  titles). 
According to the Commission, a higher degree of harmonisation of national 
rules might be pursued through the adoption of a ‘European Copyright 
Code’.8 Such a codification effort would help to consolidate the existing EU 
copyright  entitlements  and  would  finally  give  EU  law-makers  the 
possibility of updating and harmonising the field of copyright exceptions 
and of adapting the existing enforcement rules to the digital environment 
with the aim to ensure a fair balance with other fundamental rights. 
As  far  as  the  second  track  of  action  is  concerned,  ‘Licences  for 
Europe’  was  launched  in  January  2013  and  has  developed  four  work 
packages,  namely  cross-border  access  and  portability  of  services,  user-
generated content and licenses for small-scale users of protected material, 
audio-visual  work  and  film  heritage  institutions  and  text-  and  data-
mining.9 The stakeholder dialogue is being developed through closed-door 
meetings where enterprises from the creative industries, licensing bodies, 
commercial and non-commercial users of protected content and Internet 
end-user  representatives  are  exploring  and  testing  innovative  licensing 
solutions enabled by new technologies. The purpose of the whole exercise 
is to identify short-term, pragmatic solutions, where possible, but also to 
explore  the  limits  of  licensing  in  the  selected  areas.  Even  though  the 
outcome of this initiative is still uncertain, a dialogue among stakeholders 
and  the  formulation  of  concrete  proposals  might  place  the  European 
Commission in a better position to assess which goals can be realistically 
pursued  through  industry-led  solutions  and,  conversely,  which  policy 
objectives will require public policy action.  
                                                   
8 See European Commission (2011a), A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights, p. 11.  
9 See the ‘Licences for Europe’ website (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/licensing-
europe/index_en.htm). 29 | 
 
2.  LICENSING IN THE ONLINE MUSIC AND 
FILM SECTORS 
2.1  Introduction  
In spite of the national and territorial dimension of copyright entitlements 
in the European Union, in recent years the European Commission has been 
seeking  to  foster  the  development,  growth  and  functioning  of  EU-wide 
markets for digital content. The Internal Market Directorate General of the 
Commission is convinced that there is wide room for multi-territorial (and 
possibly EU-wide) licensing of rights that might reflect the natural cross-
border  reality  of  the  Internet  and  of  digital  settings  more  in  general. 
However, multi-territorial licenses still appear as an unrealistic option in 
the vast majority of scenarios. Markets for digital content are still heavily 
fragmented and highly differentiated for reasons that are not necessarily 
linked to the territorially limited scope of copyright. Europe is culturally 
very diverse, with different languages and different tastes and preferences 
that  the  creative  industries  have  to  take  into  careful  consideration  in 
shaping their offerings. A further complication is the unequal penetration 
of broadband access services in the various EU member states, although 
recent figures suggest that it no longer gives rise to a significant digital 
divide.10  
The participants in the CEPS Task Force widely acknowledged that 
the licensing of copyright needs to be fostered and improved in order to 
facilitate the emergence and diffusion of legitimate content services. If more 
                                                   
10 In 2012, an average of 70% of European households had access to a broadband Internet 
connection. A divide in broadband penetration existed between Western European member 
states (73%) and those in Central and Eastern Europe (65%) as well as when comparing 
densely  populated  areas  (at  least  500  inhabitants/km2)  where  75%  of  households  were 
connected to a broadband, urbanised areas (between 100 and 499 inhabitants/km2) where 
the  penetration  rate  reached  72%,  and  sparsely  populated  areas  (less  than  100 
inhabitants/km2), where the average rate was 64% (EUROSTAT, Households with broadband 
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digital content were made available legitimately – this is one of the most 
frequently heard messages – large-scale copyright infringements would be 
easily  reduced  to  a  more  tolerable  level.  Not  surprisingly,  stakeholders 
answered the question of how these policy objectives could be achieved in 
very  different  ways.  On  the  one  hand,  copyright  holders  strongly 
advocated the enactment and effective enforcement of measures aimed at 
restricting  unauthorised  access  to  copyrighted  content  through  a  more 
effective  cooperation  of  online  intermediaries.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
‘technology  and  communications’  front  formed  by  internet  service 
providers  (ISPs),  internet  companies,  content  platforms  operators  and 
commercial  users  of  digital  creative  content  stressed  the  necessity  to 
simplify today’s licensing schemes and to reduce transaction costs as much 
as possible. From an impartial point of view, it seems evident that these 
two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
2.1.1  Individual and collective rights management  
From  a  legal  point  of  view,  multi-territorial  licenses  are  much  easier  to 
obtain where an individual rights-holder or a rights aggregator manages a 
well-defined repertoire of works. Individual management is predominant 
in the audio-visual sector and in the markets for software and videogames. 
In  these  markets  the  copyright  holder  is  in  a  position  to  autonomously 
decide how broad, territorially speaking, a certain license should be.  
Conversely, obtaining a multi-territorial license is different and more 
complex,  where  licenses  for  primary  forms  of  content  exploitation  are 
issued  by  collective  rights  management  organisations  (i.e.  collecting 
societies)  and  there  are  multiple  rights  to  clear,  as  in  the  music  sector. 
Music rights management is particularly complex since the mechanical and 
public performance rights granted to authors by law, and simultaneously 
applicable whenever a digital use of a creative work is made, might turn 
out  to  be  owned  and/or  managed  by  different  entities  on  a  strictly 
territorial  basis.  In  addition,  it  must  always  be  considered  that  any 
legitimate use of music recordings also presupposes the clearance of the so-
called ‘neighbouring rights’ of record producers and of music performers, 
which are normally acquired and managed by producers themselves, either 
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2.1.2  Reform plan concerning collective management in the online 
music sector 
From  2005  onwards,  the  European  Commission  has  taken  action  to 
facilitate  the  acquisition  of  all  online  music  rights  by  online  music 
distributors on an EU-wide basis.11 This policy objective has proven to be 
very hard (or impossible) to achieve since national collecting societies of 
authors and music publishers in EU countries have traditionally operated 
on a strictly national basis and are de facto or  legal monopolies.12 They 
have concluded agreements of mutual representation for the management 
of their respective music repertoires in their sole country of business. At the 
same  time,  collecting  societies  developed  different  rules  and  contractual 
practices for the transfer and management of the mechanical and public 
performance  rights,  thus  leading  to  the  creation  of  parallel  ownership 
regimes for each of these rights and a lack of transparency in the licensing 
of rights. 
The  most  important  distinction  in  this  regard  is  probably  the  one 
concerning the assignment of mechanical rights in the UK and continental 
European  repertoires.  There  is  a  philosophical  and  cultural  difference 
underlying the notion of copyright and author’s rights in both territories. In 
the  UK,  music  publishers  have  historically  been  the  sole  proprietors  of 
mechanical  rights  through  their  own  collective  rights  management 
organisation, after having acquired them from the authors. In continental 
Europe, instead, authors and music publishers usually co-own the same 
rights under the shield of their respective collecting societies, which have 
                                                   
11 See European Commission (2005a), “Community Initiative on the Cross-border Collective 
Management  of  Copyright”,  Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  7  July 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/study-collectivemgmt_en.pdf). 
12  More  precisely,  collecting  societies  are  deemed  natural  monopolies  characterised  by 
economies of scale. The efficiencies arising from such monopolies are given by the fact that 
the fixed costs of creating a society and of administering a musical repertoire are very high 
(irrespective  of  the  number  of  works  managed)  whereas  the  costs  of  administering  an 
additional work are reasonably small. This means that the larger societies and repertoires, 
by acting in a cost-efficient manner, tend to attract all copyright holders over time. See 
Drexl, Nérisson, Trumpke & Hilty (2004), “Comments on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related 
rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal 
market”,  Max  Planck  Institute  for  Intellectual  Property  and  Competition  Law  Research 
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traditionally sought to protect authors from the bargaining power of the 
publishers and ultimately become authors’ unions. 
The European Commission sought to break up this well-established 
system in order to enable a smooth management of online music rights on a 
pan-European  basis.13  The  main  idea  was  that  of  dismantling  national 
barriers  that  restricted  rights-holders  from  issuing  EU-wide  licences  for 
digital uses of their musical compositions and that forced commercial users 
of such compositions to seek authorisations in every EU country through 
the  local  collecting  societies. At  the  same  time, according  to  this  reform 
plan,  individual  rights-holders  should  have  been  allowed  to  opt  for  a 
collective  rights  manager  of  their  choice,  irrespective  of  the  country  of 
domicile of the rights-holders or of the copyright manager. 
To pursue these ends, in 2005 the Commission opted firstly for a non-
binding Recommendation, which was addressed to EU member states and 
collecting  societies.  This  recommendation  urged  them  to  re-consider  the 
existing  structure  of  online  rights  management.14  At  a  later  stage,  the 
Commission  decided  to  directly  tackle  the  mutual  representation 
agreements that European collecting societies concluded with each other 
under the aegis of the International Confederation of Societies of Authors 
and  Composers  (CISAC).  This  happened  through  an  antitrust  decision 
(known as the CISAC decision) of 2008 that found the clauses of territorial 
exclusivity  and  the  membership  requirement  of  economic  residence 
embodied in these agreements illegal since they were deemed to constitute 
cartels restricting competition in the EU market for services of copyright 
management.15  The  Commission  decision,  which  concerned  solely  the 
exploitation of copyright via the internet, satellite and cable retransmission, 
did not call into question the very existence of reciprocal representation 
agreements. It did, however, prohibit clauses that restricted authors’ ability 
to freely join the collecting society of their choice and clauses having the 
                                                   
13 Ibid. These commentators argue that, in light of the efficiencies they produce, natural 
monopolies  like  collecting  societies  should  be  accepted  as  an  efficient  market  solution. 
Hence, the law should not try to impose competition on them, since this attempt would 
endanger the efficiencies stemming from the monopoly. 
14  See  European  Commission  (2005b),  Recommendation  on  Collective  Cross-Border 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, OJ L276/54, 
21 October [hereinafter Recommendation of 18 October 2005]. 
15 See Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and 
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effect of providing all collecting societies, in their territory of establishment, 
with absolute territorial protection against other collecting societies as far 
as  the  grant  of  licences  to  commercial  users  was  concerned.  The 
Commission  also  found  that  a  concerted  practice  existed  between  the 
collecting  societies  in  so  far  as  each  society  limited,  in  the  reciprocal 
representation  agreements,  the  right  to  grant  licences  relating  to  its 
repertoire  in  the  territory  of  another  collecting  society  party  to  the 
agreement.  As  a  result,  the  CISAC  decision  ordered  the  24  collecting 
societies of the European Economic Area to withdraw the above-mentioned 
clauses from their mutual representation agreements and to bring cartels 
on territorial segmentation of collective licensing for online, satellite and 
cable transmissions to an end.16 
Interestingly, the very recent judgment of the General Court of the 
European Union in the action brought by most of the collecting societies 
and by CISAC, while upholding the legal interpretation of the Commission 
with  regard  to  the  membership  and  exclusivity  clauses,  annulled  the 
Commission’s decision in respect of the finding of the concerted practice.17 
In that respect, the General Court considered that the Commission had not 
provided  sufficient  evidence  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  a  cartel 
regarding  the  territorial  scope  of  the  mandates  that  collecting  societies 
grant  each  other.  In  addition,  the  reasoning  of  the  Commission  did  not 
render implausible the explanation that the parallel conduct of collecting 
                                                   
16 Ibid., pp. 73–75, Arts 1 and 4 (membership clauses) and 3 (territorial exclusivity). The 
addressees  of  the  decision  were:  AEPI  (Greece),  AKKA/LAA  (Latvia),  AKM  (Austria), 
ARTISJUS  (Hungary),  BUMA  (Netherlands),  EAU  (Estonia),  GEMA  (Germany),  IMRO 
(Ireland),  KODA  (Denmark),  LATGA-A  (Lithuania),  OSA  (Czech  Republic),  PRS  (UK), 
SABAM (Belgium), SACEM (France), SAZAS (Slovenia), SGAE (Spain), SIAE (Italy), SOZA 
(Slovakia),  SPA  (Portugal),  STEF  (Iceland),  STIM  (Sweden),  TEOSTO  (Finland),  TONO 
(Norway) and ZAIKS (Poland). 
17 T-392/08 AEPI v. Commission, T-398/08 Stowarzyszenie Autorów ZAiKS v. Commission, T-
401/08  Saveltajain  Tekijanoikeustoimisto  Teostory  v.  Commission,  T-410/08  GEMA  v. 
Commission,  T-  411/08  Artisjus  v.  Commission,  T-413/08  SOZA  v.  Commission,  T-414/08 
Autortiesibu un komunicesanas konsultaciju agentura/Latvijas Autoru apvieniba v. Commission, T-
415/08 Irish Music Rights Organisation Ltd v. Commission, Eesti Autorite Uhing v. Commission, 
T-417/08  Sociedade  Portuguesa de  Autores  v.  Commission,  T-418/08 OSA  v.  Commission,  T-
419/08 LATGA-A v. Commission, T-420/08 SAZAS v. Commission, T-421/08 Performing Right 
Society  v.  Commission,  T-422/08  SACEM  v.  Commission,  T-425/08  Koda  v.  Commission,  T-
428/08 STEF v. Commission, T-432/08 AKM v. Commission, T-433/08 SIAE v. Commission, T-
434/08 Tono v. Commission, T-442/08 CISAC v. Commission, T-451/08 Stim v. Commission, 
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societies was not the result of concertation, but rather of the need to fight 
effectively against the unauthorised use of musical works.  
The  latest  initiative  of  the  European  Commission  in  this  field  has 
been a proposal for a Directive on Collective Management of Copyright 
and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works 
for online uses in the internal market.18 This legislative proposal seeks to 
create an appropriate legal framework for the licensing of rights that are 
administered by collecting societies on behalf of rights-holders by enacting 
rules  ensuring  a  better  governance  and  greater  transparency  of  all 
collecting societies. This proposed Directive also seeks to encourage and 
facilitate  the  multi-territorial  licensing  of  the  rights  of  authors  in  their 
musical works, codifying, with significant corrections, the rules and best 
practices endorsed through the 2005 Recommendation.  
2.2  The Commission Proposal on Collective Management 
Stakeholders,  independent  experts  and  EU  policy-makers  discussed  the 
legislative proposal of the Commission and, in particular, new provisions 
concerning i) the creation of a common level playing field for collecting 
societies in Europe, ii) the codification of certain licensing-related rights for 
copyright holders and iii) the model of multi-territorial licensing for online 
music  rights.  Even  though  this  proposal  embodies  rules  for  all  works 
whose rights are managed on a collective basis, the Task Force participants 
focused mostly on their impact in the music sector.  
Panellists  and  discussants  unanimously  agreed on  the  necessity  to 
create a common level playing field for collecting societies in Europe in 
order to let such entities compete on a fair and equal basis. The codification 
of the main principle that authors and other rights-holders should be free 
to assign their rights to a collecting society of their choice, irrespective of 
the country of residence or domicile of the rights-holder and of the country 
of establishment of the collecting society, was also very well received. More 
controversial, however, were a few rules embodied in the section of the 
proposal  for  a  Directive  concerning  the  requirements  that  collecting 
societies  should  meet  in  order  to  be  allowed  to  grant  multi-territorial 
licenses for digital uses of their respective repertoires. 
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2.2.1  A common level playing field for collecting societies in Europe 
The proposal of July 2012 builds upon the principles and (in part) on the 
provisions  previously  embodied  in  the  2005  Recommendation,  through 
which the European Commission identified a set of practices with a view to 
enhancing the degree of efficiency and transparency of collecting societies 
and enabling effective competition among them.19 Such practices concerned 
crucial aspects such as equitable royalty collection and distribution without 
discrimination on the grounds of residence, nationality or category of the 
rights  holder;  increased  collective  rights  managers’  accountability;  fair 
rights  holders’  representation  in  the  collective  rights  managers’  internal 
decision-making; and effective dispute resolution procedures. 
It is worth remembering that the recourse to a soft-law instrument for 
such  a  sensitive  and  delicate  matter  raised  a  strong  conflict  with  the 
European  Parliament,  which  openly  criticised  the  adoption  of  the 
Recommendation without its prior consultation and formal involvement. 
The Parliament claimed that the Commission was seeking a radical change 
of  the  structure  of  copyright  licensing  without  intending  to  pursue  any 
legislative  harmonisation  of  the  disparate  regulatory  frameworks 
concerning  the  governance  and  functioning  of  collective  rights 
management organisations at national level. What was advocated was the 
necessity  of  a  truly  democratic  debate  about  what  the  nature,  type  of 
governance, functions and ultimate objectives of collecting societies should 
have been in the information society.  
Even if the Parliament acknowledged that copyright holders should 
in principle be free to choose a collecting society for the management of 
their rights, it expressed concern about the risks of rights concentration in 
the  hands  of  the  biggest  collecting  societies  that  the  Recommendation 
entailed, to the detriment of local and niche repertoires. In particular, in a 
resolution in 2007 following the release of an official report on the 2005 
Recommendation,  the  Parliament  argued  that  a  fair  and  transparent 
competitive  system  among  national  collecting  societies  could  have  been 
created  through  a  flexible  framework  Directive,  which  could  have 
regulated copyright collective management for cross-border online music 
services.20 Through this proposal to the Commission, the Parliament made 
                                                   
19 See Recommendation of 18 October 2005 (European Commission, 2005b, p. 54). 
20 European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2007 on the Commission Recommendation 
of  18  October  2005  on  Collective  Cross-Border  Management  of  Copyright  and  Related 
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it clear that urging national collecting societies to compete with one another 
without  having  harmonised  their  highly  heterogeneous  legal  status, 
institutional mission and services would not have been fair. This would 
have inevitably endangered the economic sustainability of those societies 
that, according to their national laws, not only try to maximise licensing 
revenues  (acting  as  pure  copyright  holders’  agents),  but  also  pursue 
cultural goals and a certain degree of solidarity among their members.21 
Through  the  proposed  Directive  of  July  2012,  the  European 
Commission  eventually  acknowledged  that  a  common  playing  field  for 
collective  management  should  have  been  created  though  a  proper 
legislative  measure.  This  measure  aims  at  harmonising  national  rules 
concerning  membership  and  organisation  of  collecting  societies, 
management  of  rights  revenue,  management  of  rights  on  behalf  of 
collecting  societies,  relations  with  users  and  transparency  and  reporting 
obligations.22 
The  Task  Force  participants  widely  agreed  that,  if  European 
collecting societies and other licensing bodies are expected to compete with 
one another on reasonably fair grounds, they should enjoy a uniform legal 
treatment and be subject to similar administrative duties and burdens (e.g. 
the pursuit of solidarity or cultural goals), which can greatly influence their 
profitability.23 
In the impact assessment that accompanies the text of the proposed 
Directive,  the  European  Commission  (2012b)  emphasised  that  collective 
rights management needs to evolve in order to become efficient, accurate 
and transparent for rights-holders and users.24 In proposing this articulated 
                                                                                                                                 
Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, OJ 2007/C 301 E/02, 13 December 2007, pp. 64-
67. See also European Parliament Resolution of 25 September 2008 on Collective Cross-
Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, 
OJ 2010/C 8 E/19, 14 January 2010. 
21 See Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (2009), Collecting Societies and 
Cultural Diversity in the Music Sector, report for the European Parliament, pp. 17-18 (www.uni-
muenster.de/Jura.itm/hoeren/veroeffentlichungen/hoeren_veroeffentlichungen/Collecting_Societies_
and_Cultural_Diversity_in_the_Music_Sector.pdf).  
22 See Title II of the Proposal on Collective Management (European Commission, 2012a). 
23 See Guibault & Van Gompel (2006, pp. 138–140). 
24  See  European Commission (2012b),  Impact Assessment Accompanying  the  Document 
Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing of Rights in 
Musical  Works  for  Online  Uses  in  the  Internal  Market,  Commission  Staff  Working 
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set of rules for collecting societies, the Commission was clearly concerned 
that the inefficiency and the lack of accountability of certain societies in the 
management  of  rights  revenue  collected  on  behalf  of  copyright  holders 
would have had a negative impact on the exploitation of those rights in the 
Internal Market.  
On  the  merits  of  the  proposed  Directive,  several  Task  Force 
participants  expressed  concerns  for  the  decision  of  the  Commission  to 
largely  ignore  the  distinction  between  original  and  subsequent  rights-
holders, in line with the approach of the 2005 Recommendation (European 
Commission, 2005b). The legislative proposal does not embody a specific 
principle of non-discrimination concerning categories of rights-holders, as 
the  2005  Recommendation  did.  The  Commission’s  proposal  merely 
provides  that  the  representation  of  different  categories  of  members  of 
collecting  societies  in  their  decision-making  process  should  be  fair  and 
balanced.25  However,  as  claimed  in  particular  by  songwriters  and 
composers, fairness and balance are somehow neglected in the provision 
obliging member states to take the economic value of rights into account as 
an  objective  criterion  for  the  exercise  of  voting  rights  in  the  general 
meetings of collecting societies.26 In doing so, the legislative proposal does 
not  seem  to  take  into  consideration  that  collecting  societies  have 
traditionally acted as entities protecting the parties with weaker bargaining 
power and have been largely based on associations of individual rights-
holders, bound by a principle of solidarity among them. Authors claimed 
that  a  representation  criterion  based  mostly  on  the  economic  values  of 
repertoires  eventually  threatens  cultural  diversity,  granting  little  or  no 
power to the owners of commercially less successful or smaller repertoires.  
2.2.2  Freedom of copyright holders to assign their rights to a 
collecting society of their choice  
The  Recommendation  of  2005  also  urged  EU  member  states  to  grant 
copyright holders the right to assign the management of online rights, on a 
territorial  scope  of  their  choice,  to  a  collecting  society  of  their  choice, 
                                                                                                                                 
Document,  SWD(2012)  204  final,  11  July  2012  (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2012:0204:FIN:EN:PDF).  
25 See Proposal on Collective Management, Art. 6.3 (European Commission, 2012a). 
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irrespective of nationality and residence.27 To this end, member states were 
invited to screen their national legislation in order to prohibit all territorial 
restrictions  created  by  reciprocal  representation  agreements  and 
membership contracts that ultimately restricted each collecting society from 
managing  online  rights  for  the  whole  territory  of  the  European  Union, 
regardless of the residence of the authors and regardless of the economic 
location of the commercial users. Moreover, the recommendation made it 
clear that rights holders should have enjoyed the right to withdraw any of 
their online rights from their current collecting society and to transfer such 
rights to another collective rights management entity of their choice.28 
The  set  of  copyright  holders’  rights  identified  in  the  2005 
Recommendation  is  now  codified  and  expanded  under  Article  5  of  the 
Directive proposal, which refers to all categories of rights, not only to the 
(still legally undefined) category of online rights. The proposed Directive 
specifies that rights-holders’ freedom of choice in their relationship with 
collecting  societies  should  concern  both  the  management  of  rights, 
categories of rights or types of titles and/or repertoires of their choice and 
the subject matter of the related mandates. Moreover, withdrawal from a 
collecting society should be allowed after a notice period not exceeding six 
months. 
Generally speaking, Task Force participants agreed on the necessity 
to  codify,  clarify  and  harmonise  at  EU  level  the  rights  and  freedom  of 
copyright  holders  with  regard  to  collective  management  of  their  works. 
However,  representatives  of  collecting  societies  identified  possibly 
controversial  issues  with  regard  to  the  preservation  of  the  principle  of 
exclusivity  in  the  assignment  of  rights.  Authors  pointed  out  that  the 
possibility of direct licensing without withdrawal of mandates by rights-
holders in the (unlikely) event that a collecting society does not grant multi-
territorial licenses29 contradicts the principle of exclusivity. Songwriters and 
composers also advocated the preservation of this principle arguing that 
exclusivity  guarantees  certainty  and  equal  treatment  of  repertoires, 
ensuring transparency for rights-holders.  
It seems evident that the expansion of the rights-holders’ freedom to 
withdraw  any  categories  of  rights,  including  offline  rights,  constitutes  a 
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28 Ibid. 
29 See Proposal on Collective Management, Art. 30 (European Commission, 2012a). COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 39 
challenge to the exclusivity principle, in so far as the Directive would allow 
copyright  holders  to  split  the  management  of  their  rights  and  to  assign 
different  categories  of  rights  to  distinct  societies.  This  solution  clearly 
contradicts  exclusivity  of  mandates,  facilitates  fragmentation  of  rights 
management and makes the activities of collecting societies more difficult 
and burdensome, endangering the efficiencies stemming from their natural 
monopolies.  
2.2.3  Requirements for the grant of multi-territorial or pan-
European licenses 
As briefly recalled above, collecting societies have traditionally managed 
the rights in their musical repertoires and in the (global) repertoires of their 
sister societies just in their own countries of establishment. This means that 
multi-territorial  licenses  have  traditionally  fallen  outside  the  business  of 
collecting  societies.  Such  a  licensing  structure  has  inevitably  caused 
fragmentation  in  the  EU, since  –  at  least  until  the  adoption  of  the  2005 
Recommendation  –  whoever  wished  to  exploit  copyrighted  music  on  a 
pan-European  basis  was  forced  to  ask  for  and  negotiate  one  license  for 
every  country  of  operation,  gaining  access  to  multiple  repertoires  on  a 
national basis.  
The  Recommendation  of  2005  was  based  on  the  assumption  that 
collecting societies did not need to compete with each other on the grounds 
of  their  management  services.  As  a  result,  societies  were  not  given 
sufficient incentive to modernise their business and to take advantage of 
digital technologies in order to gain the ability to process large amounts of 
data  and  to  provide  more  flexible  and  more  nuanced  solutions  for  the 
licensing of new digital services and for the calculation of the respective 
tariffs. 
Seven years after the adoption of the recommendation, after having 
had the opportunity to observe a considerable transformation in the market 
for services of online music rights management, the Commission sought to 
establish the requirements that collecting societies should respect in order 
to be able to issue multi-territorial or pan-European licences.30 This set of 
conditions has been, rather effectively, mentioned as a ‘European Licensing 
Passport’. 
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The Passport aims at certifying:  
  Whether  or  not  a  given  society  has  the  capability  of  processing 
efficiently and transparently the data needed for the exploitation of 
such licenses, e.g. identification of music repertoire, by using a time-
sensitive, authoritative database containing the necessary data;31 
  Whether  or  not  a  society  ensures  transparency  with  regard  to  the 
online music repertoire, and/or represents and offers rights-holders 
and other societies the possibility to correct the relevant data and to 
confirm their accuracy;32 and 
  Whether or not a given society has the ability to monitor the actual 
usage  of  the  works  covered  by  the  licenses,  being  capable  of 
processing usage reports and invoicing,33 paying rights-holders and 
other  collecting  societies  without  delay  and  providing  them  with 
information on works used and financial data related to their rights, 
such as amounts collected and deductions made.34 
This new system is based on the principle that collecting societies that 
do  not  hold  a  passport  cannot  promote  and  directly  licence  their  own 
repertoires on a multi-territorial basis. Considering this severe restriction, 
the  proposed  Directive  embodies  safeguards  seeking  to  ensure  that  the 
repertoire of all societies can have access to multi-territorial licensing.  
The  legislative  proposal  provides  that  a  collecting  society  may 
request  another  society  granting  multi-repertoire  licences  to  have  its 
repertoire represented on a non-discriminatory and non-exclusive basis for 
the purpose of multi-territorial licensing.35 Under this regime – known as a 
‘tag-on’  regime  –  the  requested  society  may  not  refuse  if  it  is  already 
representing  (or  if  it  offers  to  represent)  the  repertoire  of  one  or  more 
collecting  societies  for  the  same  purpose.36  It  is  also  provided  that, 
following a transitional period, copyright holders may grant licences (either 
directly  or  through  another  intermediary)  for  their  own  online  rights  if 
their collecting society does not grant multi-territorial licences and if it does 
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35 Ibid., Art. 28. 
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not  enter  into  one  of  the  agreements mentioned  above.37  The  legislative 
proposal  also  specifies  that  a  society  is  allowed  to  outsource  services 
related  to  the  multi-territorial  licences  it  grants,  without  prejudice  to  its 
liability towards rights-holders, online service providers or other collecting 
societies.38 
EU  policy-makers  and  representatives  of  authors  and  of  music 
publishers agreed on the fact that this part of the proposed Directive, as a 
whole, seeks to improve the functioning of collecting societies, giving them 
the right incentives to invest in the development of technical infrastructure 
and to make an effort to become more business-oriented by customising 
their licensing schemes. In this regard, the proposal places emphasis on the 
need  to  ensure  flexibility  and  to  facilitate  the  granting  of  customised 
licences by providing that collecting societies are allowed to grant licences 
to  innovative  online  services,  (i.e.  those  that  have  been  available  to  the 
public  for  less  than  3  years,  without  being  required  to  use  them  as  a 
precedent for the purposes of determining the terms of other licences.39 
The  Passport  system  and  the  related  ‘tag-on’  regime  undoubtedly 
constitute  the  most  relevant  additions  to  the  picture  of  rules  regarding 
multi-territorial  licensing  that  the  2005  Recommendation  encouraged.  In 
particular, the introduction of the tag-on regime should clearly be seen as a 
correction of new licensing rules for online music rights that did not work 
as  effectively  and  impartially  for  all  rights-holders  as  the  Commission 
would have expected after the adoption of its 2005 Recommendation. What 
was (and still is) at stake under this new regime is the equal treatment of 
music repertoires and the protection and valorisation of the repertoires of 
small- and medium-sized societies. Through this addition, the Commission 
evidently sought to re-balance a set of new rules and licensing practices 
that evidently favoured the largest collecting societies in Europe and the 
major  music  publishers,  placing  them  in  a  position  to  set  up  their  joint 
ventures and licensing vehicles with a view to providing pan-EU licences 
(at least for the mechanical rights in the Anglo-American repertoires).  
Music authors claimed that, under the new regime, the inclusion of 
the  repertoires  of  small  and  medium-sized  societies  in  the  scope  of  the 
multi-territorial  licenses  issued  by  bigger,  wealthier  and  technologically 
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better equipped societies should be guaranteed. Authors’ representatives 
claimed that multi-territorial licenses granted to users by requested society 
A should effectively include the repertoire of mandating society B. At the 
same time, the repertoire of society B should be licensed under the same 
conditions applied to the repertoire of society A. Authors claimed that, for 
the tag-on regime to be fair, society A should also obtain the consent from 
society B before excluding any repertoires from the scope of its licenses 
with  users.  This  aspect  is  very  relevant  according  to  authors  since  non-
compliance  with  the  passport  requirements  restricts  a  collecting  society 
from licensing its own repertoire on a multi-territorial  basis and obliges 
such a society to accept the licensing conditions set out by the mandated 
society. Representatives of collecting societies also stressed that it would be 
unreasonable  to  end  up  depriving  small  and  medium-sized  collecting 
societies (taking advantage of the tag-on regime for pan-European uses) of 
the  possibility  of  regional  licensing  when  their  infrastructure  and 
administrative capabilities allow them to do so. This permission might be 
seen  as  an  important  incentive  for  small  and  medium-sized  societies  to 
invest in the development of their infrastructure and services. 
The heavy consequences under the new system if a society does not 
hold  a  passport  inevitably  raised  the  issue  of  how  compliance  with  the 
passport requirements should be verified and  what type of authority or 
institution should perform this supervisory task. The proposed Directive 
makes a rather vague reference to ‘competent authorities’ of member states 
without clarifying whether or not the Directive intends to oblige member 
states to establish a system of supervisory authorities and of authorisations 
enabling collecting societies to operate, as has already happened in a few 
member  states  like  Germany.  Should  these  competent  authorities  be 
institutions  like  a  member  state  ministry?  Original  rights-holders  like 
composers and songwriters emphasised that activities such as the granting 
of the passport and the checks concerning whether or not a given passport 
society continues to comply with the passport requirements should ideally 
be assigned to a European organisation or agency.  
It would be wise to amend the proposed Directive on this aspect and 
to  centralise  this  function,  since  the  scrutiny  of  a  European  institution 
would  ensure  a  uniform  enforcement  of  the  passport  requirements. 
Moreover,  the  centralisation  of  the  process  of  granting  passports  and 
exercising supervisory powers over collecting societies would also avoid 
the problem of how to make the authorisation systems that exist in a few 
member  states  compatible  with  the  cross-border  reach  of  licenses. 
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of  collecting  societies  are  made  subject  to  authorisation  granted  by  a 
supervisory  institution,  the  authorisation  obtained  in  the  country  of 
establishment  by  a  given  society  would  have  no  extra-territorial  effects. 
Such  situation  would  create  a  regulatory  vacuum  for  the  activities 
performed by that society in other EU member states.40  
2.3  The expected impact of the proposed Directive’s rules in the 
music sector  
With the (likely) adoption of the new Directive, collecting societies will no 
longer be allowed to accomplish their tasks unless they modernise their 
business quickly and gain the ability to respond promptly to requests of 
customised licenses coming from providers of  new content offerings for 
consumers. The rules of the proposed Directive concerning the governance, 
membership and organisation of collecting societies, management of rights 
revenue, relations with users and transparency and reporting obligations 
will certainly have a positive impact on the functioning of these entities. 
Thus, from a purely service-related perspective, there will be considerable 
improvements.  
Still, as evidenced also in the debate among Task Force participants, 
there are several aspects of the proposal that are not fully convincing and 
might give rise to uncertainties and practical problems in the near future. 
This  section  identifies  unclear  aspects  of  the  proposed  Directive 
(section 2.3.1) and seeks to shed light on the model for online music rights 
management,  which  the  adoption  of  the  Directive  would  foster  (section 
2.3.2). 
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2.3.1  Unclear aspects of the proposal 
It is not entirely clear why the European Commission decided to insert a 
section on multi-territorial licensing of online music rights in a general and 
broad  legislative  measure  trying  to  harmonise  the  disparate  legislative 
frameworks under which national collecting societies have operated so far. 
Harmonising the general rules on collective management might have taken 
priority over the codification of specific rules (at least the ones taken from 
the  Recommendation  of  October  2005)  that  had  evidenced  problems  in 
their  implementation  and  did  not  simplify  the  licensing  business  of 
copyright holders and did not produce any benefits for commercial users of 
digital music. 
The proposed Directive also fails to take the traditional composition 
of  collecting  societies  into  account.  In  particular,  the  proposal  does  not 
consider carefully that, in the vast majority of member states, these societies 
have been largely based on associations and ‘unions’ of authors, i.e. the 
original rights-holders, helping to solve conflicts of interest arising between 
original rights-holders and music publishers, who become rights-holders 
on the grounds of assignment of rights. The fact that national law should 
oblige collecting societies to take the economic value of rights into account 
as an objective criterion for the exercise of voting rights in their general 
meetings  is  a  direct  challenge  to  the  preservation  of  the  principle  of 
solidarity  among  rights-holders  and  strongly  affects  the  representation 
power of original rights-holders, especially those owning small or niche 
repertoires.41  The  general  meetings  take  resolutions  on  the  distribution 
policy  for  the  amounts  due  to  rights-holders,  including  the  revenues 
coming from statutory remuneration rights, such as those associated with 
the exception of private copying. The proposed Directive does not consider 
that in several member states that have implemented the private copying 
exception, national laws reserve the administration of the revenue coming 
from levies to collecting societies with a view to protecting the economic 
interests of authors vis-à-vis those of publishers. The fact that, under the 
proposal, decisions on the allocation of private copying revenue will also 
be  taken  on  grounds  of  the  commercial  value  of  rights  might  easily 
frustrate the ultimate purpose of statutory remuneration, i.e. subsidising 
creativity, placing large music publishers in a more advantageous position.  
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It is not clear whether or not the rules concerning the governance, 
membership, organisation, relations with users, duties of transparency and 
reporting  that  each  member  state  will  have  to  establish  for  collecting 
societies will also apply to the licensing vehicles that large music publishers 
set up after the adoption of the 2005 Recommendation in cooperation with 
the biggest collecting societies in Europe. In its impact assessment of the 
proposed  Directive,  the  European  Commission  (2012b)  considered  these 
corporate  sub-entities  created  by  major  music  publishers  and  a  few 
collecting societies (e.g. CELAS, DEAL, etc.) as licensing agents of rights-
holders and not as collecting societies. The proposal seems to uphold that 
conclusion, stating that entities owned, in whole or in part, by collecting 
societies that offer and grant multi-territorial licenses for online rights in 
musical  works  should  be  subject  to  just  a  limited  number  of provisions 
embodied mostly in Title III of the proposal (Multi-territorial licensing).42 If 
that were true, collecting societies wishing to circumvent the application of 
the rules of the future Directive for any of their licensing activities would 
merely need to entrust rights (and repertoires) to corporate sub-structures 
that  they  might  set  up  with  other  collecting  societies  or  single  rights-
holders.  This  lack  of  clarity  is  a  direct  consequence  of  a  definition  of 
‘collecting society’ that, on the one hand, presupposes the assignment or 
licensing of rights by a plurality of rights-holders and a form of ownership 
or control by its members and, on the other hand, does not require that 
collective  management  organisations  should  act  as  trustees  of  copyright 
holders.43 
With specific regard to the provisions on multi-territorial licensing of 
online music rights, it is very difficult to predict how the current situation 
would evolve with the entry into force of the new Directive and whether 
there would be any significant changes in the new licensing models of the 
online music sector. 
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2.3.2  Model of online rights management: One-stop shops for 
multiple repertoires 
It is unfortunate that the proposed Directive largely relies on the approach 
of the 2005 Recommendation without touching upon the factors and the 
intrinsic limits that affected the implementation of such recommendation. 
As anticipated above, this non-legislative instrument did not produce any 
benefits for commercial users of digital music since it increased, instead of 
lowering, the number of licenses that an online music provider needs in 
order to launch a pan-European service.  
The  main  idea  of  letting  rights-holders  in  musical  compositions 
concentrate  their  online  rights  in  the  hands  of  a  single  pan-European 
licensor for multi-territorial licensing did not work (and could not work, 
from the beginning) because of different contract rules and distinct types of 
assignments  between  authors,  publishers  and  collecting  societies  at 
national level.  
When the 2005 Recommendation was drafted, the Commission did 
not  take  into  careful  consideration  that  copyright  contract  laws  and  the 
agreements regarding the assignments of rights varied significantly from 
country to country and led to distinct relationships between authors and 
music  publishers  and,  as  a  result,  to  distinct  ownership  regimes.  In 
particular, the fact that continental-European collecting societies followed a 
union  model  in protecting  authors  from the  bargaining power  of  music 
publishers and in ensuring that authors eventually kept (or at least share on 
an equal basis) the copyright in their works was largely ignored.  
Considering  that  online  rights  (i.e.  mechanical  plus  public 
performance  rights)  were  difficult  (or  impossible)  to  transfer,  the  major 
effect  of  the  2005  Recommendation  was  that  of  placing  major  music 
publishers  in  a  position  to  withdraw  just  the  mechanical  rights  in  their 
Anglo-American repertoires in order to  confer such rights to the above-
mentioned  new  customised  licensors  for  purposes  of  pan-European 
licensing.  This  could  happen  since  –  just  for  the  Anglo-American 
repertoires, in light of a different contractual practice – music publishers 
are  the  sole  proprietors  of  the  mechanical  rights  and  they  could  let  the 
mandates  to  national  collecting  societies  concerning  these  categories  of 
rights and repertoires expire. This means that the largest music publishers 
were the only ones taking advantage of the 2005 Recommendation in order 
to  distance  themselves  from  certain  (supposedly  inefficient,  non-
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mechanical  rights  and  to  create  specialised  licensing  agencies  for  pan-
European administration of these rights in their own music repertoires. 
Still,  such  licensing  vehicles  have  not  been  able  to  license  full 
packages of rights for online exploitation since public performance rights – 
for  all  music  repertoires  –  are  still  owned  or  co-owned  by  authors  and 
managed by their respective collecting societies. In Germany, for instance, 
this situation has led to a Court of Appeal judgment where the licensing of 
mechanical rights in the EMI musical repertoire by CELAS (a joint venture 
created by EMI, PRS and GEMA) was deemed to be illegal under German 
law since it gave rise to an incomplete or insufficient authorisation that did 
not  enable  any  economically  autonomous  digital  use  of  the  EMI  music 
repertoire.44  
In response to the centralisation of the licensing of mechanical rights 
in the Anglo-American repertoires of major music publishers (which are no 
longer administered by local societies for online exploitation), small- and 
medium-sized societies established regional hubs (e.g. SACEM, SGAE and 
SIAE  through  the  ‘Armonia’  initiative  in  southern  Europe;  the 
Scandinavian  and  Baltic  societies  did  the  same  through  the  Nordisk 
Copyright Bureau) in order to license joint musical repertoires on a pan-
European basis.45  
By focusing merely on the multi-territorial scope of licensing and on 
the  technical  and  management-related  requirements  that  each  ‘Passport’ 
society should meet, the proposed Directive does not touch upon nor does 
it  try  to  solve  any  of  the  above-mentioned  legal  problems.  Nor  does  it 
clarify  what  licensing  models  should  collecting  societies  and/or  the 
licensing  agents  of  copyright  holders  preferably  embrace  in  order  to 
provide  a  smooth  and  efficient  licensing  of  music  rights  for  online 
exploitation.  
The  fact  that  online  rights  cannot  be  easily  withdrawn  and/or 
transferred smoothly from one pan-European licensor to another is strictly 
linked to distinct and complex ownership regimes that could be made more 
uniform  (for  future  works)  only  through  harmonisation  of  copyright 
contract laws and a simplified definition of ‘online rights’. Online rights 
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constitute  a  non-codified  category  that  is  actually  a  combination  of 
mechanical  and  public  performance  rights.  The  exclusive  rights  of 
reproduction  and  public  performance  traditionally  refer  to  completely 
different modes of commercial exploitation in the offline world and, as a 
result, can easily prove to be owned by (or assigned to) different entities 
and/or  rights-holders,  with  potential  blocking  effects  on  licensing 
agreements. A codification and unification of online rights, to make their 
transfer and management smoother and faster, would certainly require a 
different understanding of the existing right of making content available to 
the  public  or  a  reform  of the  list  of  exclusive  rights  under  the  2001  EU 
Copyright  Directive.  None  of  these  objectives  can  be  achieved  with  a 
narrow legislative intervention such as that of the proposed Directive on 
Multi-Territorial Licensing.  
A  significant  change  or  improvement  of  the  actual  situation  of 
uncertainty and fragmentation of online music rights could stem from the 
implementation of the Passport requirements and of the complementary 
tag-on regime. Considering that the technical capacity required under the 
proposal for the Passport to be granted is remarkably high, it is likely that 
(at least in the early stage of the implementation of the Directive) just a very 
few  and  large  collecting  societies,  who  have  already  invested  in  the 
development of sophisticated rights management information technologies, 
will be able to gain the Passport and be allowed to issue multi-territorial 
licences.  The  tag-on  regime  will  make  it  possible  for  the  less  developed 
societies (not holding a passport) to ask an authorised society to include 
their repertoires in the multi-territorial licences that the requested society 
will offer and grant for its own repertoire. Considering that the proposed 
Directive  embodies  a  principle  of  non-discrimination  between  distinct 
repertoires and rights-holders in case of management of rights on behalf of 
other collecting societies, the requested Passport society under the tag-on 
regime will have to behave as a manager of a “neutral” rights hub through 
which  users  of  digital music  will  gain  access  to  all  gathered  repertoires 
under the same contractual conditions.46 
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If this situation concretely materialised, these licensing hubs would 
look like, in terms of shape and function, the regional hubs that have been 
established in various areas of Europe. The licensing hubs stemming from 
the enforcement of tag-on obligations would also make the services of the 
specialised  licensing  vehicles  created  by  major  music  publishers  less 
attractive and less convenient for commercial users. As we have seen, these 
vehicles would still need to pre-acquire the necessary public performance 
rights from local collecting societies in order to offer full packages of rights, 
thereby raising both transaction and monetary costs. In this respect, the 
main question is whether and how the largest European collecting societies, 
which have already established corporate sub-structures for the licensing of 
online uses of the repertoires of major music publishers, will react to the 
(likely)  entry  into  force  of  the  new  Directive.  These  societies  (i.e.  PRS, 
GEMA,  SGAE,  etc)  might  actually  turn  out  to  be  the  Passport  societies 
receiving requests of rights management under the tag-on regime, having 
to license small and niche repertoires that, commercially speaking, would 
not be of any interest to them.  
If  the  creation  of  a  few  licensing  hubs  managing  full  packages  of 
online rights was the outcome of the proposed Directive, the tag-on regime 
would  have  achieved  its  main  purposes:  i)  facilitating  aggregation  of 
repertoires,  ii)  protecting  the  repertoires  of  small-  and  medium-sized 
societies for the sake of cultural diversity and iii) making the acquisition of 
online  rights  for  multiple  repertoires  on  a  multi-territorial  basis  for 
commercial users easier and smoother.  
If  the  above-mentioned  forecast  was  correct,  collecting  societies 
would be expected to compete with the each other on the grounds of their 
management services and technical capacity, and not on the grounds of 
their distinct repertoires. It is worth recalling that the adoption of the 2005 
Recommendation seemed to trigger an unprecedented (at least in Europe) 
competition  between  distinct  music  repertoires,  which  followed  the 
(incomplete) withdrawal of online rights from local collecting societies by 
major  music  publishers  and  the  creation  of  mono-repertoire  licensing 
vehicles for these rights such as CELAS, PAECOL, PEDL, PEL, DEAL, etc.47 
The  Commission  proposal,  instead,  seems  to  reject  (or  at  least  not  to 
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encourage)  this  new  form  of  competition  by  facilitating  repertoire 
aggregation through the tag-on regime and by embracing the principles of 
non-discrimination  of  repertoires  (when  a  collecting  society  happens  to 
manage the repertoires of other collecting societies)48 and non-exclusivity of 
the  representation  agreements  for  multi-territorial  licensing  of  online 
rights.49 
The rules and principles embodied in the proposed Directive suggest 
that the future system of online music rights management in the EU could 
be  based  on  a  few  rights  management  hubs  created  by  the  Passport 
societies.  These  hubs  would  be  in  a  position  to  license  full  packages  of 
rights (i.e. the mechanical and public performance rights of both authors 
and  music  publishers)  to  commercial  users  wishing  to  exploit  different 
music repertoires on a pan-European or multi-territorial basis. Under this 
system all collecting societies would be free to entrust their online rights to 
any passport societies on a non-exclusive basis, so that the same repertoires 
might end up being available in the portfolio of rights of more than one 
pan-European hub. The new licensing system would also enable collecting 
societies  to  widely  rely  on  their  mutual  representation  agreements 
(especially after the annulment of the 2008 CISAC decision, in its section on 
concerted practices) in order to be entitled to authorise online exploitation 
of  their  respective  repertoires  and  of  extra-European  repertoires  upon 
request of users, irrespective of the user’s economic residence. These hubs 
would  ultimately  function  as  centralised  one-stop  shops  for  multiple 
repertoires.  This  means  that  providers  of  pan-European  online  music 
services would need to seek, negotiate and obtain a number of licences that 
will be much lower than the number of licences required today.  
In  conclusion,  the  system  that  has  been  described  would  play  the 
same function that other types of one-stop shops have played (or should 
have  played)  for  the  acquisition  of  rights  for  online  exploitation.  An 
example in this respect is IFPI’s “Simulcasting Agreement”, which enables 
users  established  in  the  territory  of  the  EEA  to  approach  any  collective 
management society of record producers (established in the EEA territory) 
to negotiate and obtain a multi-territorial and multi-repertoire licence for 
acts of simulcasting (i.e. the simultaneous Internet transmission of sound 
recordings  included  in  broadcasts  of  radio  and/or  TV  signals). Another 
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example  of  the  same  kind  was  given  by  the  structure  of  the  Santiago 
(online public performance) and Barcelona (digital reproduction) standard 
agreements,  that  collecting  societies  concluded  under  the  shield  of  their 
international  umbrella  associations  (CISAC  and  BIEM,  respectively)  in 
order to enable commercial users to obtain a license for online exploitation 
(e.g. webcasting, streaming and online music on demand) of the worldwide 
music repertoire from their national collecting society.50 The only difference 
that  would  exist  between  these  precedents  and  the  multi-repertoire 
licensing hubs that might stem from the implementation of the Passport 
and tag-on regime is the non-identity of repertoires that each pan-European 
rights  hub  might  have  in  its  portfolio,  depending  on  the  scope  of  the 
representation agreements that each society will have concluded.  
2.4  Multi-territorial licensing in the film sector 
The Task Force participants also discussed the issue of multi-territorial (or 
EU-wide) licensing of audio-visual works in a framework, namely the film 
sector, where content exploitation - instead - seems to be firmly entrenched 
within national borders. Participants heard diverging views about why, in 
spite  of  the  theoretically  easier  licensing  for  movies  –  whose  rights  are 
concentrated  in  the  hands  of  film  producers  –  online  movies  are  not 
legitimately made available to consumers in several EU jurisdictions in the 
same way, and in the same proportion, as online music is. It was widely 
acknowledged  that  a  better  and  wider  availability  of  legitimate  audio-
visual content online would help reduce digital piracy to a more tolerable 
level. Still, stakeholders explained the more limited development of online 
film services in different ways. 
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2.4.1  Online content exploitation in the film sector 
The  debate  among  stakeholders  and  policy-makers  focused  on  the 
supposedly inverse relationship that exists between availability of lawful 
offerings  of  online  movies  and  large-scale  copyright  infringements. 
Available data show that online services offering film content are much less 
developed  than  online  music  services.51  In  this  regard,  major  film 
producers acknowledged that online markets are still a small fraction of the 
whole picture for them in Europe. However, copyright and the acquisition 
of online rights do not seem to be the only factors hindering access to films 
by  content  providers  and,  eventually,  by  consumers.  The  discussion 
revealed the existence of access barriers such as deliberate non-availability 
of content due to ‘windows’, through which films are progressively made 
available commercially, and policy and regulatory barriers at national level.  
Both film producers and providers of online film services emphasised 
that traditional windows (i.e. exploitation through DVDs, pay TV, free-to-
air TV) in the release of movies are currently shrinking: for instance, the 
six-month  window  between  cinema  and  DVD  releases  have  recently 
become a four-month window. Digital retail is not so well developed yet, 
but video on-demand is growing rapidly in the EU and such growth is 
based  on  increasingly  higher  consumer  expectations  in  terms  of  quick 
availability  of  content  online  after  release  in  cinemas,  whose  physical 
appeal does not seem to decline because of the uniqueness of the theatrical 
experience of a movie. Windows regarding the home entertainment sector 
are moving online: the first DVD window has moved online as rental or 
pay per view, in the same way as the pay TV ones, which have become 
video-on-demand  services  made  available  through  subscription  models. 
Also free-to-air TV transmissions of movies are partially moving online, 
where they are funded through advertising revenues. 
From the perspective of major film producers, windows have been 
inherently related to the process of funding movie productions and making 
them profitable in order to continue to produce content. Film producers 
claim  that  a  large  part  of  their  job  is  to  clear  rights  and  undertake  the 
                                                   
51  In  2011,  global  revenues  coming  from  digital  sales  accounted  for  32%  of  the  music 
industry’s total sales and for just 1% of film industry sales (see IFPI, 2012). Even though the 
MAVISE  database  on  TV  and  on-demand  audio-visual  services  and  companies  whose 
offerings  are  available  in  Europe  (http://mavise.obs.coe.int)  lists  541  service  providers 
specialised in VoD for films, an online service playing the same role as Netflix for the US is 
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principal risk for movie production. A producer has to raise funds (i.e. own 
funds, private equity, hedge funds, tax incentives, product placement, pre-
sale of rights often on territorial bases); organise locations, insurance and 
effects;  hire  authors,  actors  and  many  others;  and  obtain  necessary 
clearances,  rights  and  licenses.  The  producer  may  assign  copyright  to  a 
distributor  or  license  it  to  a  number  of  companies  (e.g.  by  territory, 
language,  category  of  rights).  The  main  purpose  of  these  contractual 
arrangements, which include the creation of windowed releases, is that of 
positioning a film in the best competitive position in order to cover costs, to 
secure return on investment and make profits in order to create new works. 
Major film producers license content on a national basis and on a linguistic 
basis on multi-territorial grounds, but rarely do they release content on a 
pan-EU basis. These producers claim that contractual freedom allows them 
to exploit their works in a complicated and fast-changing environment and 
to ultimately decide whether and how their content should be licensed and 
made available in a certain region or country of Europe.  
Obviously, the  fact  that  there  is  no  major  European  film producer 
raises problems in terms of equal availability of film content produced by 
national medium- and small-sized producers of movies, whose creations 
are  often  subsidised  by  member  states,  under  their  cultural  policy 
programmes  and  by  the  European  Commission  through  the  so-called 
‘MEDIA Programme’.52 The different financial resources at the disposal of 
film producers and their completely different bargaining power vis-à-vis 
intermediaries (i.e. local distributors, cinemas, licensees, etc.) are not the 
only  reason  for  such  unequal  distribution  and  availability  of  content. 
Cultural diversity and linguistic specificities also play an important role 
and explain, to a large extent, why European movie productions are much 
less  available  than  US  majors’  movies.  European  film  productions  are 
targeted very often at a specific national audience. Obviously, this makes it 
difficult for these films to be widely appreciated on an international basis. 
See Figure 1. 
                                                   
52 MEDIA (Decision no. 1718/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
November  2006  concerning  the  Implementation  of  a  Programme  of  Support  for  the  European 
Audio-visual Sector, OJ L327/12 – 24 November 2006) is the EU's support programme for the 
European audio-visual industry aiming at: i) enhancing the European audio-visual sector, ii) 
increasing  the  circulation  of  European  audio-visual  works  and  iii)  improving  the 
competitiveness of the sector by facilitating access to funding and fostering the adoption of 
digital  technologies. MEDIA  has  a budget  of  €755 million  over  the  period  2007-13.  For 
further information, see http://europa.eu/culture/media/index_en.htm.  54 | LICENSING IN THE ONLINE MUSIC AND FILM SECTORS 
Film producers stressed that there is a very different dynamic behind the 
film industry in the US than in Europe and this is the consequence of a 
voluntary  market  distortion  that  EU  member  states  and  the  European 
Commission  have  accepted  as  a  matter  of  national  cultural  policy.  In 
Europe, when a film is funded with public money, film production is not 
expected to lead to significant financial gains for the producers since the 
objective of cultural promotion of local productions largely prevails over 
that of making profits.  
Figure 1. Cinema admissions by region of production, year 2009 
 
Note: US films include also works produced in Europe with investment from the US. 
Source:  Author’s  elaboration on  the  European  Commission’s Green  Paper  on Online 
Distribution of Audiovisual Works in the European Union (2011b). 
 
The  main  problem  arising  with  regard  to  publicly  subsidised  film 
productions, in terms of availability and dissemination, is created mostly 
by  administrative  rules  at  national  level  and/or  contractual  provisions 
applicable  to  these  productions  that  end  up  distorting  market-based 
dynamics.53 Very often these administrative or contractual restrictions do 
not easily enable new and window-neutral licensing practices to emerge 
                                                   
53  The  Communication  of  the  European  Commission  on  state  aid  to  the  cinema  sector 
established an appropriate framework allowing member states to grant financial support to 
the  production  and  distribution  of  films  while  maintaining  a  level  playing  field  in  the 
Internal Market. See European Commission (2001). 
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and develop. For instance, as emphasised by a start-up provider of online 
film  services,  in  Sweden  there  was  a  rule  until  recently  under  which 
publicly  subsidised  movies  could  be  made  available  just  for  cinema 
distribution, in a way that neither the film-maker nor the film producer was 
placed  in  a  position  to  decide  what  form  of  distribution  or  commercial 
exploitation that movie should have had.54 If EU policy-makers decide that 
publicly  subsidised  movies,  which  form  part  of  the  national  cultural 
heritage of European nations, should be available online, these models of 
old-fashioned restrictions should be quickly removed from all public film 
systems so that these movies can become freely available on the market. 
This means that public sector institutions such as public broadcasters or 
media companies owned (or directly controlled) by member states should 
not  be  allowed  to  acquire  rights  that  they  would  be  unwilling  or 
commercially unable to license for online exploitation of movies.  
Excessively broad contractual arrangements seem to create problems 
also  for  the  online  availability  of  the  most  commercially  successful  and 
appealing  film  content  in  EU  jurisdictions  where  US-based  film  majors 
have traditionally sold full packages of rights, including online rights, to 
TV and/or cable broadcasters on an exclusive basis. An evident problem of 
availability  arises  whenever  such  exclusive  licensees  do  not  make 
significant online exploitation of their film content or do not sub-licence 
their (territorially exclusive) rights to online content providers wishing to 
develop  new  film  offerings  in  a  given  jurisdiction.  EU  policy-makers 
seemed to be aware of all the above-mentioned restrictions, which prevent 
content  owners  from  adjusting  their  release  policies  to  fast-changing 
market  conditions  and  raise  obstacles  for  current  and  future  content 
providers to make film content widely available online. The factors that led 
to  this  highly  fragmented  picture  and  the  development  of  effective 
solutions for the creation of more advanced digital markets for film content 
will be briefly examined in the next sections.  
                                                   
54 The previous system has been replaced by the 2013 Film Agreement concluded by the 
Swedish State and the Swedish film industry (including, among others, the associations of 
Swedish film and TV producers, film distributors, the Regional Film Funds Network) and 
the Swedish TV broadcasters. The text agreement is available in English on the website of 
the Ministry of Culture (www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/20/16/74/111b3287.pdf).  56 | LICENSING IN THE ONLINE MUSIC AND FILM SECTORS 
2.4.2  Is there any room and demand for pan-European licenses in 
the audio-visual sector?  
At first sight, licensing practices in the film sector might appear incredibly 
disruptive and distortive of the logic of the EU internal market. Still, as 
acknowledged by the Task Force participants, licensing audio-visual works 
on  a  cross-border  (and  possibly  EU-wide)  basis  is  complex  and  such 
complexity does not stem only from copyright-related issues.  
Obviously, the territoriality of copyright, and of the exclusive rights 
the  law  grants  to  copyright  holders,  matters.  In  this  regard,  today’s 
situation  would  have  been  completely  different  if  the  European 
Community had not initially excluded intellectual property rights from the 
areas of law that should have been either harmonised or unified in order to 
create  a  well-functioning  Common  Market.  In  this  respect,  a  few 
commentators  spoke  about  a  political  mistake  that  stemmed  from  a 
misinterpretation of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, whose exclusion of property 
rights from the areas of Europeanisation of laws should not have concerned 
just  real  property,  without  extending  to  the  domain  of  intellectual 
property.55 If intellectual property rights, as it was said, had been made EU-
wide  from  the  beginning,  where  appropriate,  now  the  European  Union 
would  not  be  characterised  by  the  existence  of  many  business  models 
taking advantage of territorial fragmentation and firmly based on country-
by-country content exploitation, with so many vested interests, costs and so 
many positions that policy-makers have to take into consideration.  
Still, the above-mentioned situation does not seem to be irreversible if 
one considers that the markets for creative content (especially in the music 
and film sectors) are increasingly based on access services rather than on 
sales of goods.56 The fact that the area of services constitutes 74% of the 
European  GDP  and  developed  enormously  in  the  last  decades,  with  a 
significant acceleration in the last years triggered by the implementation of 
the  2006  Services  Directive,  should  always  be  borne  in  mind.  Internal 
market legislation has been a tool to foster economic growth in Europe, 
                                                   
55  The  Treaty  of  Rome  (25  March  1957),  Art.  222,  reads:  “This  Treaty  shall  in  no  way 
prejudice  the  rules  in  member  states  governing  the  system  of  property  ownership” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf). 
56 “[In 2011] consumers spent €1.2 billion on audio-visual content through digital/online 
platforms  and  services,  representing  an  increase  of  20.1%  compared  to  2010.  Whereas, 
spending on physical video (DVD/BD) amounted to €8.3 billion, down 7.7% compared to 
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helping to remove an enormous amount of distortions and restrictions and 
subsequently enabling the emergence of unprecedented types of business 
models that neither economists nor policy-makers were able to predict (e.g. 
in 1995 nobody would have been able to predict the emergence and success 
of low-cost airline businesses as a result of liberalisation of this market at 
EU level). An economist who contributed to the discussion emphasised that 
the emergence of new business models can be predicted on condition that 
market structures start becoming obvious and the conduct of entrepreneurs 
is  easier  to  foresee.  Unfortunately,  as  the  Task  Force  participants 
acknowledged, pan-European markets for online film content exploitation 
seem to be far from reaching such a threshold. 
One of the main questions that arose with regard to film and audio-
visual  content  concerned  the  demand  for  pan-European  licenses  by 
commercial users, especially if one considers how high the costs of such 
multi-territorial  licenses  would  be.  Is  anybody asking  film  producers  or 
owners  of  sport  rights  for  pan-European  licenses  at  the  moment?  Is 
anybody willing to pay for them? Film producers and owners of rights in 
sport events acknowledged that they would certainly start granting multi-
territorial  or  pan-European  licenses  for  online  films  and  for  online 
transmissions of sport events if these licenses made commercial sense.  
Content  owners  emphasised  that,  considering  the  centralisation  of 
rights that characterises these types of audio-visual content, copyright is 
not  an  obstacle  for  the  unification  of  markets.  Under  the  current  legal 
framework in Europe film and sport events rights-holders have the ability 
to grant national, multi-national and pan-EU basis licenses. For instance, a 
leading association of owners of rights in football matches stressed that, 
even though a pan-EU offer for such rights exists, there has never been any 
demand  for  it.  The  reason  for the  lack  of  demand  is  linked not  only  to 
commercial or economic factors (i.e. nobody seems to have enough money 
to pay for such licenses) but also to cultural diversity and fragmentation. 
Because  of  cultural  fragmentation,  if  a  content  provider  wants  to  take 
advantage of the Digital Single Market and to supply content on a multi-
territorial basis, it needs to acquire a deep knowledge of each individual 
market, to invest in advertising, to recruit the best marketing people and to 
sell content to local audiences effectively. To make an example: the fact that 
US-based  online  movie  provider  Netflix  launched  its  services  in  Europe 
starting by linguistically homogenous countries such as the UK and Ireland 
is not coincidental. Entering new markets in Europe takes time, also for 
global  and  successful  players.  As  content  owners  summarised,  no 58 | LICENSING IN THE ONLINE MUSIC AND FILM SECTORS 
commercial  user  is  expected  to  launch  content  services  in  Europe  by 
acquiring rights for 27 countries simultaneously. 
Task force participants widely agreed that EU policy-makers wishing 
to foster the development of the EU Digital Single Market should not end 
up  dictating  commercial  strategies  and  decisions  that  only  commercial 
users  of  digital  content  can  fully  estimate  and  undertake.57  The  choice 
about when and where to make audio-visual content available to the public 
should  always  be  left  to  commercial  exploiters,  who  are  ultimately 
responsible for the development of new and economically viable business 
models.58  
Nonetheless,  stakeholders  and  policy-makers  acknowledged  that 
legislative changes under EU law and the increasingly important case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the exercise of 
intellectual property rights in the Internal Market might have a relevant 
impact on licensing schemes in the audio-visual sector. In particular, the 
Task  Force  participants  fully  recognised  the  importance  of  the  principle 
embodied  in  a  judgment  (Premier League)  through  which  the CJEU  held 
that,  even  though  selling  content  rights  on  a strictly  country-by-country 
basis  is  legitimate,  such  a  contract-based  territorial  segmentation  cannot 
enjoy absolute territorial protection in the EU.59 As stressed by EU policy-
makers, the  Premier  League  judgment  might  be  interpreted  as  eventually 
                                                   
57 See Communication from the Commission (2010a), “A Digital Agenda for Europe”, op. 
cit., p. 8, where it points out that easier, more uniform and technologically neutral solutions 
for  cross-border  and  EU-wide  licensing  in  the  audio-visual  sector  should  preserve  the 
contractual freedom of rights-holders (“Right holders would not be obliged to license for all 
European territories, but would remain free to restrict their licenses to certain territories and 
to contractually set the level of licence fees.”).  
58 The power of choice granted by national copyright entitlements in the audio-visual sector 
and its compatibility with EU law was recognised by the European Court of Justice in C-
62/79 SA Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, and others v CinéVog Films 
and others, 18 March 1980, at 881, where the Court stated: “[…] that the provisions of the 
Treaty  relating  to  the  freedom  to  provide  services  do  not  preclude  an  assignee  of  the 
performing right in a cinematographic film in a member state from relying upon his right to 
prohibit the exhibition of that film in that State, without his authority, by means of cable 
diffusion  if  the  film  so  exhibited  is  picked  up  and  transmitted  after  being  broadcast  in 
another member state by a third party with the consent of the original owner of the right” 
thus allowing the exercise of copyright on a national basis with regard to contents that can 
circulate as intangibles. 
59 C-403/08 Football Association Premier League and Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd (C-429/08), Joined cases, 4 October 2011, [hereinafter Premier League].  COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 59 
having  the  effect  of  weakening  the  full  enforceability  of  licensing 
agreements which create territorial restrictions for the licensee of audio-
visual content wishing to provide access to that content on a cross-border 
basis (i.e. outside the territory covered by the license). The case brought 
before the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerned an agreement under 
which  a  Greek  broadcaster,  who  acquired  rights  in  the  transmission  of 
football matches, had undertaken the promise to prevent the public from 
receiving  the  broadcasts  outside  the  area  (i.e.  Greece)  for  which  the 
broadcaster  held  the  license.  In  this  business  sector,  this  is  a  model 
agreement that all broadcasters conclude with the sport content owner in 
order  to  protect  the  territorial  exclusivity  of  all  broadcasters.  In  Premier 
League the case concerned only satellite TV transmissions and did not touch 
upon  the  actual  granting  of  exclusive  licenses  for  the  broadcasting  of 
sporting events and the strictly territorial basis upon which these licenses 
are granted. Rather, the case concerned acts of retail and purchase of cards 
and decoding devices which allowed certain restaurants and bars located in 
the UK to receive satellite channel broadcasts from another member state, 
the  subscription  of  which  was  less  expensive  than  that  of  the  UK 
broadcaster  transmitting  the  Premier  League  football  matches  on  an 
exclusive  basis.  The  judgment  clearly  made  a  distinction  between 
individual use and profit-making uses of satellite broadcasts, arguing that 
the  owners  of  public  houses  made  these  broadcasts  available  to  a  new 
public, attracting more customers and for purposes of financial gain.60 The 
CJEU  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  above-mentioned  agreement  was 
illegal under Art. 101 TFEU insofar as it restricted the supply of decoding 
devices and of TV broadcasting services enabling access to the protected 
content for non-commercial purposes on a cross-border basis. 
2.4.3  How could a digital single area for audio-visual content be 
eventually created? Policy options  
EU  policy-makers  are  fully  aware  of  the  difference  that  exists  between 
Europe and the US in terms of types of online content traffic. In Europe 
(unauthorised) access to online content through peer-to-peer networks is 
still widely predominant, whereas in the US legitimate services, providing 
online content like Netflix, generate much more traffic than in the EU.61 
                                                   
60 See Premier League, paras. 197-207.  
61  According  to  the  Global  Internet  Phenomena  Report  (see  Sandvine  2012,  Global  Internet 
Phenomena  Report  (2H  2012) 
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Europe has a larger population and a bigger GDP than the US but online 
content markets much less developed, which means that content creators 
and producers earn much lower revenues. There is a great potential that 
the EU should take advantage of by simplifying and streamlining licensing, 
in  order  to  have  more  dynamic  markets  for  Europe’s  creative  content. 
Policy-makers and stakeholders unanimously agreed that Europe needs to 
find ways to encourage innovation and creation if it wants to allow more 
digital  innovative  services  to  emerge  and  take  off  in  the  EU.  The  aim 
should not only be that of maximising the potential of this market but also 
increasing  the  export.  Europe’s  linguistic  and  cultural  diversity  is  a 
challenge  but  also  presents  opportunities  that  neither  rights-holders  nor 
devisers of digital services should miss.  
To achieve the above-mentioned objectives in the close future and to 
significantly  reduce  the  gap  that  exists  with  the  US,  the  European 
Commission is actually looking for tools and solutions aimed at facilitating 
the creation of a digital single area where films can be marketed, licensed, 
and lawfully accessed by consumers in new, efficient, convenient, and user-
friendly  ways.  Since  2009  the  Commission  papers  have  shown  an 
increasing awareness of the need to intervene with legislative measures in 
order  to  foster  and  facilitate  pan-European  or  multi-territorial  online 
exploitation,  also  in  the  field  of  on-demand  film  deliveries.62  As 
acknowledged by the Commission, in the long-term a policy solution to be 
considered in order to achieve such result would be that of creating EU-
                                                                                                                                 
(www.sandvine.com/downloads/documents/Phenomena_2H_2012/Sandvine_Global_Internet_Pheno
mena_Report_2H_2012.pdf),  which  focuses  on  internet  traffic  generated  by  the  top  ten 
applications  (including  basic  http  traffic)  per  band  usage,  audio-visual  real-time 
entertainment in the US market accounted for 47.5% of peak-period aggregate traffic (fixed 
access) in the second half of 2012, Netflix being the leader with a traffic share of 28.8%. In 
the same period, BitTorrent was exhibiting a downward trend, being responsible for an 
average of only 10.3% of aggregate traffic. By contrast, audio-visual entertainment in the EU 
accounted  for  28.5% of  peak-period  traffic, mainly  due  to  the  performance  of  YouTube 
(20.1%).  In  particular,  file-sharing  played  a  more  prominent  role  in  Europe,  generating 
18.8% of peak-period traffic. 
62  See  DG INFSO  and  DG  MARKT,  Creative  Content  in  a  European  Digital  Single Market: 
Challenges for the Future (22 October 2009), p. 12 and p. 17 (discussing the possible legislative 
extension of the principle of the country of origin of the transmission principle to the realm 
of  online  film  deliveries)  (http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/col_2009/ 
reflection_paper.pdf) [hereinafter Creative Content].  COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 61 
wide (i.e. unified) copyright titles.63 Unification of EU copyright law would 
have instant EU-wide effect, giving rise to a single market for copyright 
and related rights through. European copyright titles would remove the 
inherent territoriality of national copyright rules, especially if the system 
were  construed  as  prevailing  over  national  titles.64  In  the  short-term, 
instead, what seems a more realistic option is a sector-specific intervention 
that might apply only in the realm of online film deliveries. A policy option 
that the European Commission is considering carefully is the extension of 
the  so-called  ‘country  of  origin’  principle,  incorporated  into  the  Audio-
visual Media Services Directive for the identification of the law applicable 
to  online  transmissions  by  broadcasters,  to  all  web-based  content 
transmissions.65  
According to the Commission, which is in charge of monitoring the 
implementation  of  the  Audio-visual  Media  Services  Directive,  the  said 
legislative choice regarding the application of a single law was somehow 
justified by the fact that broadcasting is generally much more regulated at 
national level than acts of web-based on-demand deliveries. The country of 
origin  principle  is  also  incorporated  under  the  1993  Satellite  and  Cable 
Directive for the creation of a single audio-visual area and the definition of 
the  notion  of  communication  to  the  public  by  satellite  at  a  Community 
                                                   
63 See DG INFSO and DG MARKT (2009), Creative Content, op. cit., p. 18 (discussing the 
consequences of copyright unification through a EU regulation and mentioning also a softer 
approach, according to which EU-wide entitlements might co-exist with national copyright 
titles). 
64 The possible creation of an optional unitary copyright title on the grounds of Article 118 
TFEU, after having examined its potential impact on the single market, rights-holders and 
consumers, was also mentioned in A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights. 
65 See Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 
2010 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative 
Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services (Audio-visual 
Media Services Directive) (codified version), OJ L95/1, (15 April 2010) [hereinafter Directive 
2010/13], replacing (with no substantive changes) Directive 2007/65, Art. 2, (See Directive 
2007/65 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending 
Council  Directive  89/552/EEC  on  the  coordination  of  certain  provisions  laid  down  by  law, 
regulation  or  administrative  action  in  Member  States  concerning  the  pursuit  of  television 
broadcasting activities, OJ L322/27, 18 December 2007 [hereinafter Directive 2007/65]). This 
solution was already considered in the Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual 
Works in the European Union: Opportunities and Challenges Towards a Digital Single Market, 
COM(2011) 427 final (13 July 2011), [hereinafter Green Paper on the Online Distribution of 
Audiovisual Works], pp. 11-14 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0427:FIN:EN:PDF. 62 | LICENSING IN THE ONLINE MUSIC AND FILM SECTORS 
level.66  Both  Directives  apply,  respectively,  this  principle  of  private 
international  law  to  broadcast  transmission  signals  and  to  online 
transmissions of audio-visual content (mainly digital TV services). 
In both the above-mentioned cases, the logic was that of avoiding the 
cumulative application of several national laws to a single EU-wide act of 
commercial exploitation of copyrighted works, by adopting a criterion that 
identifies a single applicable law.67 While adopting a single law approach 
both these Directives took steps to prevent opportunistic location of the 
television service’s business establishment or of the point of departure of 
the transmission in a country with particularly lax copyright norms. First, 
the  single  law  approach  applied  only  to  business  establishments  or 
transmission  points  located  within  the  European  Union.  Second,  the 
Directives  embodied  measures  ensuring  a  sufficient  level  of  substantive 
harmonisation  of  member  state  laws  in  their  respective  fields  of 
application. This means that, despite the application of a single national 
law with EU-wide effects on satellite and online TV services, identical or 
similar conditions for market players in all EU member states preclude a 
race to the bottom.  
An extension of the country of origin principle to online interactive 
(i.e.  on-demand)  content  transmissions  should  certainly  be  pondered 
carefully, taking the differences between online transmissions – on the one 
                                                   
66 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of Certain Rules 
Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and 
Cable Retransmission, OJ L248/15 (6 October 1993), [hereinafter Directive 93/83]. 
67 Even though the logic is the same, these two Directives implement the principle of the law 
of  the  country  of  origin  of  the  transmission  in  different  ways.  Directive  93/83  adopts  a 
country of emission rule, under which satellite broadcasters must clear copyrights just once, 
in  the  EU  member  state  from  which  the  programme-carrying  signal  is  uplinked  to  the 
satellite under the control and responsibility of the broadcaster (rather than in the various 
member  states  where  the  broadcast  is  received  because  of  the  satellite  footprint).  By 
contrast, Directive 2010/13 (which codified the 2007 ‘modernisation’ amendment to the 1989 
Television  without  Frontiers  Directive)  extends  a  ‘country  of  establishment’  rule  from 
traditional  television  services  to  both  interactive  and  non-interactive  online  television 
services. Due to the country of establishment principle, providers of audio-visual media 
services must comply only with the laws (including copyright law) of the EU member state 
where the service provider is established, rather than with those of the member states where 
the service can be received: see Directive 2010/13, Art. 2, 3 (setting the criteria according to 
which a media service provider should be deemed to be established in a given member 
state:  e.g.  location  of  the  provider’s  head  office  or  location  of  a  significant  part  of  its 
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hand - and satellite transmissions and digital TV services – on the other 
hand  -  into  account.  What  should  also  be  pondered  is  the  scope  of 
application of such regime and its potential impact on the various creative 
content sectors. If, for the aforementioned reasons, EU law elaborated the 
country of origin principle in a sector-specific manner and then extended it 
to online film services (and to the delivery of services that are ancillary to 
broadcast activities, e.g. catch-up TV) operated within the European Union, 
then  a  licence  acquired  in  the  territory  of  the  country  of  the 
communication’s  origin  would  automatically  cover  the  whole  EU 
territory.68 The pan-European reach of a licence  in the country of origin 
would  derive  automatically  from  the  law  of  such  country  since,  legally 
speaking, that country would be the only place of use of copyrighted works 
in the online environment.69 
It goes without saying that, if EU law-makers opted for this policy 
option,  for  online  copyright  licensing  (expanding  also  one  of  the  key 
principles of the Directive 2010/13), they would need to determine how to 
concretely  adapt  the  country  of  origin  principle  to  the  realm  of  online 
content  deliveries.70  The  criterion  identifying  the  single  applicable  law 
could be either the country of upload of the copyrighted content to the 
server  connected  to  the  Internet  or  the  country  of  establishment  of  the 
service provider. These variations on the country of origin principle would 
entail the emergence of distinct scenarios, whose thorough analysis was not 
developed in the Task Force debate. For instance, EU law would need to 
                                                   
68 See European Commission (2011b), Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual 
Works, pp. 12-13 (discussing the extension of the ‘country of origin’ principle to the licensing 
of audio-visual works and, in particular, to on-demand TV programmes online). 
69 It goes beyond the scope and the purposes of this work to discuss the implications of the 
described reform for the determination of the law applicable to copyright infringements 
affecting works made available online under the above mentioned “single law” principle. 
This aspect is currently disciplined under Regulation (EC) no 864/2007 of the European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11  July  2007  on  the  Law  Applicable  to  Non-contractual 
Obligations (Rome II), OJ L199/40 (31 July 2007), Art. 8. Regulation 864/2007, Article 8, 
provides  that  the  law  applicable  to  a  non-contractual  obligation  arising  from  the 
infringement of an intellectual property right should be the law of the country for which 
protection is claimed (lex loci protectionis). Ideally, to avoid the application of distinct laws to 
the management of online music rights and the infringement of the same rights, EU law-
makers could create an exception to the lex loci protectionis rule by embracing the principle of 
the country of origin of the transmission even for the determination of the law applicable to 
online copyright infringements. 
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establish a secondary criterion identifying the single law of a EU member 
state if the service provider establishment or the transmission points were 
not  located  within  the  European  Union  (e.g.  opting  for  the  law  of  the 
member state with which the online music service or the non-E.U. provider 
are  most  closely  connected,  in  light  of,  say,  the  presence  of  offices  or 
workforce of the same provider).  
The implementation of a country of upload (or emission) principle 
would  also  alter  significantly  the  bargaining  conditions  of  content 
licensing. In the determination of licence prices, in particular, parties would 
necessarily need to take account of the actual and potential audiences of 
online content transmissions on a pan-European or multi-territorial basis. 
Moreover, content licensors and online service providers would have to 
retain a sufficient degree of contractual freedom in order to be autonomous 
and  flexible  enough  in  designing,  launching  and  promoting  new  and 
economically  profitable  content  offerings  and  in  determining  their 
territorial  reach  in  the  context  of  culturally  and  linguistically  diverse 
countries.  If  such  freedom  was  not  adequately  guaranteed  and  licences 
should be pan-European on a mandatory-basis, their prices might become 
so high that on one (or just a very limited number of large online content 
providers  like  international  Internet  platforms  or  global  media 
conglomerates) would be able to pay for the acquisition of online rights. 
In this prospective framework, copyright holders and their licensees 
would  effectively  start  treating  the  European  Union  as  a unified  Digital 
Single Market, although retaining the freedom to geo-localise their content 
transmissions  and  to  make  them  accessible  to  diversified  audiences 
throughout the EU.71 The circumstance that member state copyright rules 
have already been harmonised to a sufficient extent would widely mitigate 
the  above-mentioned  risk  of  a  “race  to  the  bottom”  in the protection  of 
copyright  holders,  as  a  consequence  of  the  application  of  one  single 
national law. Needless to say, this policy option would require a legislative 
reform of EU law, especially after the conclusion reached by the CJEU in 
Football Dataco v. Sportradar.72 In that case the court had to determine the 
                                                   
71 A model to follow is Directive 93/83, which is based on contractual freedom in order to 
enable content  licensors  to  continue  limiting  the  satellite and  cable  exploitation  of  their 
rights, “[…] especially as far as certain technical means of transmission or certain language 
versions are concerned […]” (Recital 16).  
72 Cf. C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v SportradarGmbH et Sportradar AG, 18 October 
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criteria of localisation of acts of online transmissions of copyrighted content 
from one member state to another and to assess whether the subsequent re-
use of the protected content (i.e. a database) took place just in the country 
of  upload  or,  also,  in  the  country  of  use  or  reception  of  the  content 
transmission. The Court held the act of re-use can be deemed to be located 
in the territory where user’s computer receives the content for purposes of 
storage and display on screen.73  
As  recalled  above,  the  case  law  of  the  CJEU  is  opening  up  new 
scenarios and policy solutions that look even more radical than a sector-
specific implementation of the country of origin principle. The first option 
is the implementation of the exhaustion principle (and of the so-called ‘first 
sale doctrine’) with regard to intangible copies of copyrighted content that 
consumers  download  from  the  Internet.  In  the  UsedSoft  case,  the  CJEU 
recently  held  that  the  exclusive  right  of  distribution  of  the  owner  of  a 
computer program should be deemed to be exhausted in relation to the sale 
of a copy of the protected program that customers have downloaded from 
the  copyright  holder’s  website  and  that  they  have  legitimately  acquired 
under a license granted for an unlimited period of time in exchange for a 
fee.74  The  CJEU  held  that,  when  this  type  of  sale  occurs,  the  copyright 
owner  is  no  longer  entitled  to  block  the  resale  of  such  copies  by  third 
parties who acquire the software licenses from the original users and sell 
them (while transferring also the related right to download updated copies 
of the computer program) to their own customers. The CJEU clarified that, 
for the distribution right to be exhausted, the first acquirer should delete or 
make  the  original  copy  of  the  program  downloaded  onto  her  computer 
unusable at the time of resale.75 If this conclusion, which was reached with 
                                                   
73 Ibid., para. 43.  
74 C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp., 3 July 2012, [hereinafter UsedSoft 
GmbH v Oracle]. 
75 See UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle, paras. 78-79. As acknowledged by the CJEU, ascertaining 
whether such a copy has been made unusable may prove to be difficult. Still – as the court 
emphasised - copyright owners distributing computer programs through physical media 
(e.g. CD-Rom or DVD) have to face the same problem, since it is only with great difficulty 
that they can make it sure that the original acquirer has not made copies of the program that 
she continues to use after having sold her material medium. To solve that problem, the 
CJEU concluded, the software owner is allowed to use technological protection measures 
(like product keys) in the distribution of both physical and digital (i.e. intangible) formats. 
Technologies like the one for which Amazon was recently granted a patent in the US might 
solve the problem in the close future. See http://patft.uspto.gov (“Secondary market for 
digital objects”). Amazon has developed a system of ‘data stores’ where the user who no 
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specific regard to provisions of the EU Software Directive,76 were extended 
to all kinds of copyrighted digital works (e.g. movies, videogames, e-books, 
music files, etc), intangible copies of creative works could be freely re-sold 
on  a  cross-broader  basis,  and  subsequently  disseminated  on  a  EU-wide 
basis,  provided  that  their  first  buyers  have  made  such  copies  unusable 
when re-selling them. To this end, the provisions of the 2001 Information 
Society  Directive  that  define  the  exclusive  rights  of  distribution  and  of 
making content available to the public would need to be revised in order to 
make  the  exhaustion  principle  applicable  also  to  permanent  sales  of 
intangible copies of copyrighted works. As things now stand, the sale of 
intangible copies through the Internet entails the exercise of the sole right 
of making content available (i.e. a type of right that is not contemplated 
under the Software Directive), whereas exhaustion applies only to the right 
of distribution of physical copies.77  
The  second  policy  option  that  the  recent  case  law  of  the  CJEU 
suggests is based on the assumption that EU law (under Article 101 TFEU) 
prohibits agreements whose purpose or effect is preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition in the EU Internal Market. In particular, the case law 
of  the  CJEU has  held  that  agreements  that  tend  to  restore  the  divisions 
between national markets are liable to  frustrate the Treaty’s objective of 
achieving  integration  of  those  markets  through  the  establishment  of  a 
single  market.78  As  recently  evidenced  in  the  Premier  League  judgment, 
licensing  agreement  between  the  owner  of  exclusive  rights  in  sporting 
events protected under national law and a TV broadcaster may eventually 
be deemed to infringe competition law insofar as the agreement restricts 
the  broadcaster  from  technically  enabling  access  to  the  licensed  content 
outside his or her country of establishment and operation. Even though this 
case did not concern and did not directly affect the exclusivity granted by 
                                                                                                                                 
longer  desires  to  retain  the  right  to  access  the  now-used  digital  content  is  given  the 
possibility of transferring it to another user’s personalised data store, while deleting the 
used content from the originating data store.  
76 See Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 111/16 (May 5, 2009), [hereinafter Software 
Directive], (codifying the content of Council Directive 91/250 EEC of 14 May 1991). 
77 See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on  the  Harmonisation  of  Certain  Aspects  of  Copyright  and  Related  Rights  in  the  Information 
Society, OJ L167/10 (June 22, 2001), [hereinafter Information Society Directive], Art. 4.2. 
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owners of sporting events to TV broadcasters on a strictly territorial basis, 
the judgment emphasised that the enforcement of EU competition law and 
the pursuit of its underlying objective of EU-wide market integration might 
end up denying legal protection to technology-enabled (and contractually 
agreed) restrictions aimed at ensuring territorial exclusivity in the access to 
protected  audio-visual  content.  This  conclusion  might  be  of  great 
significance  in  the  development  of  online  exploitation  of  audio-visual 
content  if  the  above-mentioned  principle  were  re-stated  (or  deemed  to 
apply) with regard to technologies (e.g. encryption devices) that are used 
on the Internet in order to protect territorial exclusivity of access to content 
and to ensure an effective geo-localisation of online content offerings.  
2.5  Standardisation of rights management information systems 
and repertoire databases 
EU policy-makers and stakeholders unanimously emphasised the essential 
role that central identification systems and repertoire databases will play 
for copyright with regard to music, film and other types of creative content. 
Markets for intangible goods such as copyright works can only function if 
all necessary information about the relevant rights as well as who owns 
and/or  controls  them  is  openly  available  and  in  standardised  and 
interoperable formats. Tools such as the Global Repertoire Database (GRD) 
and  initiatives  such  the  Linked  Content  Coalition  (LCC)  and  the 
“Accessible Registries of Rights Information and Orphan Works towards 
Europeana” (ARROW) might greatly simplify, modernise and improve the 
conditions  of  licensing  in  digital  markets.  The  operative  elements  of 
licensing  would  take  great  advantage  of  standardised  and  fully 
interoperable formats if all digital rights management information could be 
sorted out in a way that all content licensors and licensees have easy access 
to  such  data.  The  availability  of  such  data  would  certainly  promote  the 
creation of a level playing field for all players.  
The  GRD  is  a  central,  authoritative  and  multi-territorial  source  of 
copyright-related information concerning the global repertoire of musical 
works. Metadata includes information about musical works themselves, the 
creators of the works and their ownership, control or administration.79 The 
collected  data  need  to  be  overlaid  with  authoritative  information  about 
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what  organisation  (whether  a  music  publisher,  a  collective  rights 
management  society  or  other  institution)  is  in  a  position  to  grant  the 
requisite licences for the exploitation of the musical works by rights share, 
by  right  type,  by  use  type,  by  territory  and  by  exploitation  date.80  This 
ambitious project aims at providing a comprehensive database of the global 
ownership and control of musical works, openly available to songwriters, 
publishers,  collecting  societies,  and  end-users.  The  GRD seeks  to  enable 
cost  savings  (mainly  by  eliminating  duplication  in  activities  of  data 
management  and  processing),  to  lead  to  a  better  management  of  online 
digital content (by lowering administrative barriers for companies wishing 
to distribute music online and to increase music availability), and to ensure 
a quicker and more efficient compensation to rights-holders. The GRD will 
be able to perform its desired function only if all constituencies have proper 
access to the data collected in the database. Three years after the launch and 
support  of  the  initiative  by  the  European  Commission,  the  GRD  is 
progressing to a designed blueprint ready to be built. However, the project 
is moving slowly and discussions are problematic since it is still unclear 
under which conditions metadata will be made available by rights-holders 
and collecting societies.  
Another remarkable standardisation initiative has been developed by 
the  Linked  Content  Coalition  (LCC),  which  has  more  than  40  partners 
across various sectors.81 The LCC is mostly a right-holder initiative, even 
though it involves tech companies (e.g. Microsoft, Digimarc, Microgen) and 
broadcasters (e.g. RTL Group) as partners that are also commercial users of 
content. This initiative is not supposed to create a database itself (as the 
GRD does for music rights information) but aims at defining how rights 
should  be  described  and  how  metadata  should  be  standardised  so  that 
different databases can inter-operate and create a networked information 
environment. The LCC project, which is followed closely by the European 
Commission, does not promote any specific business models; nor does it 
                                                   
80  The  GRD  Working Group,  which manages  the  project, was  formed  in  late  2009  and 
includes the following companies and organisation: European Composer and Songwriter 
Alliance, International Confederation of Music Publishers, International Confederation of 
Societies of Authors and Composers, Sony/ATV Music Publishing/EMI Music Publishing, 
Universal  Music  Publishing,  Warner/Chappell  Music,  Australasian  Performing  Right 
Association,  GesellschaftFürMusikalischeAufführungs-  und  Mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte, PRS for Music, Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de 
musique, SverigesTonsättaresInternationellaMusikbyrå, Apple, Google, Omnifone. 
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endorse any collective or individual licensing schemes. Rather, it aims at 
creating  a  standardised  and  freely  accessible  technical  framework  that 
seeks to facilitate the content supply chain and to ensure that content can 
be  licensed  more  easily  in  the  digital  environment.  The  LCC’s  key 
deliverable  is  the  ‘Rights  Reference  Model’  (RRM),  presented  in  March 
2013, which is designed to support automated access to content rights and 
rights data across the Internet.82 The RRM covers all types of media, usage 
(by both humans and machines) content (e.g. text, image, sound or audio-
visual) and any business model, including free use. This model is expected 
to have two main uses. One is that of a ‘hub’, enabling information held in 
different formats to be converted into a common language.83 The second 
use of the RRM is as the basis to develop new multimedia rights systems, 
including new messages and languages where needed.84 An aspect that is 
also  particularly  important  for  the  LCC  is  micropayments,  especially  in 
                                                   
82 There have been several initiatives aimed at improving automation of rights management 
on the Internet coming from different sectors. See for instance the ‘PLUS’ coalition in the 
field of photography and graphic images (http://useplus.com). See also the ‘Automated 
Control  Access  Protocol’  (ACAP)  (http://the-acap.org),  which  was  a  rights  expression 
language designed primarily to express usage policies for publicly available online content 
in web pages in a non-proprietary and open format and in a machine-readable way. ACAP 
was a global project initiated by publishers and newspaper agencies worldwide. However, 
the project did not gain acceptance as it undermined existing, accepted and tested web 
standards  and  protocols  such  as  robot.txt and,  at  the  moment,  it  seems  to  have  lost 
momentum (even though, since 2011, it has been maintained by the International Press 
Telecommunications Council). 
83 As emphasised by the European Publishers Council, which is managing the project, there 
will never be a single rights language to suit everyone. The RRM developed by the LCC is 
conceived so that any existing language or message (e.g. standards like ODRL, XRML, PLUS 
or rights messages in ONIX and DDEX or other proprietary formats used by individual 
companies) can be converted into the RRM without losing any of its meaning.  
84 The LCC proposes to use the 'Rights Reference Model', inter alia, to identify rights ‘at the 
point of entry’ to the web, by targeting user-generated content creators (bloggers, authors of 
mash-ups, etc.) and enabling them to declare themselves, works and rights in their works. 
This would create a framework model whereby all content generated on the internet could 
be registered and assigned rights status. The LCC would also define ‘Principles of User 
Interface’, organising the way users access and interact with the LCC. In both cases, what 
publishers  are  trying  to do  is  to  integrate  (or  ‘map’)  machine-readable  rights 
expressions (like the ones that have been widespread in DRM proprietary systems for more 
than a decade) and to encourage other sectors to make standards and clearer definitions 
themselves. Online intermediaries object that this approach would raise the difficult issue of 
rights-holders defining, in standards, what uses are permitted or not under copyright (i.e. 
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sectors (for instance the publishing sector) where sometimes the transaction 
cost raised by how to make a payment is higher than the payment for the 
content  itself.  The  LCC  is  now  likely  to  move  towards  a  standards 
consortium.  
ARROW  is  another  standard-based  rights  management 
infrastructure,  supported  by  the  Commission  and  mentioned  in  official 
documents  and  legislation.85  ARROW  enables  exchanges  of  information 
within  a  network  of  databases  and  registries,  thus  facilitating  right 
information management of text-based works in any digitisation projects. 
ARROW enables to identify authors, publishers, and other rights-holders of 
a work or their representatives, as well as right status, including whether 
the  work  is  orphan,  copyrighted  or  in  public  domain,  or  if  it  is  still 
commercially  available  or  out  of  commerce.  In  addition,  the  system 
provides  information  on  how  to get  the  licence  in  order  to  digitise  and 
exploit  the  desired  work.  Given  all  these  characteristics,  ARROW  has 
become an indispensable tool for EU-wide projects like ‘Europeana’ aimed 
at  ensuring  the  widest  access  to  knowledge  and  at  preserving  cultural 
heritage,  especially  in  the  text-  and  image-based  sectors.86  This  tool  will 
also facilitate the new task that the Orphan Works Directive assigns to the 
Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal Market, namely, the creation of 
a  single  publicly  accessible  online  database  of  orphan  works  and  the 
collection of relevant data (e.g. records of diligent searches) coming from 
public libraries, educational establishments and museums, archives, film or 
audio heritage institutions and public service broadcasters established in 
the member states. 87  
                                                   
85 See http://arrow-net.eu. See for instance A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights.  
86 See http://europeana.eu. 
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3.  DOES EUROPE NEED TO REFORM 
COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS? WHAT IS THE 
FUTURE OF LEVIES? 
3.1  Introduction  
The members of the Task Force participated in interesting and politically 
timely discussions with regard to the appropriateness of the actual system 
of copyright exceptions under EU law. In particular, the debate among EU 
policy-makers,  stakeholders,  civic  society  organisations,  consumer 
advocates and academics focused on a possible adaptation and reform of 
the horizontal legal framework created by the Information Society Directive 
of 22 May 2001.88 
The term ‘exceptions’ is used here interchangeably with expressions 
such as ‘restrictions’ and ‘limitations’. This term refers to certain categories 
of  uses  that  the  law  exempts  from  the  copyright  scope,  with  a  view  to 
achieving  a  number  of  public  policy  objectives  (e.g.  allowing  criticism, 
research,  teaching,  news  reporting,  parody,  and  so  on).89  Copyright 
exceptions  may  encompass  different  types  of  statutory  provisions, 
including  full  copyright  exemptions,  statutory  licenses,  compulsory 
licenses,  and  cases  of  so-called  mandatory  collective  administration  of 
copyright.90 What makes these provisions similar to each other is that, in all 
                                                   
88 See the Information Society Directive, Art. 4.2. 
89  See  Guibault  (2002),  Copyright  Limitations  and  Contracts,  An  analysis  of  the  contractual 
overridability of limitations on copyright, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 16. 
90 Ibid., p. 20. As the author explains, the most common form of limitation recognised in 
favour of users consists of a full exemption from the scope of the rights-holder’s exclusive 
right, where the right to authorise or prohibit is withdrawn without monetary compensation 
for  the  rights  owners  for  the  use  of  their  work.  Under  a  statutory  licence,  instead, 
copyrighted works can be used without authorisation from the rights-holder but against 
payment of fair remuneration. Unlike voluntary licenses, the amount of remuneration to be 
paid to rights-holders under a statutory licence is either fixed by the legislator or by some 
regulatory  authority.  In  this  classification,  the  third  category  (compulsory  licensing)  is 
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of these cases, users are entitled to access, copy, quote, extract, manipulate 
and tinker directly with copyrighted material without the authorisation of 
the copyright owner. 
The most relevant and debated issue was about whether or not a set 
of provisions based on a list of non-mandatory exceptions and limitations 
with  a  narrow  character,  like  the  one  provided  under  Art.  5  of  the 
Information Society Directive, still accommodates the needs of a mature 
and fast changing digital environment. In today’s digital environment new 
technology-enabled creativity and transformative uses pose unprecedented 
questions about the most appropriate scope of digital copyright and the 
best  way  to  legally  define  its  borders.  In  response  to  a  supposedly 
inadequate role of a closed number of exceptions to the rights granted by 
harmonised copyright laws, academics and stakeholders openly discussed 
the advantages and disadvantages that the introduction under EU law of a 
flexible norm like the US fair use doctrine would create in the context of 
European legal systems 
The  debate  touched  also  on  whether  or  not  the  current  system 
provides for a sufficient degree of harmonisation of national copyright laws 
with a view to fostering the development of cross-border (and possibly EU-
wide) uses and online exploitation of protected digital content. Touching 
upon the issue of harmonisation of exceptions in the Internal Market, the 
debate  inevitably  focused  on  the  diverse  implementation  of  levies  on 
recording equipment and blank media in the various member states where 
copyright  law  provides  a  private  copying  exception.  Speakers  and 
discussants placed special emphasis on the mediation process on levies that 
the European Commission launched in April 2012 and put to an end in 
January 2013. The report provides an overview and a critique of the policy 
recommendations  that  the  mediator,  Antonio  Vitorino,  published  at  the 
end of this process.  
This chapter will review all the aforementioned issues after having 
provided a short overview of the current system of copyright exceptions in 
the EU. It is worth mentioning by now that the chapter will not examine in 
                                                                                                                                 
distinguished from the previous one (statutory licensing) on the assumption that the former 
requires  a  rights  owner  to  grant  an  individual  licence  at  a  price  and  under  conditions 
determined either with the user or by authorities where an agreement cannot be reached. 
The fourth category, finally, addresses a much less constraining form of limitation, under 
which  copyright  law  requires  that  certain  rights  must  be  exercised  through  authors’ 
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detail  the  recently  adopted  EU  Directive  on  Orphan  Works,  which  was 
eventually shaped as a measure introducing a new copyright exception. 
This Directive certainly constitutes an important step towards the objective 
of  enabling  online  access  to  wide  collections  of  creative  works  by 
institutions acting in the public interest (i.e. public libraries, archives, film 
heritage  institutions,  public  broadcasters).  However,  the  Directive  has  a 
specific field of application, dealing just with works whose authors and 
rights-holders cannot be identified and solely enables non-commercial use 
of such works, like those allowed by a publicly funded digitisation project 
like Europeana.91 For these reasons, and due to time constraints, the Task 
Force  members  decided  not  to  take  this  piece  of  legislation  and  this 
relevant subject into consideration.  
3.2  The system of copyright exceptions embodied into the 2001 
Information Society Directive  
The  existing  legal  framework  on  copyright  exceptions  and  limitations  is 
defined  in  the  2001  Information  Society  Directive.  After  having  briefly 
examined the current legal framework, this section draws on the Task Force 
debate in order to evaluate advantages and disadvantages of the possible 
introduction of a more flexible legal framework for the understanding and 
enforcement of copyright exceptions by private parties and courts.  
3.2.1  Is the current system of copyright exceptions at EU level still 
appropriate? 
The Information Society Directive did not manage to effectively harmonise 
copyright exceptions beyond a certain extent since there was no political 
consensus among EU law-makers about the acts and uses that should have 
been  exempted  from  copyright’s  scope,  especially  in  the  digital 
environment. As a result of such political failure, there is now an imbalance 
in  this  field  that  lies  in  the  fact  that,  at  a  time  when  the  scope  of  the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders was harmonised and expanded (as a 
result of the adaptation of copyright’s scope to digitised information), the 
2001 Directive did not make its exhaustive list of exceptions and limitations 
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mandatory for member states. Nor did the Directive succeed in creating a 
legally  binding  or  useful  distinction  between  mandatory  and  non-
mandatory  exceptions  in  light  of  their  nature,  function  and  of  their 
relevance in enabling unauthorised cross-border uses. Such a distinction 
would  have  certainly  helped  creating  a  more  harmonised,  effective  and 
consistent  safety  nets  for  particularly  important  exceptions  that  now, 
instead,  can  be  legitimately  restricted  through  contractual  means  and 
practically imposed through sophisticated DRM technologies.  
The  exceptions provided  in  the  lengthy  list  under  Article  5  of  the 
Information  Society  Directive  are  provided  à  la  carte,  which  means  that 
member states are free to take and implement only those ones they find 
most appropriate in their national copyright systems because of their own 
interests  and  of  economic  and  cultural  priorities.  Interestingly,  the  only 
exception that the Directive made it mandatory in 2001 is a technological 
exemption  concerning  acts  of  temporary  copying  occurring  for  the  sole 
purposes  of  enabling  content  transmission  in  a  network  between  two 
parties  by  an  intermediary  and  enabling  a  lawful  use.  These  acts  are 
excluded  from  the  scope  of  the  exclusive  right  of  reproduction,  on 
condition that they have no independent economic significance (Art. 5.1 
Information Society Directive).92  
The  greatest  achievements  in  the  Information  Society  Directive  in 
terms of harmonisation of exceptions and limitations were, respectively: 
                                                   
92  The  CJEU  has  interpreted  this  technological  exemption  in  3  cases  (C-5/08  -  Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, 16 July 2009, [hereafter Infopaq I]; C-302/10 - 
Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, 17 January 2012, [hereinafter Infopaq II]; 
Premier League). The Court found that the following factual requirements should be met for 
the exemption to apply: i) the reproduction should be transient, i.e. “its duration [should be] 
limited  to  what  is  necessary  for  the  proper  completion  of  the  technological  process  in 
question” (Infopaq I, para. 64); ii) the reproduction should be an integral and essential part of 
the technological process (see Infopaq II, para. 30); iii) the sole purpose of the reproduction is 
to enable a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary or a lawful 
use (i.e. authorised by the rights-holder or not restricted by law: see Information Society 
Directive, Recital 33; see also Premier League, para. 171, and Infopaq II, paras. 43-44); and iv) 
the reproduction should not have an independent economic significance (i.e. it should not 
be able to generate an economic advantage additional to the one generated by the intended 
use and it should not modify contents (see Premier League , para. 176, and Infopaq II, para. 
54). Unfortunately, none of these cases concerned Internet-related technologies and the cited 
judgments did not truly clarify the application of the technological exemption of temporary 
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i.  The  creation  of  an  exhaustive  number  of  types  (or  classes)  of 
exceptions that all member states are bound to comply with (insofar 
as they decide to opt for a certain type or class); and  
ii.  The introduction into EU law of the so-called three-step test (Art. 5.5) 
that  EU  law-makers  borrowed  from  international  conventions  on 
copyright, where the test has the function of instructing Contracting 
Parties on the legitimacy (in terms of scope and of potential impact on 
the market for the copyrighted work) of national exceptions.93  
From a political point of view, the current system reflects scepticism 
about the concrete possibility of fully harmonising copyright exceptions. A 
few participants emphasised that full harmonisation in this area is a very 
unlikely objective since cultural diversity makes it impossible for member 
states to agree on a unitary set of mandatory exceptions and limitations. 
Advocates  of  the  current  system  also  added  that,  as  it  stands,  the 
exhaustive  number  of  specific  exceptions  embodied  in  the  Information 
Society  Directive  preserves  legal  certainty  while  leaving  national  law-
makers  and  courts  with  a  significant  room  for  manoeuvre.  However, 
independent  experts  pointed  out  that,  if  the  system  had  applied  the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  more  carefully,  considering  also  that  full 
harmonisation could not be achieved in any event, member states should 
have been left with the freedom to create additional exceptions at national 
level, in both online and offline settings.  
As  we  have  seen,  more  harmonisation  throughout  the  EU  would 
certainly  ensure  higher  legal  certainty  and  a  smoother  cross-border 
dissemination  of  works  and  services  taking  advantage  of  copyright 
exceptions  and  limitations.  Still,  as  argued  by  representatives  of  the 
computer  and  communication  industry,  this  solution  would  not  easily 
accommodate  new  technology-enabled  uses  that  –  for  the  sake  of 
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this convention in 1967. According to Art. 9(2), it shall be a matter for national legislation to 
permit  the  reproduction  of  copyrighted  works  in  certain  special  cases  (first  step),  on 
condition that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work 
(second step) and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author 
(third  step).  After  its  introduction  into  the  Berne  Convention,  subsequent  international 
provisions regarding copyright law, that is, Art. 13 of the 1994 TRIPS Agreement and Art. 
10(2) of  the  1996 WIPO Copyright  Treaty resumed  this  test.  These  provisions  expressly 
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innovation and freedom of expression and communication on the Internet – 
should not  fall  within  copyright’s  scope.  This  front  (supported  by some 
academics and by consumer advocates) advocated a much more flexible 
approach to copyright exceptions, especially at a time when new uses of 
copyrighted  information  by  both  humans  and  computers  appear  and 
develop on a daily basis and deviate considerably from the categories of 
use  identified  in  the  late  1990s.  It  was  argued  that  uncertainty  about 
lawfulness  of  new  uses  is  somehow  inevitable  in  a  society  in  which 
technologies develop at a very fast pace and in unpredictable ways. What 
seems hard to contradict is that, in this context, EU legislation, which is 
static in nature, will never be able to keep up with the pace of technological 
innovation,  due  to  the  closed-list  approach  and  to  the  fact  that  the 
preparatory  work  and  the  process  of  law-making,  transposition  into 
national  law  and  entry  into  force  of  new  legislation  at  EU  level  is 
particularly  complex  and  can  take  many  years.  The  computer  and 
communications  industry,  whose  largest  companies  are  mostly 
headquartered  outside  the  EU,  clearly  indicated  US  law  and  a  clause 
ensuring flexibility, like the US ‘fair use’ doctrine, as a model to follow. In 
particular, it was proposed that such a new clause could be introduced into 
the EU copyright system in addition to the existing set of exceptions and 
limitations.  
3.2.2  A more flexible framework for copyright exceptions?  
A  reform  of  copyright  exceptions  based  on  the  introduction  of  a  norm 
ensuring higher flexibility was advocated not only by Internet companies 
and consumers, but also by a front of academics and independent experts. 
A  few  scholars  have  proposed  a  model  law  in  the  context  of  a  project 
entitled  “European  Copyright  Code”,  where  a  clause  following  the 
wording  and  the  rationale  of  the  three-step-test  would  co-exist  with  a 
closed  set  of  exceptions.94  As  stressed  by  the  drafters  of  the  Code,  this 
approach  would  reflect  a  combination  of  common  law  and  civil  law 
principles,  giving  rise  to  a  system  where  the  law  enumerates  various 
categories of exceptions and, at the same time, creates a safety valve for 
flexibility. The above-mentioned ‘flexibility clause’ would enable courts to 
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permit uses that are similar to the ones expressly enumerated in the Code 
and that would pass the three-step test.95  
It should be borne in mind that, as a consequence of the introduction 
of the three-step test into EU law, the test has now a binding force not only 
for EU member states, when codifying their own national exceptions, but 
also (and most importantly) for national courts in the concrete application 
of the same exceptions.96 For EU member states, then, the three-step test at 
the  moment  not  only  constitutes  a  series  of  criteria  for  interpretation 
addressed to the national parliaments (criteria that all member states were 
already compelled to comply with as a result of their adhesion to the Berne 
Convention and the WTO). The test is also a standard of evaluation and of 
judicial  application  of  the  exceptions  provided  under  national  law,  in 
conformity  with  the  catalogue  of  (optional)  exceptions  spelt  out  under 
Article 5 of the Information Society Directive. 
Whereas  national  courts  currently  apply  the  three-step  test  when 
enforcing every single exception, in the prospected system courts would 
use the test each time a new unauthorised use is not contemplated in the 
closed  circle  of  exceptions.  Under  these  new  circumstances,  European 
courts would behave, to a great extent, like US courts when applying the 
doctrine of fair use.97  
Another  front  of  academics  argued  that  EU  law-makers  should  be 
cautious in transplanting the idea of a flexible set of standards into EU law 
since Europe has a completely different (and widely heterogeneous) system 
of judicial enforcement of copyright rules. Before taking this option into 
consideration, EU policy- and law-makers should bear in mind that today’s 
fair use doctrine is the result of hundreds of years of case law in which US 
courts analysed several aspects of unauthorised copying and of other types 
of  unauthorised  use.  In  assessing  the  legitimacy  of  non-authorised  uses 
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§107 of the US Copyright Act of 1976. The doctrine gives rise to a system of exceptions that 
is to a certain extent antithetic to that of continental Europe and to the idea of limiting the 
subject matter of copyright through specific and punctual provisions, like the exceptions of 
droit d'auteur systems. Fair use operates ex post, and courts apply this doctrine on a case-by-
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under the fair use doctrine, US courts should consider elements such as the 
aim and the character of the use, the nature of the work and the quantity or 
portion of the work used as well as the effect of the use on the potential 
market value of the work. It seems evident that fair use and its criteria are 
clearly  designed  to  achieve  the  same  objective  pursued  by  European 
exceptions  and  by  the  three-step  test  (i.e.  preventing  unauthorised  uses 
from  competing  with  any  forms  of  commercial  exploitation  that  are 
exclusively granted by the law to the copyright holder). Still, what varies 
significantly is how the objective has been achieved so far and will have to 
be pursued in the future.  
The development of an extensive case law in the US on the grounds 
of  theories  such  as  the  distinction  between  transformative  and  non-
transformative uses and the recognition of ‘market failure’ have allowed 
courts to understand how the fair use doctrine can be implemented and 
constantly adapted over time. It was stressed that the interpretation of fair 
use  has  been  in  rapid  evolution  recently,  and  the  fast  development  of 
completely new forms of exploitation of copyrighted works in the digital 
world (e.g. digitisation of millions of books owned by a university library 
without the consent of the copyright holders) has made the application of 
fair use much less predictable than ever.  
A few academics expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of a 
system  where  the  actual  EU  exceptions  would  co-exist  with  an 
implementation of the three-step test that followed the fair-use model, in 
terms  of  flexibility.  What  might  be  more  useful,  it  was  argued,  is  a 
comparison  between  the  outcome  of  fair-use  cases  in  the  US  and  the 
settlement of identical or similar cases by European courts having to rely 
on  the  categories  of  unauthorised  uses  created  under  the  Information 
Society Directive. In this regard, the Task Force discussion (as well as the 
relevant  literature)  pointed  out  that  the  categories  of  exceptions  and 
limitations  identified  in  the  2001  Directive  can  be  viewed  as  broad 
prototypes that eventually place courts (and ultimately the Court of Justice 
of the European Union) in a position to ensure a progressive understanding 
and adaptation of exceptions and limitations to technological changes.98 If 
the  above-mentioned  comparison  eventually  showed  that  flexibilities 
embodied  into  the  provisions  of  the  Information  Society  Directive 
effectively enabled European courts to achieve results comparable to those 
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ensured by fair use in the US, a legislative reform at EU level might prove 
to be un-necessary.  
An  interesting  aspect  of  the  debate  concerned  the  potential 
beneficiaries  of  the  introduction  of  a  clause  ensuring  flexibility  for 
copyright exceptions in Europe: who would stand to benefit from such a 
new  approach?  Interestingly,  consumer  advocates  claimed  that  the 
introduction  of  a  flexible  standard  of  evaluation  for  unauthorised  uses 
would certainly make new uses and practices (like parodies and mash-ups, 
which have gained an unprecedented relevance in the digital culture) much 
easier to understand and, possibly, to accept from a legal point of view. 
Still,  as  a  downside,  such  a  flexible  approach  would  also  entail  lack  of 
predictability that would inevitably be linked to the decisive role of judicial 
interpretation.  Various  Task  Force  participants  pointed  out  that  fear  to 
incur  higher  damages  and  litigation  fees  in  the  context  of  copyright 
infringement cases might eventually stifle unauthorised uses that, at least 
in principle, could be covered under the scope of a ‘flexibility clause’. For 
the same reasons, although from an opposite perspective, large enterprises 
such  as  Internet  companies,  telecommunications  operators  or  media 
conglomerates  might  end  up  taking  advantage  of  the  uncertainties  and 
unpredictability that a more flexible legal framework would trigger. In a 
system where the boundaries of exceptions would be based on the outcome 
of complex and time-consuming proceedings, individual authors and/or 
content owners having no or little financial means at their disposal might 
feel  reluctant  to  undertake  potentially  very  expensive  lawsuits  against 
companies hiring the best lawyers and relying upon an almost unlimited 
litigation  capacity.  In  response  to  these  arguments,  technology  and 
communications  companies  object  that,  if  fair  use  caused  so  much  legal 
uncertainty,  they  would  face  thousands  of  lawsuits  filed  every  week 
targeting fair-use decisions that their in-house lawyers have to take every 
day.  
3.3  Exceptions and limitations targeted at new technology-
enabled uses  
One of the most relevant aspects that were taken into consideration is the 
complex  relationship  between  exceptions  and  new  technologies.  Should 
exceptions be deemed to shrink and to be progressively phased out in light 
of the increased opportunities of copyright holders to control digital works 
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guaranteed, legally speaking, in an environment where an excessively wide 
scope of digital copyright would actually stifle suitable unauthorised uses 
by persons and, also, by computers or machines? 
The  debate  focused  on  the  interface  between  copyright  exceptions 
and innovative business models and on the role of exceptions. After that, a 
particularly  relevant  discussion  concerned  the  legal  treatment  of  acts  of 
automated data processing performed by computers and machines, which 
cannot be easily understood using the traditional categories of exceptions 
and  limitations  provided  under  EU  law.  Finally,  the  discussion  briefly 
touched on legalisation of unauthorised activities occurring on peer-to-peer 
networks  through  a  possible  exception  covering  non-commercial  file 
sharing  of  copyright  works.  This  solution  would  also  require  a  flat-rate 
payment by users based on a system of mandatory or extended collective 
management what would clear the rights of communication to the public.  
3.3.1  Copyright exceptions and innovative business models 
When examining the issue of whether or not the EU should go for further 
harmonisation  of  copyright  rules,  content  owners  such  as  book  and 
newspaper  publishers  raised  the  attention  of  participants  on  the 
supposedly  inverse  relationship  between  innovation  and  copyright 
exceptions.  Digital  publishing  is  the  new  challenge  for  publishers  and 
requires significant investments on innovative business models. The e-book 
market  is  still  in  its  infancy  and,  according  to  publishers,  needs  to  be 
encouraged through a solid and stable copyright framework. Even though 
copyright  holders  acknowledged  the  suitability  of  exceptions  and 
limitations in certain specific cases, they strongly believe that licensing and 
technological advances such as ARROW (see §2.5 supra) must play a central 
role in today’s digital society since it is a flexible, practical, and fast means, 
which does not imply heavy transactions costs. Furthermore, according to 
content owners, licensing provides proper incentives to invest in new and 
innovative business models, thus meeting new needs of users.  
In  the  current  scenario,  despite  a  slow  growth  of  digital  content 
markets,  professional  content  creators  have  had  increasing  problems  in 
getting  remunerated.  Newspaper  publishers,  in  particular,  claimed  that 
innovation is not economically sustainable for them without an effective 
enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights.  Book  and  newspaper 
publishers stressed that an inappropriate treatment of copyright exceptions 
might  make  the  situation  even  worse,  enabling  more  free  riding  and 
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publishers admitted that traditional licensing systems do not always fit the 
needs of providers of new digital content services. However, innovation in 
licensing and reliance on digital rights management technologies are the 
most  realistic  approach  in  order  to  protect  intellectual  property  and  to 
ensure a long-term sustainability of book publishing and professional news 
media and quality journalism.  
3.3.2  Copyright exceptions and purposes of scientific research and 
teaching 
Representatives  of  open  access  publishers  focused  on  the  standpoint  of 
researchers  (and  of  their  communities)  on  the  value  of  copyright 
exceptions.  By  opting  for  open  access,  researchers  unilaterally  place  the 
results of their work at the public's disposal, without any restrictions of use 
and for free in electronic format. The main objective of this licensing policy 
is that of guaranteeing the widest possible access to scientific literature on 
digital  archives  maintained  by  academic  institutions,  research  centres, 
governmental authorities and other institutions in pursuit of similar goals. 
Authors normally opt for such licensing forms either spontaneously or in 
compliance  with  directives  or  guidelines  given  by  their  employers 
(universities or research institutions). The movement has its manifesto in 
the  Berlin  Declaration  of  2003  on  open  access  to  scientific  literature, 
promoted by the Max Planck Society.99  
The peculiarity of open access publishing is that this business widely 
relies on the relinquishment of economic rights by the authors of the works 
published.  Publishers  following  this  business  model  normally  acquire 
certain  exploitation  rights  from  authors  who  opt  for  licensing standards 
such as Creative Commons’ and do not seek an immediate financial gain or 
a  monetary  reward  from  their  creative  work.  These  authors,  who  are 
normally  remunerated  by  their  employers  in  order  to  produce  research 
output,  are  motivated  mainly  by  the  purpose  of  contributing  to  the 
advancement  of  scientific  knowledge  in  their  fields  and  by  gaining 
exposure  and  reputation  within  their  respective  academic  communities 
through  dissemination  of  their  work  on  freely  accessible  on-line 
repositories.  As  a  result  of  these  arrangements,  open  access  publishers 
                                                   
99 See Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities, Open 
Access at the Max Planck Society (http://oa.mpg.de/lang/en-uk/berlin-prozess/berliner-
erklarung/). 82 | DOES EUROPE NEED TO REFORM COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS? 
normally release online for free what they sell in hardcopy formats for a 
fee.  
One  of  the  main  principles  of  the  open  access  movement  is  that 
copyright in the results of publicly funded research should be retained by 
authors and their works should be released under licensing terms granting 
free access and permitting certain forms of re-use of such works for free. 
Considering  the  ultimate  purpose  of  this  movement,  it  is  easy  to 
understand why, ideally, academic researchers and publishers opting for 
open  access  would  expect  from  the  law  wider  freedoms  and  usage 
permissions with regard to all copyrighted materials, including the ones 
released for gainful purposes by traditional publishers.  
Supporters  of  open  access  licensing  believe  that  copyright  should 
always  incorporate  exceptions  allowing  academics  to  use  protected 
materials for private study, criticism and review. This front of stakeholders 
advocated similar solutions for text and data mining and for research and 
teaching  purposes,  arguing  that  non-commercial  restrictions  placed  on 
activities aimed at producing research output are not in the public interest 
and eventually stifle innovation. Researchers and enterprises espousing the 
concept  of  open  access  also  emphasised  that  modern  research  projects 
operate with large international teams, based in multiple countries, and the 
above-mentioned copyright exceptions should be fully harmonised, at least 
across Europe. 
As  things  stand,  EU  law  allows  member  states  to  provide  for 
exceptions  or  limitations  to  the  rights  of  reproduction  and  of 
communication to the public if the use of the copyrighted work occurs “for 
the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as long as 
the source, including the author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out 
to be impossible and to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose 
to be achieved.”100 This type of exception seems flexible enough to permit 
national  law-makers  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  researchers  and  teachers 
without  unreasonably  compromising  the  interests  of  copyright  holders. 
Moreover, the adoption of a neutral term in the provisions (use) shows that 
the national exceptions and limitations for educational uses can apply to 
different  types  of  use  and,  therefore,  not  only  to  quotations.  However, 
national  exceptions  covering  acts  of  reproduction  and  communication, 
carried  out  in  relation  to  research  and teaching  activities,  are  limited  in 
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their  scope  by  the  requirements  of  the  purposes  of  illustration  (which 
establishes a necessary correlation between freedom of use and the subject 
matter of teaching and research), the non-commercial character of the use 
and by the three-step test.  
Types  of  exceptions  such  as  the  one  for  research  and  teaching 
purposes provided under the Information Society Directive might easily 
create  problems  for  legitimate  cross-border  uses  in  so  far  as  these 
permissions are not shaped as mandatory for member states under EU law. 
The fact that exceptions of this kind may not exist in all EU jurisdictions 
does  not  facilitate  and  encourage  the  development  of  cross-border 
initiatives  such  as  open  courses  made  available  online  for  free  by 
educational institutions such as public universities. Teaching initiatives of 
this type have recently developed at a fast pace and have been offered at an 
increasingly  high  level,  at  a  both  a  European  and  international  scale. 
Educational institutions and teachers offering online open courses would 
clearly run the risk of infringing copyright, somewhere in Europe, even if 
they strictly complied with the requirements set out under EU law, while 
using  and  publishing  portions  of  copyrighted  materials  in  the  courses 
offered on their closed web-based networks. In addition, the fact that the 
scope of the aforementioned exception is restricted to activities having a 
non-commercial purpose might raise doubts about the legitimacy of these 
types of uses by private educational institutions, even when courses are 
offered just to their students: would those initiatives have a commercial 
character? That is one of the questions that remain unanswered as things 
stand.  
3.3.3  Understanding and regulation of ‘automated data processing’ 
of digital works 
The approach undertaken by EU law-makers in 2001 undoubtedly creates 
problems today in terms of lack of harmonisation of uses permitted by law. 
The fact that certain uses of copyrighted materials might turn out to be 
lawful in certain EU member states and unlawful in other states certainly 
hinders and jeopardises the development of cross-border activities and of 
EU-wide services having to rely on a form of copyright exemption. This 
situation is even more undesirable and unsustainable in the long run for 
Internet  companies  and providers  of  innovative  content  offerings  if  one 
considers that, due to an outdated and unreasonably restrictive set of rules 
at  EU  level,  it  has  become  impossible  to  fully  understand  and  regulate 
technology-enabled uses that escape the traditional contours of copyright. 84 | DOES EUROPE NEED TO REFORM COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS? 
As pointed out in the relevant literature, there are classes of uses of 
digital works that include any sort of automated processing of such works 
for  purposes  of  data  mining,  computational  analysis  on  texts  and 
automated  extraction  of  information  and  whose  legal  treatment  is  very 
unclear  under  the  existing  legal  framework.101  What  characterises  these 
technology-enabled  uses  is  that  works  are  automatically  processed  for 
various  purposes  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  traditional  forms  of 
exploitation of copyrighted works that follow copying (i.e. dissemination 
and uses addressed to an audience). Uses like the ones occurring in the 
context  of  mass  digitisation  projects  (from  search  and  indexing  to  text 
analysis) are undertaken by machines to the benefit of machines and for 
reasons that are not (directly) associated to enjoyment and consumption of 
works by humans. These are all activities that are beneficial to companies 
or  non-profit  institutions performing  acts  of  automated  data  processing, 
using  protected  digital  works  not  as  ‘works’,  but  as  ‘data’  in  order  to 
extract, collect and re-use a vast array of useful information.102 Automated 
data processing can pursue objectives such as data analysis, sophisticated 
text  analysis  (e.g.  the  content  of  a  book  or  the  whole  production  of  a 
specific author), analysis of metadata on patterns of use of digital copies 
(e.g. to create databases of user profiles) and computational analysis (which 
includes  image  analysis  and  text  extraction,  linguistic  analysis  and 
automatic translation and indexing and search).103  
To  sum  up,  there  are  classes  of  unauthorised  uses  of  copyrighted 
works  in  digital  formats  that  are  of  crucial  relevance  for  the  mere 
functioning of information and communication technologies whose use has 
become  vital  on  the  Internet  and,  more  in  general,  in  the  information 
society. The fact that the current system of exceptions is based on a closed 
number of provisions, and that such provisions were carved out at a time 
                                                   
101 See Borghi and Karapapa (2011), “Non-display uses of copyright works: Google Books 
and beyond”, Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, pp. 21-24. In 
computer  sciences  ‘data  mining’  is  defined  as  the  extraction  of  implicit,  previously 
unknown, and potentially useful information from data. ‘Text mining’ is the process of text 
analysis in order to extract information that is useful for particular purposes: see I. Witten 
and  E.  Frank  (2005),  Data  Mining:  Practical  Machine  Learning  Tools  and  Techniques,  San 
Francisco; CA: Elsevier, p. 351.  
102 See M. Borghi and S. Karapapa, ‘Non-display uses of copyright works […]’, op. cit., pp. 44-47.  
103  On  automated  text  processing  and  data  mining,  see  Borghi  and  Karapapa  (2013), 
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when the digital environment and the Internet were in their infancy, forces 
courts  and  private  parties  to  seek  the  application  of  old-fashioned 
categories to the above-mentioned new types of uses on digital works.  
Despite  their  built-in  flexibilities,  exceptions  like  those  permitting 
quotations  for  purposes  such  as  criticism  or  review  and  reproduction 
and/or  communication  of  published  articles  in  connection  with  the 
reporting of current events cannot easily become applicable standards for 
the  assessment  of  activities  (e.g.  reproductions  of  picture  thumbnails, 
display of text snippets, etc) through which protected works are processed 
automatically,  for  instance,  by  search  engines  and  online  news 
aggregators.104  
It was pointed out that EU member states have implemented these 
exceptions into their laws according to different strategies of transposition, 
and only a few of them have eventually preserved the technology-neutral 
wording  embodied  in  the  Directive.105  This  means  that  in  vast  EU 
jurisdictions (e.g. France, Germany, etc) quotations and uses for purposes 
of  news  reporting  are,  in  their  statutory  definitions,  strictly  limited  to 
criticism and to the purpose of review of the works in which such uses are 
incorporated.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  Netherlands  and  in  the  Nordic 
countries, the laws transposing these provisions seem to leave wide room 
for  a  fair  implementation  of  the  same  exceptions  to  acts  comparable  to 
quotations made  by  computers, such  as  those  made  by  a  search  engine 
collecting information from an online database of housing agencies.106  
The inadequacy (or insufficiency) of the present EU copyright system 
for the purpose to foster economic growth in the context of a mature digital 
economy  has  been  emphasised  recently  by  studies  and  initiatives 
undertaken  at  EU  and  national  level.  At  European  level  the  European 
Commission has been rather reluctant to admit that the 2001 Information 
Society Directive should be re-opened in order to improve and modernise 
the  section  on  copyright  exceptions.  In  its  recent  Communication  on 
Content in the Digital Single Market of December 2012, when touching upon 
its  plan  for  new  legislation,  the  Commission  announced  actions  in  the 
domains  of  out-of-print  works  (through  a  contractually  based  solution 
taking the form of a Memorandum of Understanding), access to works by 
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visually impaired persons and technology-based solutions, especially with 
regard  to  rights  management  information.107  The  Commission  made  no 
reference in that document to the issue of copyright exceptions, except for 
the mediation process on private copying levies and the enactment of the 
Orphan Works Directive (which should be seen as a legislative measure 
introducing new copyright exceptions).  
Very  different  is  the  scenario  of  certain  EU  member  states  where 
policy-makers  have  already  announced  or  started  initiatives  aimed  at 
modernising the framework of copyright exceptions. The most significant 
example in this regard is the UK, where the Intellectual Property Office 
(IPO)  has  been  following  and  implementing  policy  recommendations 
embodied  into  the  Hargreaves  Review  of  May  2011.108  In  response  to  a 
public  consultation  launched  by  the  UK  government,  the  IPO  recently 
published a lengthy document that explains what the government will do 
in  order  to  enhance,  as  proposed  by  Hargreaves,  the  UK’s  regime  of 
copyright  exceptions  (or  “permitted  acts”,  according  to  the  IPO’s 
lexicon).109 Through this ambitious and comprehensive reform plan the UK 
government seems to challenge the position of the European Commission, 
trying  to  speed  up  a  policy-making  process  that,  clearly,  will  have  no 
equivalents at EU level before the expiration of the Commission’s mandate 
in  2014.  The  most  evident  challenges  embodied  in  the  UK  reform  plan 
concern  the  creation  of  a  narrow  private  copying  exception  and  of  an 
exception  covering  text  and  data  mining  for  non-commercial  research 
within certain limits.110 On both fronts the UK government seems to deviate 
or, at least, to proceed independently from the European prospect. On the 
one  hand,  the  exception  allowing  individuals  to  copy  lawfully  acquired 
content on media and devices they own for strictly personal uses would 
come  with  no  remuneration  for  copyright  holders,  as  the  Information 
                                                   
107 See European Commission (2012c), Content in the Digital Single Market. 
108 See Hargreaves (2011), Digital Opportunity. A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, 
UK Intellectual Property Office, London, May.  
109 See UK Intellectual Property Office (2012), Modernising Copyright: A modern, robust and 
flexible framework, 20 December. 
110 See UK Intellectual Property Office, Modernising Copyright, op. cit., at 16. Other areas in 
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Society Directive would require.111 On the other hand, the UK intends to 
introduce  an  exception  in  an  area  where  the  European  Commission, 
instead, is just exploring, at least for now, the potential and possible limits 
of  standard  licensing  models  and  assessing  the  feasibility  of  technology 
platforms to facilitate text and data mining access.  
3.3.4  Legalisation of non-commercial sharing of protected works 
through a statutory license 
During  the  debate  about  the  desirability  of  new  exceptions  in  the  EU 
Digital  Single  Market,  a  civic  society  organisation  claimed  that  non-
commercial sharing of cultural works on peer-to-peer networks should be 
made legal. It was argued that the Information Society Directive could be 
amended  in  order  to  allow  a  copyright  limitation  aimed  at  excluding 
unauthorised  file  sharing  among  individuals,  having  not-profit-making 
character,  from  the scope  of  the  exclusive  rights  of  reproduction  and  of 
making  digital  content  available  to  the  public.  According  to  the 
proponents, this new provision should be accompanied by the creation of 
new social rights to remuneration and access to funds granted to authors. 
Under this scheme, all Internet broadband subscribers should be obliged to 
pay a flat-rate monthly fee collected by ISPs and aimed at remunerating 
creators  of  works  shared  over  the  Internet  and  at  funding  content 
production.  
Proposals  aimed  at  legalising  file  sharing  have  been  made  for  a 
decade  now.112  In  the  most  sophisticated  (and  legally  most  plausible) 
versions,  these  proposals  advocate  the  creation  of  an  exception  to  the 
exclusive right of digital reproduction – through an expansion of the scope 
of the exception of private copying, which would cover user downloads – 
and  the  implementation,  at  the  same  time,  of  extended  (or  mandatory, 
alternatively) collective licenses that, through the intermediation of rights-
holder collecting societies, would clear  copyright in the content that file 
sharers upload.  
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112 See, for instance, N. Netanel (2003), “Impose a Non-commercial Use Levy to Allow Free 
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing”, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 17(1), p. 1; and W. 
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These proposals gained momentum in the US and in Europe at a time 
when markets for online content (especially Cloud-based services enabling 
access to digital works in streaming) had not emerged and developed yet. 
At that time, there seemed to be no or little alternative to unauthorised file 
sharing  for  efficient  dissemination  of  creative  works  online. Markets  for 
digital  content  were  not  mature  yet  since  copyright  owners  (and  their 
rights  licensors)  had  not  adapted  their  business  to  the  new  digital 
environment (not fully, at least) and web-based content platform could not 
rely on today’s broadband Internet access services for a smooth and user-
friendly delivery of digital works. Moreover, from a purely legal point of 
view, the legalisation of unauthorised downloads through the extension of 
the private copying exception was (and still is) at odds with the three-step 
test and, in particular, with the requirement that aims at protecting actual 
and  potential  markets  for  copyright  works  from  excessively  broad 
exceptions.  
Nowadays there are several factors that make the enactment of such a 
legislative reform unlikely, at least in Europe. Firstly, the fact that online 
markets have been eventually developing and that EU policy-makers want 
such markets to grow and become increasingly cross-border, reaching one 
day (possibly) the stage of the EU Digital Single Market, should be taken 
into  consideration.  Legalising  file  sharing  would  be  likely  to  have 
disruptive  effects  on  nascent  or  well-functioning  online  content  markets 
and  would  frustrate  the  most  recent  initiatives  that  the  European 
Commission has  recently  undertaken  in  the  field  of  copyright  licensing. 
Secondly,  it  should  also  be  considered  that  large-scale  online  copyright 
infringements are likely to decrease significantly with the increasingly wide 
and cheaper offerings of legitimate online content. At the same time, online 
‘piracy’  could  be  reduced  to  a  more  tolerable  extent  through  a  more 
nuanced and effective implementation of the judicial measures and tools 
made available under the laws implementing the 2004 Intellectual Property 
Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED).113 Finally, neither rights-holders nor 
ISPs  seemed  to  endorse  the  proposed  scheme  of  statutory  licences  and 
eventually agreed that the scheme would not be beneficial to anyone. On 
the  one  hand,  copyright  holders  clearly  expressed  their  preference  for 
voluntary licensing schemes in the online environment. On the other hand, 
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ISPs firmly refused to embark on a licensing scheme that would raise the 
transaction and administrative costs related to their role of intermediaries 
with their subscribers dramatically.  
3.4  Copyright exceptions and the pursuit of public policy goals 
A short digression on the constitutional dimension of copyright exceptions 
is indispensable to understand why EU law has failed to take the public 
policy  element  that  normally  upholds  these  provisions  in  due 
consideration. Unsurprisingly, this approach was mostly a consequence of 
the purely Internal Market-related angle from which copyright rules have 
been harmonised.  
3.4.1  Constitutional dimension of copyright exceptions 
In  both  the  copyright  and  the  droit  d’auteur  traditions,  exceptions  to 
exclusive rights seek to strike a balance between granting incentives and 
rewards for individual creation, and providing too much protection and 
thereby  stifling  intellectual  innovation.  In  the  relevant  literature,  it  is 
argued  that  copyright  exceptions  that  facilitate  ‘transformative’  or 
‘productive’  uses  of  copyrighted  works  should  be  ranked  above  all  the 
other  exceptions.114  Keeping  transformative  uses  distinct  from  non-
transformative  (i.e.  consumptive)  uses  helps  identify  the  justification  or 
rationale  underlying  each  copyright  exception.  Exceptions  that  allow 
transformative uses must be considered to be more important than those 
that  enable  mere  reproductive  (and  hence  ‘non-transformative’)  uses 
because  only  the  former  promote  the  creation  of  competing  works  by 
                                                   
114 See Senftleben (2004), Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test. An Analysis of the three-
Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p.  39; 
Heide (2003), Copyright, Contract and the Legal Protection of Technological Measures – Not “the 
Old  Fashioned  Way”:  Providing  a  Rationale  to  the  “Copyright  Exceptions  Interface”’ 
(www.ssrn.com). The distinction between transformative and non-transformative uses is 
used here in a merely descriptive way. In short, transformative use takes place when the 
user creates a new work incorporating an earlier one into it. Derivative works, such as 
caricatures, parodies, and pastiches, as well as uses such as quotations for teaching, criticism 
and scientific research, exemplify transformative use. In contrast, non-transformative use 
takes place when the user accesses the work without embedding it into a new creation. Non-
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leaving follow-on users free to share ideas or parts of pre-existing works.115 
This conclusion is ultimately grounded in the constitutional protection of 
freedom of expression, which guarantees public access to quotations and 
enables other transformative uses of copyrighted works, like caricatures, 
parodies and pastiches.  
By permitting certain transformative uses without the authorisation 
of the copyright owner, certain exceptions built into copyright laws protect 
and  encourage  freedom  of  expression  ensuring  that  new  generations  of 
creators have the opportunity to build upon pre-existing stocks of works 
still protected by copyright. The assumption is that intellectual creation, as 
a fruit of human intellect, is a cumulative process that requires an author to 
permit follow-on creators to use and enjoy the fruit of his or her labour in 
the same way as he or she was allowed to access already existing works.116  
By  opening  up  new  scenarios  for  uses  of  copyrighted  works,  the 
advent  and  the  very  fast  development  of  the  digital  environment  have 
considerably strengthened the need for society to have an effective system 
of copyright exceptions that can preserve online the constitutional values 
that have traditionally been protected offline. Unfortunately, EU law- and 
policy-makers did not pursue this objective when drafting and discussing 
the provisions of the Information Society Directive in the late 1990s.117  
                                                   
115 See Heide, ‘Copyright, Contract and the Legal Protection of Technological Measures’, op. cit., p. 
2. Nonetheless, the importance of non-transformative uses should never be underestimated 
if one considers  that  the creation of  new works of  authorship would  never be  possible 
without the opportunity of engaging in uses of works (i.e. personal use for the purpose of 
private study) which serve as an indispensable source of inspiration and information for 
contemporary authors and end-users wishing to become new creators. 
116 See Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test, op. cit., p. 38, who describes 
this requirement as ‘intergenerational equity’, a concept based on the idea that intellectual 
creation is a public good which cannot be depleted and which is constantly renewed by new 
ideas  and  forms  of  expression.  On  this  assumption  the  author  argues  that  it  is  highly 
desirable, in order to promote scientific and cultural progress, for transformative and non-
transformative uses of works of the intellect to be able to draw upon more than just the 
public domain, which is formed by all the pre-existing ideas and works of former authors 
which are unprotected (either because of the non-eligibility of mere ideas for copyright 
protection, or due to the expiration of the term of protection of the copyrighted material in 
question). To a certain extent, this opportunity should also concern works of contemporary 
authors who still enjoy copyright protection. 
117 At that time, the primary objective of harmonisation was the elimination of the negative 
effects that the existing differences in protection between member states would have had on 
the internal market for copyrighted goods. The new digital environment, in particular, was 
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EU law-makers were mostly worried about the increased economic 
impact that exceptions might have had in the context of the new digital 
environment.  For  that  reason,  they  acknowledged  in  the  Directive’s 
preamble that the scope of certain exceptions could have to be even more 
limited when it comes to certain new uses of copyright works.118  
At  that  time,  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  did  not 
bind  EU  secondary  legislation,  as  it  will  do  after  the  upcoming  formal 
accession of the EU to the Convention.119 With the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the new version of Article 6 of the 
Treaty on European Union formally recognises the constitutional value of 
protection of human rights, providing that the freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union should 
have the same legal value as the EU Treaties.120 If this had been the EU 
legislative framework at the time when the Information Society Directive 
was drafted, the legal treatment of copyright exceptions would probably 
have been more consistent and would have ensured higher consideration 
for exceptions protecting and enhancing freedom of expression.  
It was briefly recalled above that, as things stand, EU law raises no 
distinction  between  major  and  minor  exceptions  and  restricts  member 
states from enacting new exceptions. In addition, the Information Society 
Directive provides no interface between copyright protection, contracts and 
measures  of  technological  protection  (e.g.  Digital  Rights  Management 
systems) having the potential to restrict uses permitted by law, both legally 
and technically. The only attempt that the Directive made in this regard 
was that of obliging member states to monitor the conduct of copyright 
holders and to take appropriate measures in order to ensure that a limited 
                                                                                                                                 
understood  as  making  such  differences  “more  pronounced  in  view  of  the  further 
development  of  transborder  exploitation  of  works  and  cross-border  activities  […]”:  see 
Recital 31 of the Information Society Directive. As pointed out in the relevant literature, had 
the Directive been consistent with this objective, harmonisation measures could only have 
been  taken  when  there  was  plain  evidence  that  these  discrepancies  would  affect  intra-
Community trade: see Cornish and Llewelyn (2005), Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, 
Trade Marks and Allied Rights, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 441.  
118 See Recital 44 of the Information Society Directive.  
119 See Art. 6(2) TEU.  
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number  of  exceptions  can  be  exercised  effectively,  in  spite  of  the 
implementation of technologies such as DRMs.121  
3.4.2  Uncertainties concerning the automated processing of digital 
works 
To understand why the current legal treatment of copyright exceptions at 
EU  level  raises  so  many  uncertainties  and  problems  in  today’s  digital 
environment one should start by considering that the harmonised right of 
digital reproduction is so broadly defined as to cover all forms of copying, 
including  temporary  copying,  and  then  use  of  digital  works.  The  sole 
mandatory exemption at EU level is granted to acts of copying occurring 
for the purpose of enabling i) mere transmission of copyrighted materials 
between third parties by an intermediary and ii) a lawful use of protected 
content.122 This means that, unless one of the optional types of exceptions 
listed  under  Art.  5  of  the  Information  Society  Directive  proves  to  be 
applicable  in  a  certain  member  state,  whatever  unauthorised  use  of 
copyrighted digital materials falls within the copyright scope, and requires 
a license in order to be lawful.  
During the Task Force debate, participants widely agreed that, to a 
large  extent,  blocking  and/or  excessively  restrictive  effects  in  online 
content communications stemming from the very broad scope of the right 
of  digital  reproduction  (and  from  the  little  room  granted  to  exceptions) 
were somehow mitigated by the implementation of ‘notice-and-takedown’ 
                                                   
121 Art. 6(4) of the Information Society Directive creates safety nets for copyright exceptions 
against DRMs. This complex provision establishes obligations for member states to make it 
sure that certain exceptions can be effectively exercised notwithstanding the legal protection 
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other: photocopying, quotations for teaching and scientific purposes, uses for the benefit of 
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museums, ephemeral recordings made by broadcasters and copies of broadcasts made by 
non-commercial social institutions. The scope of application of the above-mentioned safety 
nets is made even narrower by the last provision of Art. 6(4), which makes the mechanism 
non-applicable to digital works made available on-demand. For a more detailed analysis, 
see Mazziotti, EU Digital Copyright Law and the End-User, op. cit., pp. 94-100.  
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procedures, as a result of the safe harbour provisions embodied in the 2000 
Electronic Commerce Directive.123 Representatives of online intermediaries 
and  search  engine  operators  acknowledged  that  the  creation  of  liability 
exemptions for ISPs, as a mandatory measure of electronic communication 
policy in the whole EU territory, has had a relevant impact in the Internal 
Market by facilitating the setting up of online content services and making 
the conditions under which unauthorised content should be removed after 
a notice of the copyright holder uniform in all EU jurisdictions. 
Whenever the above-mentioned EU-wide liability exemptions or local 
exceptions prove to be inapplicable, any unauthorised uses of copyright 
works inevitably falls within copyright’s scope. From a legal point of view, 
this  means  that  any  act  of  such  reproductions  and/or  communications 
requires a licence from the copyright holder. In practical terms, this means 
that, in the absence of applicable exceptions, a search engine operator or an 
online  news  aggregator  would  need  a  license  in  order  to  legitimately 
display picture thumbnails or text snippets in the supply of their services to 
the  public.  The  German  Federal  Supreme  Court  indirectly  upheld  this 
conclusion in a well-known case concerning the lawfulness of unauthorised 
reproduction  and  making  available  to  the  public  of  copyright  protected 
pictures  in  thumbnail  form  by  Google’s  image  search  engine.124  After 
having  found  that  the  quotation  exception,  as  shaped  under  German 
copyright  law,  could  not  cover  this  kind  of  use,  the  Court  applied  the 
doctrine of ‘implied consent’ in order to find Google not liable of copyright 
infringement. The judgment found that the copyright owner had implicitly 
authorised the use of her protected pictures in the search engine service by 
making  her  works  available  online  without  applying  technical  means 
blocking the automatic indexing and displaying of online content by search 
engines.125 As persuasively pointed out in the literature, this case is a very 
good example of how national courts constrained by a closed system of 
exceptions at EU level look for flexibilities outside the copyright field.126  
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As things stand, in many EU jurisdictions it is very uncertain whether 
or not acts of automated data processing of digital works performed by 
machines can take advantage of any copyright exceptions. Uncertainties are 
even greater with regard to the automated processing of copyright works 
that machines undertake to the benefit of machines, for uses that are not 
addressed to (and intelligible) to humans. An excellent example is given, in 
the  context  of  large-scale  book  digitisation  projects,  by  so-called  ‘non-
display’  uses  of  literary  works.  It  is  still  uncertain  whether  the 
unauthorised  scanning  and  digitisation  of  literary  works  which  are  not 
displayed to users but are merely used for purposes of data mining127 and 
text-mining128 infringe copyright or not. 
Interestingly, data mining for scientific research purposes is one of 
the  themes  that  have  been  discussed  in  the  platform  for  stakeholder 
dialogue (“Licences for Europe”) that the European Commission launched 
in  January  2013  after  its Communication  on  Content  in  the  Digital  Single 
Market  of  18  December  2012.  The  official  premise  is  that  data  mining 
requires a copyright licence (i.e. an additional licence on top of the licence 
to access the copyright works). Unlike the UK Intellectual Property Office 
in  its  reform  plan  for  modernisation  of  copyright,  the  European 
Commission is not considering (at least for now) the possible adoption of 
an exception to copyright that would permit the use of the analytics for 
non-commercial research. As things stand, the Commission does not intend 
to  go  beyond  the  exploration  of  standard  licensing  models  that  can 
facilitate access to, and use of, data. This means that data mining falls prima 
facie within the scope of copyright protection. If that held true, copyright 
would inevitably extend to facts and data embodied in the copyright works 
(e.g. scientific journal articles) that technologies used by researchers have to 
copy in large quantities in order to be able to analyse patterns, trends and 
other useful information. These bulk copies are deemed to be infringing if 
they are made without the specific authorisation of copyright holders and 
                                                   
127 ‘Data-mining’ is normally referred to as the extraction of implicit, previously unknown, 
and potentially useful information from data. Data-mining is in many ways conceptually 
similar to ‘reading’ and ‘research’. It is a way for software to perform tasks such as reading, 
comparing  and  analysing  large  quantities  of  data  in  order  to  draw  conclusions.  It  has 
become  a  ‘copyright  suspect’  since  the  above-mentioned  tasks  are  achieved  through 
technology.  
128 “Text-mining’ indicates finding structural patterns in texts, extracting information out of 
these patterns and combining them with data on the use of work like data on works search 
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academic publishers, who claim to have received a very few requests for 
such  licences.  Infringements  are  likely  to  occur  also  if  licenses  granting 
access to research materials explicitly exclude text and data mining from 
their subject matter. Newspaper publishers emphasised that text- and data- 
mining is already happening for subscribed content for non-commercial-
use  (without  charge  to  the  users)  subject  to  some  basic  conditions. 
Furthermore, publishers stressed that access to subscribed content is being 
facilitated, often by re-packaging content in easily mined formats in order 
to  enable  consistent  search  results  without  technical  barriers  that  might 
otherwise  occur  if  researchers  sought  to  mine  data  directly  on  the 
publishers’ servers. What is crucial in this area for publishers is that any 
activity of text- and data-mining is carried out in a way that ensures that 
the database infrastructure and quality are maintained. Additionally, both 
book  and  newspaper  publishers  pointed  out  that  they  are  currently 
working within the ‘Licences for Europe’ initiative on a model clause for 
licences in the area of subscribed content in order to streamline this process 
still further.  
In  this  regard,  it  is  certainly  worth  exploring,  as  the  European 
Commission  has  been  doing,  whether  or  not  licensing  practices  can 
develop and become beneficial to both rights-holders and non-commercial 
re-users of scientific research materials. However, in consideration of the 
socially valuable character of these uses, EU law-makers might consider 
exempting this particular form of copying from copyright’s scope through 
a  specific  exception  or  through  a  ‘flexibility  clause’  that  would  place 
national courts in a position to draw flexibly on requirements of fairness 
like the ones embodied in the three-step test. At the end of the day, there 
are important precedents under EU copyright law that show that certain 
types  of  reproduction  of  copyrighted  content  should  be  exempted  in 
mandatory way in order to effectively achieve socially valuable goals and 
pursue objectives that are in conflict with absolute copyright protection. 
The EU Software Directive is the best example in this respect in so far as it 
obliges  member  states  to  restrict  the  right  of  reproduction  on  computer 
programs by granting lawful acquirers of a copy of the computer program 
a number of contractually non-waivable rights of use ensuring consumer 
protection, freedom of research and study, and openness and competition 
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parties  independently  create.129  If  EU  law-makers  wished  to  amend  the 
Information Society Directive on the legal treatment and on the status of 
the most important and valuable exceptions, hence, they would have an 
easy-to-follow example, i.e. the Directive that, in 1991, harmonised national 
copyright  rules  in  Europe  with  specific  regard  to  the  very  first  type  of 
information good.  
3.5  Boundaries of the private copying exception under EU law 
The Internal Market distortions created by the implementation of private 
copying exceptions at national level, and the European Commission’s plan 
to  intervene  in  this  area  somehow,  led  the  Task  Force  participants  to  a 
discussion about the boundaries of this type of exception under EU law. In 
particular, the debate focused on the kinds of copying that should trigger 
the application of levies, on how levies will have to be calculated and how 
a  higher  degree  of  efficiency  and  transparency  can  be  ensured  and  on 
whether  or  not  levies  remain  a  desirable  tool  to  subsidise  creativity. 
Participants  also  addressed  the  issue  of  whether  levy  systems  might  be 
replaced by national funds in the close future. This section will give an 
overview of the debate after having briefly recalled how the Information 
Society Directive deals with private copying.  
3.5.1  The current legal treatment of private copying at EU level 
The Information Society Directive defines private copying as copying made 
by  “  […]  a  natural  person  and  for  ends  that  are  neither  directly  nor 
indirectly  commercial,  on  condition  that  the  rights-holders  receive  fair 
compensation which takes account of the application or non-application of 
technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter 
concerned […]”.130  
                                                   
129  See  the  Software  Directive.  The  non-waivable  rights  of  use  created  by  the  Software 
Directive are the following: i) the right to make a back-up copy of the program (see Art. 
5(2)); ii) the right to observe, study or test the functioning of the programmme in order to 
determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program (see Art. 
5(3)); and iii) the right to reproduce the source code of the program and to translate its form 
when  these  acts  are  indispensable  to  obtain  the  information  necessary  to  achieve  the 
interoperability of an independently created program with other programs (i.e. the so-called 
‘decompilation’ or ‘reverse engineering’ of computer programs; see Art. 6(1)).  
130 See Art. 5(2)(b) of the Information Society Directive.  COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 97 
As a result of this provision, EU member states are entitled to set out 
an exception to an exclusive right (i.e. the right of reproduction) that would 
otherwise  extend  to  private  use  of  copyright  work.  Nonetheless,  the 
Directive  gives  member  states  the  option  of  freely  estimating  the 
desirability of declassifying the exclusive right to authorise private copying 
into  a  statutory  license,  on  condition  that  this  declassification  is 
accompanied by fair compensation in favour of rights-holders, and that the 
level of such compensation takes account of the presence and operation of 
technological measures.131 
The provision at issue has two important implications. On the one 
hand, it actually enables member states to maintain or introduce so-called 
levy systems even in digital settings. Member states are thereby given the 
option of determining the form, the detailed arrangement and the possible 
level of fair compensation, on condition that they carefully evaluate, among 
other circumstances, whether private copying causes minimal harm to right 
holders  or  not.132  On  the  other  hand,  Article  5(2)(b)  provides  that,  if 
compensation schemes are not maintained or newly introduced, member 
states  must  ensure  the  phasing-out  of  levies  as  long  as  technological 
measures such as DRM systems effectively control and enforce the private 
use and copying of protected materials. 
A few years after the enactment of the Information Society Directive, 
it had already become clear that there was no common ground on how 
member  states  had  implemented  the  provision  of  Article  5(2)(b)  of  the 
Directive.133  After  holding  a  consultation  with  member  states  and  all 
stakeholders in October 2004, the European Commission’s Internal Market 
Directorate General disclosed the intention of intervening in the complex 
interplay  created  by  the  implementation  of  DRM  technologies  and  the 
proliferation of national  levies on digital copying equipment and digital 
media.134  According  to  the  Roadmap  document  regarding  a  possible 
                                                   
131 See the Information Society Directive, Recital 35, in fine. 
132 Ibid., Recital 35. 
133 See the speech given by Charles McCreevy (European Commissioner for Internal Market 
and Services), Address to the European-American Business Council/Business Software Alliance 
Conference  on  Digital  Rights’  Management,  High  level  Industry  Seminar/Global  Industry 
Roundtable  on  Levies  and  DRMs,  Brussels,  12  October  2005 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/copyright-infso/copyright-infso_en.htm). 
134 See Commission of the European Communities, Copyright levy reform, Commission’s 
Work Programme for 2006 – Roadmap. 98 | DOES EUROPE NEED TO REFORM COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS? 
copyright levy reform in the EU delivered by the Commission in 2006, the 
above consultation evidenced that levies were unequally applied in terms 
of equipment, media and amounts across EU member states, and that there 
was a lack of transparency in relation to their collection and distribution.  
From  then  onwards  the  European  Commission  has  undertaken  a 
number of initiatives and consultations with stakeholders seeking to tackle 
the heavy distortions created in the Internal Market by an unequal and not 
sufficiently efficient and transparent application of levies. Drawing on the 
achievements of a draft Memorandum of Understanding developed though 
the  intermediation  of  the  Commission  in  2009,  a  mediation  process  on 
copyright  levies  launched  in  April  2012  sought  to  boost  a  stakeholders 
agreement on outstanding critical issues (see §3.6 below).  
3.5.2  What types of copying should trigger the application of 
levies?  
Copyright levies are applied in 22 out of 27 member states on blank media 
and recording devices.135 Levy systems make it possible for authors and 
other  categories  of  rights-holders  (i.e.  publishers,  music  performers  and 
actors,  recording  and  film  producers)  to  obtain  fair  remuneration  for 
unauthorised copying of their works while respecting consumer privacy 
and ensuring legal certainty for personal use. In addition, as stressed by 
copyright  holders,  levies  are  and  should  remain  anchored  to  a  market 
failure rationale, and should therefore be implemented just when licensing 
proves to be either impossible or economically unviable. This should also 
mean, for a matter of logic and consistency within the levy system, that for 
the types of copying that fall within a statutory licence, and subsequently 
trigger the application of levies, licensing should not be allowed and cannot 
become  an  alternative  to  levies  (otherwise  the  consumer  would  end  up 
paying  twice).  The  Information  Society  Directive  indirectly  upholds  this 
conclusion by obliging EU member states to take account of the application 
(or  non-application)  of  DRM  systems  (and  hence  of  existing  licensing 
schemes) in determining whether or not levies should apply.136  
                                                   
135 It is worth noting that the UK, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus are the only 
member states of the European Union where levy systems have never existed. Annex I 
provides three tables showing retail prices for i) printers, ii) music/video/game devices and 
iii) tablet computers in 20 countries against levy and VAT rates.  
136 See Art. 5(2)(b). Music publishers emphasised that if DRMs had been standardised and 
developed in order to ensure interoperability these systems might have been accepted by 
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The  inclusion  of  types  of  copying  in  the  scope  of  the  statutory 
licensing  schemes  accompanied  by  levies  should  be  assessed  on  the 
grounds of certain elements (or requirements) that Task Force participants 
took into consideration. The purpose of the debate was not only that of 
clarifying  what  the  scope  of  private  copying  currently  is,  but  also 
suggesting how the above-mentioned requirements could be harmonised 
and made uniformly applicable in those EU countries that decide to keep or 
introduce a private copying exception.  
As  we  have  seen,  under  the  Information  Society  Directive  the 
requirement  of  fair  compensation  is  a  condition  for  the  application  of 
private copying, unless harm caused by unauthorised copying proves to be 
minimal.  It  was  persuasively  argued  in  the  discussion  that  a  common 
definition of ‘harm’ and of the equal conditions under which rights-holders 
should receive fair remuneration for the harm they suffer from copying is 
currently missing at EU level and this gap should preferably be filled, if the 
Directive were amended in the future.  
The CJEU recently held that the concept of fair compensation, within 
the meaning of Article 5(2)(b) of the Information Society Directive, is an 
autonomous concept of EU law which must be interpreted uniformly in all 
the  member  states  that  have  introduced  a  private  copying  exception, 
irrespective  of  the  power  conferred  on  the  member  states  to  determine, 
within the limits imposed by EU law in particular by that Directive, the 
form, detailed arrangements for financing and collection, and the level of 
that fair compensation.137 Unfortunately, in that occasion the CJEU did not 
have the opportunity to extend this clarification to the kind of losses that 
should be compensated through fair compensation. In Padawan v. SGAE the 
CJEU  merely  held  that  fair  compensation  should  be  calculated  on  the 
grounds of the criterion of the harm caused to authors of protected works 
by the introduction of the private copying exception.138  
                                                                                                                                 
consumers, with the consequence that private copying could have been made subject to 
licensing and levies might have eventually been phased out (as foreseen under Art. 5(2)(b) 
of the 2001 Information Society Directive). However, this situation has never materialised 
and,  with  the  proliferation  of  unauthorised  digital  copying,  all  categories  of  copyright 
holders believe that levies should be increased in order to adapt them to the increased harm 
suffered by rights-holders.  
137 C-467/08 Padawan SL v. Sociedad General Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE), 21 October 
2010, [hereinafter Padawan SL v. SGAE ], paras. 33-37.  
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As independent experts stressed in the Task Force debate, a correct 
interpretation of the Directive suggests that ‘harm’ should be seen as an 
unreasonable prejudice leading to an intolerable loss of income for rights-
holders. This means that what causes harm to rights-holders can be either a 
missed licensing opportunity and/or a loss in sales. On these grounds, not 
all types of private copying necessarily cause harm to rights-holders. Only 
some kinds of copying should trigger the application of levies (or other fair 
compensation systems).  Looking  at  the  benchmark  of  the  three-step  test 
(and in particular at its third requirement) law-makers and national courts 
should  always  consider  that  fair  compensation  which  accompanies  the 
exception  of  private  copying  has  traditionally  been  deemed  to  make 
reasonable  the  potentially  unreasonable  prejudice  caused  to  copyright 
holders.  This  means  that,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  fact  that  unauthorised 
private copying might cause prejudice or harm to rights-holders should be 
tolerated.  At  the  same  time,  the  evaluation  of  the  economic  impact  of 
private copying on the licensing or sale opportunities of the copyright work 
should take into consideration that the consumer willingness to pay for the 
making of subsequent copies for personal uses diminishes progressively 
(and  significantly),  and  a  few  of  such  copies  cannot  be  expected  to  be 
remunerated. In this regard, consumer advocates added that a de minims 
rule could be introduced under EU law in order to ensure exclusion from 
the  scope  of  levy  systems  of  forms  of  private  copying  such  as  back-up 
copies, format conversion, and private storage. 
In  the  Padawan  case,  the  CJEU  recently  clarified  the  contours  of 
another  requirement  of  private  copying,  in  the  absence  of  which  levies 
cannot  be  applied  legitimately.  This  requirement  consists  of  a  necessary 
link  between  the  application  of  the  levy  intended  to  finance  fair 
compensation  with  respect  to  digital  copying  equipment,  devices  and 
media and the deemed use of such equipment and devices for purposes of 
private copying. On these grounds, the CJEU found that the indiscriminate 
application  of  private  copying  levies,  in  particular  with  respect  to 
equipment,  devices  and  media  not  made  available  to  private  users  and 
clearly  reserved  for  uses  other  than  private  copying  (i.e.  business  and 
professional uses) is incompatible with the Information Society Directive.  
Finally,  copyright  owners,  and  in  particular  film  producers, 
emphasised  the  central  role  that  the  requirement  of  lawfulness  of  the 
source should play in determining the scope of levies. According to this 
criterion, legitimate private copying can only come from a legal source (i.e. 
a lawfully acquired copy of the work), otherwise the exception would not 
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conflict with the normal exploitation of the copyright work). Even though 
this  requirement  is  not  codified  under  EU  law  yet,  it  seems  to  clearly 
emerge from the existing legal framework and to restrict law-makers and 
national authorities from taking unlawful private copies (e.g. downloads 
from peer-to-peer networks) into consideration for the determination of the 
amounts of levies.  
Interestingly, the fact that copyright works like films are successfully 
marketed in digitally copy-protected formats (e.g. DVD) makes legitimate 
private  copying  in  this  sector  unlikely,  since  consumers  would  need  to 
circumvent technical measures in order to be able to copy the work. It was 
argued that the Information Society Directive justifies the employment of 
adequate  measures  restricting  the  number  of  copies  that  consumers  are 
entitled to make. However, the same Directive leaves national law-makers 
with the freedom to specifically preserve the making of digital copies for 
personal use from the potential override enabled by anti-copy measures.139 
If national law does not create a provision of this kind, the implementation 
of  measures  of  technical  protection  prevails  on  the  enforcement  of  the 
(unprotected) exception, with the consequence that no copyright levy can 
be  charged  legitimately  (otherwise  there  would  be  an  abusive  double 
payment).140  The  inevitable  consequence  of  this  principle  is  that  lawful 
sources of legitimate private copying in the audio-visual sector tend to be 
confined to contexts where content is broadcasted through air and, now, 
over the Internet (i.e. webcasting).  
3.5.3  Methods of calculation, administration and transparency of 
levies 
A variety of fair compensation systems exists in Europe (mainly levies, but 
also  state  subsidies  and  budget  allotments)  which  are  very  different  in 
terms of methods of application, way of calculation, possible level of fair 
compensation,  and  so  on.141  The  Task  Force  participants  unanimously 
                                                   
139 See Art. 6(4)(4) of the Information Society Directive. 
140 This was the conclusion of the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) in Société Studio 
Canal et autres c. Perquin et UFC Que Choisir, judgment of 28 February 2006 (available in 
French  at  http://legalis.net).  At  the  end  of  the  day,  this is  also  what  Recital  39 of  the 
Information Society Directive foresaw: “ […] exceptions and limitations should not inhibit 
the use of technological measures or their enforcement against circumvention.”  
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agreed that common principles would be required in order to harmonise 
these systems.  
Original  rights-holders  (i.e. music  and  audio-visual  authors, music 
performers and actors) claimed that the current system of private copying 
remuneration  is  well  established  and  should  be  the  starting  point  for 
further improvements. Authors and performers, in particular, emphasised 
the importance of levies as a substantial part of their earnings (i.e. 5% of the 
earnings  of  authors  and  35%  for  performers142  in  Europe,  on  average). 
Earnings coming from levy systems are particularly relevant for individual 
creators  and  performers  since  their  respective  rights  to  remuneration 
cannot  be  validly  relinquished  or  transferred  through  contract  under 
national laws and, consequently, constitute a guaranteed source of income 
for them.143 According to individual creators in both the music and audio-
visual sectors, charging levies on new devices is playing a pivotal role to 
ensure fair compensation, due to the speed of technological change. 
This extension of levies requires negotiations and agreements with 
device  manufacturers  who  often  started  lawsuits  to  avoid  or  postpone 
payments. Therefore, a harmonised and improved system would work to 
the  benefit  of  both  manufacturers  and  copyright  holders  since  it  would 
ensure higher predictability (avoiding litigation and its costs) and a faster 
implementation of new levies.  
All the beneficiaries of levies, including music publishers, advocated 
that EU harmonisation should address issues such as a faster adaptation of 
                                                   
142 See AEPO-ARTIS (2009), Performers’ Rights in European Legislation: Situation and Elements 
for  Improvement  -  Updated  Version  (www.aepo-artis.org/usr/AEPO-
ARTIS%20study%202009/AEPO-ARTIS%20Study%20Update_200912.pdf). 
143 In the music sector, the fact that levies stem from the enforcement of a non-waivable right 
to remuneration raises an unsettled dispute between authors and performers, on the one 
hand, and publishers and record companies, on the other hand, about the legitimacy of 
licensing practices targeting digital private copying. Authors and performers claim that the 
private copying exception should cover all copying activities undertaken by the consumer in 
his or her private sphere (once he or she has acquired a lawful copy of the work) and levies 
should be calculated on the grounds of such use. Music publishers and record companies, 
instead, advocate their freedom to license more than one copy to service providers of digital 
content  wishing  to  enable  their  customers  to  legitimately  bring  and  store  the  acquired 
content on more than one device. This disagreement can be easily explained in economic 
terms since authors and (to a greater extent) performers, after having transferred their rights 
to content exploiters, do not have an interest in licensing subsequent private copies that do 
not bring additional royalties to them, whereas they do receive a legally guaranteed income 
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levies to new devices and media, a clear and common methodology for 
tariff  definition,  increased  transparency  and  quicker  negotiations  with 
manufacturers.  Copyright  holders  concluded  that  EU  harmonisation  of 
certain aspects of levy systems is necessary to improve their functioning 
and  to  adapt  them  in  order  to  make  them  fit  for  the  EU  Digital  Single 
Market. 
The  issue  of  lack  of  efficiency  and  transparency  of  existing  levy 
systems  was  raised  by  information  technology,  telecoms  and  consumer 
electronics  companies,  consumer  representatives  and  also  by  certain 
beneficiaries of levies such as music publishers. In different ways, all of 
them  targeted  the  excessively  high  administrative  costs  raised  by  the 
(statutory) interposition of authors’ collecting societies in the activities of 
collection, distribution and use of levies (e.g. for the funding of cultural 
projects and for the social protection of authors).  
In particular, companies manufacturing hardware and devices, which 
are currently liable to finance the fair compensation system (while being 
able  to  transfer  the  actual  burden  of  funding  it  to  private users),  raised 
major  complaints  against  today’s  administration  of  levy  systems.  These 
companies  stressed  that,  pending  distribution,  intermediaries  (i.e. 
collecting societies) end up keeping substantial amounts of rights-holders’ 
money. For instance, in 2010 major societies had accumulated €3.6 billion 
worth of liabilities to rights-holders and were managing €3.7 billion worth 
of available funds.144 Moreover, in countries like France, the interposition of 
an  excessive  number  of  intermediaries  increases  transaction  costs 
dramatically, with the consequence that a large part of the levy revenues 
may  be  absorbed  by  the  administration  systems  themselves,  to  the 
detriment of the rights-holders.145  
For all these reasons, consumer electronics companies welcomed and 
strongly supported the obligations of transparency and reporting that the 
European  Commission’s  proposed  Directive  on  Collective  Rights 
Management  intends  to  create  for  the  activities  of  collecting  societies, 
including the ones regarding levies and the allocation of their revenues. It 
was argued that more competition between collecting societies, as a result 
                                                   
144  See  European  Commission  (2012b),  Impact  Assessment  accompanying  the  Proposal  on 
Collective Management, SWD (2012) 204 final, Brussels, 11.07.2012, p. 19 (see the box named 
“Poor handling of collected royalties”).  
145 See Commission permanente de contrôle de sociétés de perception et répartition des 
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of  their  freedoms  to  offer  their  services across borders  and  to  represent 
rights-holders resident or established in other member states, will certainly 
improve  the  current  picture  of  rights  management  also  with  regard  to 
levies. However, what is still uncertain (and was not touched upon in the 
discussion)  is  whether  and  how  collecting  societies  established  and 
operating outside the (national) territory of collection of levies, and wishing 
to  apply  their  own  national  requirements,  will  be  allowed  to  enter  a 
business  that  the  law  often  reserves  to  local  societies  and  regulates 
heavily.146  
Also  consumer  advocates  complained  that  levy  systems  are  not 
sufficiently  transparent.  They  not  only  agreed  that  the  methods  of 
application and ways of calculation, collection and distribution of levies are 
not  uniform  at  all  in  the  various  EU  member  states,  and  are  also  very 
unclear. They also stressed that consumers are usually unaware of these 
charges  and  of  the  underlying  statutory  license  allowing  copying  for 
personal uses. To solve this problem, a good idea might be that of making 
levies  visible  for  consumers,  obliging  retailers  to  provide  buyers  of 
copyright  equipment,  devices  and  media  with  receipts  where  the  levy 
amount is clearly displayed and explained (shortly).  
A  final  problem  that  was  discussed,  and  that  the  CJEU  recently 
solved in the Opus case, concerned the avoidance of double payments in 
cross-border sales, where both the importing and the exporting countries 
charge a levy on the same device or medium.147 The CJEU held that the levy 
chargeable  to  the  manufacturer  or  importer  of  the  device  or  medium 
should  be  charged  only  in  the  country  of  residence  of  the  consumer, 
regardless of whether the commercial seller of copying equipment (in that 
case  it  was  a  distance  seller  operating  online)  is  established  in  another 
member state. The court’s reasoning was based on the assumption that the 
levy should be viewed as a form of recompense for the harm suffered by 
the author for unauthorised private copying and is ultimately due by the 
person causing the harm, i.e. the consumer. As a result, the damage that the 
                                                   
146 Consumer electronics companies stressed the potential impact on levy systems of the 
application of the 2006 Services Directive to collecting societies, to be understood as service 
providers. If  the  Directive  effectively applied  to  collecting  societies,  they  should merely 
comply with their own national requirements while offering their services on a cross-border 
basis (see footnote 40).  
147  C-462/09  Stichting  de  Thuiskopie  v.  Opus  Supplies  Deutschland  Gmbh,  16  June  2011, 
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levy seeks to repair should be deemed to take place where the consumer 
resides (and not where the distance seller operates).  
3.5.4  Do levies remain a desirable tool to subsidise creativity at 
national level? Can levies be replaced by national funds? 
Authors  and  other  categories  of  rights-holders  took  advantage  of  the 
discussion to point out that levies are still a very good tool to subsidise 
creativity  in  so  far  as  they  provide  an  important  source  of  income  to 
individual creators and the creative sector more in general. Furthermore, 
rights-holders  remarked  that  levies  have  a  positive  effect  on  the 
development and on the economic sustainability of cultural projects and 
their revenues are useful for the social protection of authors.  
Consumer  electronics  companies,  instead,  replied  that  hardware-
based  levies  are  no  longer  desirable  since  new  models  of  content 
distribution  are  developing  rapidly  and  Cloud  computing  is 
revolutionising  consumers’  copying  habits.  Hardware  and  device 
manufacturers advocated the implementation of alternative forms of fair 
compensation that would guarantee rights-holder revenues in the long run 
and a well-functioning ecosystem for creativity.  
From an economics-based perspective, available data show that levies 
clearly have non-negligible subsidising effects for creators and the ability of 
devices and media to copy and store music is an important added value 
that consumers associate to the price of these products.148 More uncertain, 
instead,  is  the  effect  of  levies  on  prices  of  devices  and media,  which  in 
several cases do not seem to be influenced by the level of compensation of 
rights-holders.149 As explained in the relevant literature, the extent to which 
it is profit maximising for manufacturers of copying devices and media to 
pass  on  copyright  levies  to  consumers  (rather  than  absorb  the  costs) 
depends on several factors that might change from one market to another 
(i.e. degree of competition, elasticity of demand and whether or not levies 
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are applied uniformly to all manufacturers).150 This means that the extent of 
‘pass-on’ is difficult to estimate, unless levies are added explicitly on the 
retail price (as prescribed only in Belgium).151 
As regards the possible replacement of levies with state funds, the 
creative sector in general clearly expressed its negative opinion, holding 
that state funds and other alternative system have proven to be inadequate, 
having resulted (for instance in Spain) in dramatic losses for the copyright 
holders. Creators clearly advocated that levies should continue to be paid 
by the end-users who copy protected works, through the interposition of 
those who make copying equipment and devices available to them. Audio-
visual authors, more specifically, asserted that alternative systems based on 
general  taxation  are  inadequate  to  compensate  rights-holders,  do  not 
normally result in decrease of prices for devices and media, while merely 
increasing  profits  for  manufacturers  and  importers  of  such  media.152 
Consumer electronics companies and consumer advocates replied that the 
idea of fair compensation ensured through state subsidies should not be 
rejected  as  such,  if  the  new  system  relied  on  an  estimation  of  the  real 
economic harm suffered by rights-holders.  
Not  surprisingly,  studies  commissioned  by  interest  groups  or 
stakeholders reach very different conclusions about the welfare effects and 
desirability of levies. A study commissioned by Nokia found that the policy 
option of removing copyright levies would lead to gains for everyone.153 
Taking into account current and future dynamics in the market, this study 
argues that, with the removal of levies, consumers would buy more devices 
at  lower  prices  and  would  consume  more  digital  content.  Device 
manufacturers would be better off since they would sell more devices and 
would  have  greater  incentives  to  take  part  in  new  business  models  for 
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distributing  content.  Rights-holders  would  also  benefit  from  such  a 
removal since, with the predictable growth of digital content sales and with 
the development of new business models, they would be able to extract 
effective compensation from their works. Embracing a different economic 
model,  a  study  commissioned  by  a  group  of  copyright  holder 
representatives openly contested the aforementioned findings arguing that 
the  removal  of  levies  would  make  both  copyright  holders  and  device 
manufacturers  worse  off.154  As  regards  content  creators,  the  removal  of 
levies would reduce their incentives to produce new, high quality content 
and would deprive them of the revenue generated by the levy systems. 
Manufacturers  might  gain  financially  from  an  increase  in  sales  of  their 
products in the short term; however, in the long term their products might 
become commercially less appealing since, without the incentives provided 
by levies, there would be much less high quality content to copy. In this 
picture, consumers might gain in the short term because of the decrease of 
prices of devices but in the long run might be worse off since because of 
less investment in content and a lower availability of creative works.  
Considering  the  aforementioned  uncertainties,  a  fully  independent 
and economics-based study on the welfare effects of levies and on their 
influence on retail prices seems necessary. The European Commission has 
the  resources  and  the  expertise  to  undertake  this  kind  of  study  before 
taking any decisions on whether and how to propose new legislation in this 
complicated field.  
3.6  The European Commission’s mediation process and its final 
recommendations  
In  conclusion  of  the  debate  on  private  copying  levies,  the  Task  Force 
participants  discussed  the  European  Commission’s  mediation  process 
launched in April 2012 with EU policy-makers. After having recalled the 
main  challenges  that  a  fast-changing  digital  environment  poses  to  levy 
systems  in  EU  member  states,  a  representative  of  the  Internal  Market 
Directorate General of the Commission stressed that a mediation process 
on the legal treatment of levies was necessary at a time when the debate 
among stakeholders on how to adjust and harmonise these systems at EU 
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level had become increasingly more difficult. As EU policy-makers put it, 
the willingness of stakeholders to discuss about levies after having failed to 
reach an agreement on a Memorandum of Understanding brokered by the 
Commission  in  2009  was  gone.  From  what  the  discussion  revealed,  the 
European  Commission  still  does  not  know  whether  and  how  it  will 
propose legislation in this field.  
Even though at the time of the Task Force discussion the mediation 
report by Antonio Vitorino was not publicly disclosed yet (and it would 
actually fall outside the scope of this work) it seems worth providing an 
overview  of  his  achievements  and  a  brief  comment  on  his  policy 
recommendations.  
3.6.1  Achievements of the mediation process 
The  decision  to  appoint  a  mediator  with  the  task  of  exploring  possible 
solutions to critical issues of European levy systems was announced in a 
communication  of  the  Commission  of  24  May  2011  entitled  “A  Single 
Market  for  Intellectual  Property  Rights  -  Boosting  Creativity  and 
innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs, and first class 
products and services in Europe”.155 The main issues that the mediator was 
asked  to  examine  concerned  the  harmonisation of  methodology  used  to 
impose  levies,  improvements  in  their  administration  (especially  with 
regard to the type of equipment that should be subject to levies), the setting 
of tariff rates and the interoperability of the various national systems in 
light of the cross-border effects that disparate levy systems have on the 
Internal Market.156  
As the mediator openly acknowledged in his report, the interests at 
stake proved to be conflicting and prevented stakeholders from exploring 
common  ground.157  The  mediation  process  took  place  at  a  time  when 
several cases were still pending before the CJEU and a few EU member 
states had just decided to implement alternative forms of remuneration for 
rights-holders. At the same time, CJEU judgments like Padawan and Opus 
had  already  provided  important  clarifications  on  outstanding  critical 
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issues, so that a few problems of interpretation of the existing legislation 
were already solved. Hence, in his report the mediator sought to merely 
facilitate and advance future discussions without envisaging or proposing 
any specific intervention of EU law-makers on levies.  
After consultation with the stakeholders, the mediator reached the 
conclusion that today’s developments in the markets for digital content do 
not justify a radical reform of levy systems yet. His report concluded that 
alternative compensation systems have been put forward but have not been 
sufficiently worked out in detail, so that the elimination of hardware-based 
levies in the immediate future cannot be recommended. What the mediator 
mentioned  as  a  ‘big  bang’  (i.e.  the  elimination  of  levies)  does  not  seem 
advisable for now, in his view.158 The report acknowledged that the recent 
development  of  new  markets  for  digital  content  shows  an  increasingly 
relevant  shift  from  ownership-based  to  access-based  business  models. 
However,  due  to  the  fast-changing  character  of  new  markets  for  digital 
content,  it  is  impossible  for  policy-makers  to  predict  how  consumer 
preferences will evolve in the long term and whether or not unauthorised 
private copying will shrink, as a result of the increasingly wider room for 
licensed content services. In the current situation - the mediator concluded - 
it seems wise to maintain the existing system based on the link between the 
persons causing the harm and taking advantage of the exception (i.e. the 
consumers)  and  the persons  who  are  currently  liable  to  finance  the  fair 
compensation  system.  In  doing  so,  the  mediator  repeatedly  emphasised 
that  one  of  the  guiding  principles  should  be  avoiding  forms  of  double 
payments through the imposition of a levy in cases where rights-holders 
already obtain compensation via licensing agreements covering the private 
copying of their works.  
3.6.2  Policy recommendations of the mediator  
The  mediator  accomplished  his  institutional  task  by  making  policy 
recommendations  aimed  at  ensuring  the  greatest  possible  consistency, 
effectiveness  and  legitimacy  of  the  existing  levy  systems.  The 
recommendations  touched  upon  issues  that  were  discussed  by  the  Task 
Force participants as well as additional issues having a significant impact 
on the functioning of levies, especially in cases of cross-border exploitation.  
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The mediation final report is based on the assumption that, at a time 
when content can be delivered to consumers in the exact way they expect to 
receive  it,  licensing  opportunities  have  become  much  wider  for  rights-
holders and digital content providers. To boost the development of new 
and  innovative  business  models,  licensed  copies  should  not  trigger  the 
application of levies in order to avoid double payments which consumers 
would not show any understanding for. 
As far as the reconciliation of national levies with the objectives of the 
EU  Internal  Market  is  concerned,  the  mediator  acknowledged  that 
divergent  levy  systems  have  raised  obstacles  for  the  functioning  of  the 
Internal Market for long time and that widely varying tariff levels add to 
the problem. However, there are reasons for such disparities that are linked 
to  different  traditions  and  values  that  underlie  member  state  cultural 
policies  and  to  economic  factors  like  different  income  per  capita.  The 
mediator  recommends  that  member  states  should  remain  free  to  decide 
about  whether  or  not  a  product  is  subject  to  a  levy,  following  the 
clarifications  concerning  the  ‘leviability’  of  products  that  the  CJEU 
provided in the Padawan case. He took the view that it would be difficult 
for EU law-makers to make such determinations, which would also run the 
risk of being burdensome and too rigid, and would need to be updated 
constantly.  In  addition,  Vitorino  pointed  out  that  an  individualised 
approach  is  eventually  justified  by  the  fact  that,  while  choosing  what 
products should be made subject to levies and what tariffs should apply, 
member states can more easily transpose and quantify the economic harm 
in  a  way  that  reflects  the  different  purchasing  power  of  the  consumers 
residing in their own countries.159  
In order to remove the most severe barriers in the Internal Market (in 
compliance  with  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality)  the 
mediator  believes  that  several  measures  should  be  undertaken:  i)  the 
liability  to  pay  levies  should  be  shifted  to  the  entity  selling  the  levied 
products to consumers (i.e. the retailer); ii) levies should be made visible for 
the consumer and iii) more coherence should be placed into the process of 
setting levies. In particular, levies should be set out through a common EU-
wide definition of ‘harm’ based on the criterion of lost profit and on the 
economic value that consumers attach to additional private copies, which 
can  be  estimated  considering  the  consumer’s  progressively  decreasing 
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willingness to pay for these copies if there were no exception. Tariff-setting 
mechanisms should also rely on a procedural framework aimed at reducing 
complexity (e.g. through faster and smoother procedures where national 
authorities  should  not  intervene  unless  it  becomes  evident  that  an 
agreement between the parties is impossible), guaranteeing objectiveness 
(e.g. avoiding retroactive application of levies), and ensuring compliance 
with strict time limits (e.g. in case of introduction of a new product on the 
market, the decision as to the applicability of a levy on that product should 
be  taken  within  one  month  following  its  introduction).  In  the  above-
mentioned context, iv) levies in cross-border transactions should only be 
collected in the member state where the end-user has her or his residence 
(as  clarified  by  the  CJEU  in  the  Opus  case).  Moreover,  the  shift  of  the 
liability to pay levies from the level of manufacturers and importers to the 
retailer’s level should be facilitated by v) simplifying the levy tariffs system 
and vi) obliging manufacturers and importers to inform collecting societies 
about their transactions concerning products subject to a levy.  
Considering  the  limited  scope  of  his  mandate,  the  mediator 
envisioned  a  new  model  for  national  levy  systems  that  would  certainly 
improve the state of the art and would bring workable solutions to practical 
problems that have arisen so far in the implementation of levies on a wide 
and disparate variety of products across the EU. In particular, significant 
improvements would stem from shifting the liability to pay the levy from 
the  manufacturer  (or  importer)  level  to  the  retailer’s  level.  The 
recommended  change  would  presuppose  a  drastic  simplification  of  the 
applied tariffs, which should be reduced to a very limited number so as to 
give retailers the opportunity to reasonably handle this new task, together 
with that of providing customers with a receipt where the levy is visible. 
As a result of the shift, the mediator convincingly recommends that the 
previously liable persons (i.e. manufacturers and importers) should inform 
levy collectors (i.e. collecting societies) about their transactions concerning 
levied products in order to place collectors in a position to deal with and 
monitor a much bigger number of newly liable parties (i.e. retailers).  
The mediator’s report also embodies unconvincing recommendations 
showing  an  incomprehensible  reluctance  to  embrace  effective  pan-
European solutions, especially with regard to the non-harmonisation at EU 
level  of  the  products  (or  classes  of products)  to  be  levied.  The  fact  that 
economic  harm  and,  as  a  result,  the  level  of  fair  compensation  should 
preferably  mirror  the  different  purchasing  power  of  consumers  in  the 
various  member  states  adopting  levies  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
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achieved by letting tariffs to be set at national level. At EU level, instead, 
the risk of a supposedly too burdensome mechanism of identification of the 
levied products could be easily avoided by entrusting a Directorate General 
of the Commission or another European administrative body with the task 
of  making  such  EU-wide  determinations  and  ensuring  a  periodical  and 
technology-wise update of the list of levied products.  
In  conclusion,  in  spite  of  its  valuable  final  recommendations,  the 
mediation process does not seem to have achieved the expected results. As 
the mediator acknowledged openly, the attempt to reconcile stakeholders 
and  to  find  common  positions  among  them  on  the  most  critical  issues 
concerning levy systems was as unsuccessful as the previous attempts in 
this field. Moreover, it is very unclear whether and how the Commission 
will be able to implement these recommendations before the expiration of 
its  mandate  in  2014.  The  recommendations  indicate  solutions  in  the 
abstract, without saying how they should concretely be implemented and 
by whom, i.e. at what level of legislation or regulation. This initiative was 
clearly weakened by an excessively narrow scope of the mediator’s initial 
mandate (i.e. a mere mediation process involving stakeholders) and by his 
reluctance to explore opportunities for reform that would have required 
freedom to go beyond the boundaries of the existing legislative framework 
and of the case law that the CJEU has developed so far. The fact that a few 
relevant  cases  on  levies  are  still  pending  before  the  CJEU  certainly 
discouraged the mediator from accomplishing his task in a more open and 
forward-looking  way.  The  most  significant  example  of  this  excessively 
prudent  and  constrained  approach  is  the  mediator’s  full  reliance  on  a 
judgment of the CJEU (i.e. Padawan v. SGAE) which actually sets out a very 
low  standard  for  ‘leviability’  of  products,  making  it  possible  that  all 
equipment,  devices  and  media  that  are  technically  capable  of  copying 
copyright works end up being subject to a levy. It is hard to believe that 
such  a  low  standard,  which  might  cause  an  increasingly  higher 
proliferation  of  levies  on  different  products  in  the  various systems,  will 
have to be taken as the parameter for the future application of levies in the 
EU.  
It is not easy to understand why consultation with member states was 
not  envisaged  in  the  scope  of  the  mediation  process.  The  Commission 
should have considered more carefully that, as far as EU law stands, the 
choice about whether and how a levy system should be implemented in a 
given EU country depends solely on the discretion of national law-makers. 
The  fact  that  member  states  appeared  as  the  uninvited  guests  in  this 
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start of this process, several European governments had already expressed 
their intent to radically reform their levy systems (e.g. Spain, Netherlands) 
or not to introduce levies despite the introduction of a new private copying 
exception  (i.e.  United  Kingdom).  Even  the  mediator  emphasised  the 
necessity to start discussions with member states at this stage.160 It has to be 
seen now how the Commission will develop this dossier and whether it 
will continue to seek an apparently impossible agreement of stakeholders 
on  very  critical  issues  for  the  Internal  Market  that  would  require 
independent  policy  decisions  based  on  economic  evidence  and  a 
sufficiently wide democratic consensus by EU law-makers. At a time when 
the debate on digital copyright policy has become so turbulent, the issue of 
copyright levies would certainly require more than a mediation attempt 
and a clear and uniform solution at EU level based on sound economic 
evidence.  
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4.  ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: CURRENT 
SCENARIOS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
4.1  Introduction 
The Task Force participants finally focused on unsettled issues raised by 
the unequal implementation of online copyright enforcement measures in 
the  EU.  This  topic  proved  to  be  of  great  interest  to  all  panellists  and 
discussants  because  of  the  major  impact  that  a  significant  reduction  of 
online  ‘piracy’  would  have  on  the  development  of  markets  for  digital 
content  throughout  the  EU.  In  this  regard,  the  rejection  of  the  Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) by the European Parliament in 
July 2012 and the ongoing review of the existing EU legislation on online 
copyright enforcement by the European Commission were key elements of 
the discussion.  
This chapter starts with an overview of ACTA and of the reasons that 
led  to  its  political  rejection  and  to  an  unprecedented  clash  between  the 
European Parliament and the Commission (see §4.2). A brief analysis of 
available data showing online copyright infringement rates in one of the 
most  developed  markets  for  digital  content  in Europe  (i.e.  the  UK)  and 
specific examples of enforcement measures issued by national courts (see 
§4.3) pave the way for an examination of the existing legislative framework 
in  the  EU.  The  chapter  draws  on  the  Task  Force  discussion  about  the 
implementation  and  the  interplay  of  EU  law  provisions  that, 
notwithstanding the existence of certain liability exemptions to the benefit 
of online content carriers and hosting service providers, place copyright 
holders in a position to ask national courts for injunctions against various 
online intermediaries aimed at bringing copyright infringements to an end 
(see  §4.4).  The  discussion  touched  upon  what  the  most  suitable 
interpretation  of  potentially  contradictory  provisions  should  be  and  on 
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intermediaries  to  cooperate  with  rights-holders  in  reducing  online 
copyright infringement.  
The  chapter  reports  and  comments  upon  the  debate  on  the 
implementation of judicial remedies such as website blocking measures, the 
adoption  of  filtering  technologies  aimed  at  keeping  copyright  content 
distinct from free information and the disclosure of personal data revealing 
the origin and distribution networks of infringing goods and services. In 
doing  so,  the  present  report  focuses  briefly  on  the  compatibility  of 
enforcement  measures  with  limits  established  by  the  protection 
fundamental rights that the CJEU has recently relied on in responding to 
questions  on  interpretation  of  EU  law  arising  in  the  context  of  national 
enforcement  proceedings  (see  §4.5).  In  particular,  the  Task  Force  group 
examined  the  potential  clash  of  online  copyright  enforcement  measures 
with the enforcement of user rights and civil liberties, including freedom of 
expression  and  communication  on  the  Internet  as  well  as  freedom  to 
conduct business online, the user right to a fair trial, and protection of user 
privacy in electronic communications.  
4.2  ACTA, its rejection and the political battle on online 
copyright enforcement  
The  Anti-Counterfeiting  Trade  Agreement  is  an  international  treaty  that 
sought  to  establish  international  standards  and  common  rules  to  tackle 
large-scale  infringements  of  intellectual  property  rights  (i.e.  copyrights, 
trademarks, patents, designs and geographical indications).161 Discussions 
about  this  agreement  started  informally  in  2007,  whereas  formal 
negotiations were launched in 2008. After seven rounds of negotiations, the 
agreement was finalised in November 2010.162 As stressed by the ‘Trade’ 
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Directorate  General  of  the  European  Commission  (which  negotiated  the 
agreement on behalf of the EU) the adoption of ACTA would have placed 
intellectual property rights holders in a position to benefit from improved 
access  to  justice,  customs,  and  police  to  enforce  their  rights  against 
counterfeiters  or  infringers  in  all  those  countries  where  the  agreement 
would have entered into force. 
With specific regard to online copyright enforcement, ACTA pursued 
the  objective  of  making  the  civil  and  criminal  enforcement  measures 
referred to in the agreement available also in the digital environment. Such 
measures  should  have  included  expeditious  remedies  to  prevent 
infringement  and  remedies  that  constitute  a  deterrent  to  further 
infringements.163  The  provision  of  Article  27(2)  explicitly  obliged  each 
contracting  party  to  apply  enforcement  procedures  to  infringement  of 
copyright and of rights related to copyright over digital networks, which 
may include “[…] the unlawful use of means of widespread distribution for 
infringing purposes […]”. At least in the final version of the agreement, the 
same provision specified that enforcement procedures should have been 
implemented in a manner that avoided the creation of barriers to legitimate 
activity,  including  electronic  commerce  and,  in  compliance  with  each 
party’s  law,  preserved  fundamental  principles  such  as  freedom  of 
expression, fair process and privacy.164  
All parties, with the exception of the EU, Switzerland and Mexico, 
signed the agreement in December 2011. The EU and 22 EU member states 
signed ACTA in Tokyo in January 2012.165 After that step, the European 
Parliament started its consent procedure, which ended in early July 2012 
with  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  by  the  plenary  assembly,  following  the 
negative recommendations made by all parliamentary committees that had 
previously  examined  the  treaty  (i.e.  International  Trade,  Civil  Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs and Legal Affairs).  
Before the Parliament vote, the signature of the treaty had triggered 
an unprecedented and politically broad debate between its supporters and 
opponents that resulted in the resignation in protest of the Parliament’s 
                                                   
163 See ACTA, Art. 27(1). 
164 Ibid., Art. 27(2). 
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appointed  chief  investigator  (French  MEP  Kader  Arif)  as  well  as 
widespread  protests  across  Europe  that  strongly  influenced  and  de  facto 
paralysed  the  treaty’s  ratification  process  at  national  level.  The  newly 
appointed rapporteur (British MEP David Martin) recommended against 
the  approval  of  the  treaty  concluding  that  the  intended  benefits  of  the 
agreement were far outweighed by the potential threats to civil liberties. 
Previously,  in  February  2012,  the  European  Commission  had  referred 
ACTA  to  the  CJEU  seeking  its  legal  opinion  on  whether  or  not  this 
agreement harmed any of the fundamental rights of European citizens. This 
referral was eventually withdrawn in December 2012. 
The Task Force discussion briefly touched upon the various negative 
factors  that  led  to  the  political  rejection  of  a  treaty  that  the  European 
Commission had negotiated for more than four years. A largely insufficient 
inter-institutional dialogue certainly played a crucial role in determining 
the bad outcome of the ratification process as well as a poor perception and 
insufficient communication of the potential benefits of the treaty. Secrecy in 
negotiations that had been developed outside the framework of the WTO 
and concerned an international agreement that, at least for a time, would 
seem  to  embody  an  obligation  for  contracting  parties  to  adopt  (or  to 
strongly encourage the voluntary adoption of) graduated response regimes 
triggered  the  institutional  reaction  of  the  European  Parliament.  In  a 
resolution approved in March 2010, the Parliament openly contested the 
lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiations until that time, asking the 
Commission for an assessment of the potential impact of the new treaty on 
fundamental  rights  such  as  freedom  of  expression  and  the  right  to 
privacy.166  The  resolution  advocated  that  the  new  agreement  should  not 
have made the implementation of so-called ‘three-strikes’ law mandatory 
and that any sanctions implying disconnection of users from access to the 
Internet should have been made subject to prior examination by a court. In 
April  2010,  in  response  to  the  resolution,  the Commission made  a  draft 
version of the treaty publicly available, for the first time.  
What was unanimously deemed to be an even more decisive factor in 
the political debate on ACTA was a new and unprecedented activity of 
protest and lobbying undertaken by activists and, more generally, Internet 
users through open letters, online petitions and emails addressed directly 
                                                   
166 See European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2010 on The Transparency and State of 
Play of the ACTA Negotiations, OJ 2010/C 349 E/10, 22 December 2010. 118 | ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
to  members  of  governments  and  of  the  European  and  of  national 
parliaments. On the grounds of a draft of September 2009 that had been 
leaked, and embodied an enforcement chapter specifically targeted at the 
Internet, opponents of the treaty strongly warned that its approval might 
have  stifled  innovation  and,  even  more  importantly,  would  have 
threatened  online  freedom  of  expression  and  user  privacy.  That  draft 
seemed to oblige ACTA contracting parties to follow US law in making the 
liability exemptions for ISPs conditional on the implementation of policies 
aimed at discouraging unauthorised storage and transmission of infringing 
content,  like  clauses  in  subscription  contracts  enabling  also  graduated 
response schemes.  
By  coincidence  (at  least  as  far  as  timing  was  concerned),  this 
unprecedented  wave  of  protest  and  lobbying  by  individual  users,  civic 
society organisations – with the support of ISP industry associations and of 
the  largest  Internet  companies  –  developed  and  ideally  extended  at 
international  level  an  equally  prominent  (and  successful)  political  battle 
that took place when the US sought to adopt the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(better known as ‘SOPA’). Technically speaking, SOPA had little to do with 
ACTA since it was a legislative proposal aimed at allowing under US law 
enforcement  measures  that  are  already  been  contemplated  at  EU  level 
and/or in most of the EU member states.  
The new bill sought to expand the ability of US law enforcement to 
fight online trafficking in unauthorised copyrighted materials. Provisions 
included the requesting of court orders to bar advertising networks and 
payment facilities from conducting business with infringing websites, and 
search engines from linking to the websites, and court orders requiring ISPs 
to block access to websites. The law would have expanded existing criminal 
laws to include unauthorised streaming of copyrighted content, imposing a 
maximum penalty of five years in prison. At the time of the discussion of 
SOPA  in  the  US  Congress,  a  mobilisation  of  Internet  users,  online 
intermediaries  and  content  platform  devisers  culminated  in  a  ‘blackout’ 
(i.e.  a  switching  off)  of  approximately  7,000  websites  (including  top 
websites like Wikipedia and Reddit) seeking to raise awareness about the 
risks  that  the  new  law  would  have  entailed  (i.e.  tension  with  the  basic 
functioning of the Internet, risks of online censorship, etc).  
As briefly recalled above, ACTA was officially rejected since, along 
with  intended  benefits,  unintended  consequences  might  have  emerged, 
namely  a  potential  limitation  to  civil  liberties  stemming  from  the 
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Interestingly, during the political process that led to the rejection of ACTA 
in Europe, the fact that, at least in its latest (and diluted) version, Article 27 
explicitly preserved legitimate activities such as electronic commerce and 
the protection of fundamental rights (such as freedom of expression, fair 
process and privacy) was not deemed to be a sufficient guarantee against 
the  potentially  ubiquitous  enforcement  of  copyright  in  the  digital 
environment. The Task Force participants widely agreed that, in light of the 
above-mentioned  political  and  legal  objections,  policy-  and  law-makers 
should aim at enacting clear and sufficiently precise legal texts leading to 
foreseeable consequences. This approach would be of great importance for 
policy-makers to be able to face objections related to unintended effects of 
online copyright enforcement.  
More generally, the discussion about ACTA clearly evidenced that 
making civil enforcement measures work in compliance with the protection 
of fundamental rights and civil liberties will be the main challenge for law-
makers in the close future. Such challenge will be even bigger in a context, 
like the EU, that is politically and legally fragmented and where national 
courts  still  grant  different  types  of  online  enforcement  measures  and 
evaluate  the  potential  conflict  between  copyright  and  human  rights 
according  to  distinct  criteria  and  priorities.  The  fact  that  the  European 
Parliament  voted  against  an  international  treaty  that  would  not  have 
eventually  required  the  enactment  of  new  EU  law  provisions  clearly 
revealed  the  existence  of  a  political  bias  against  the  actual  system  of 
copyright enforcement measures from a purely intra-European perspective.  
Considering the conclusion of the saga on ACTA, the enactment of 
further EU legislative measures on copyright enforcement is very unlikely, 
at  least  for  now.  Meanwhile,  it  has  to  be  seen  whether  and  how  the 
increasingly relevant case law of the CJEU will refine the interpretation of 
the existing legislative framework. For example, it is still unclear whether, 
and under which circumstances courts can issue injunctions against online 
intermediaries in order to oblige them to cooperate with rights-holders in 
activities of online copyright enforcement. 
4.3  Online copyright infringement: Current scenarios 
The Task Force debate was stimulated by contributions made by several 
participants. This section provides a short summary of presentations which 
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UK and on the adoption of so-called ‘website blocking measures’ targeted 
at ISPs in the Netherlands.  
4.3.1  Measuring online copyright infringements in the UK: A recent 
study commissioned by OFCOM 
Under the Digital Economy Act (DEA) approved in 2010, UK law assigns to 
OFCOM crucial regulation tasks.167 In short, the DEA established a new 
framework  to  regulate  online  copyright  infringement  by  users  of 
broadband  Internet  access  services.168  The  overall  approach  of  the  DEA 
mirrors legislative initiatives previously adopted in countries like France.169 
The DEA requires ISPs to notify their customers when their accounts are 
supposed to have been used to infringe copyright and to keep a record of 
those  subscribers  who  receive  several  warnings.  The  purpose  of  this 
activity is to enable copyright holders to bring legal action against allegedly 
repeat infringers.170 In this new legal framework, OFCOM was required to 
prepare  a  code  defining  the  initial  obligations  of  ISPs  that  has  to  be 
approved with the consent of the Secretary of State and constitutes one of 
the major steps for the Act to enter into force. In addition to that, OFCOM 
is required to collect data to assess progress in reducing online copyright 
infringement.  
OFCOM started such data collection before the entry into force of the 
DEA, commissioning to Kantar Media an independent consumer tracking 
study aimed at measuring online copyright infringement and at analysing 
                                                   
167  OFCOM  is  the  independent  regulator  and  competition  authority  of  the  UK 
communications industries. For further information see http://ofcom.org.uk.  
168 See Digital Economy Act 2010 (‘Online infringement of copyright’, Sections from 3 to 16) 
(www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/24/contents).  
169  Adopted  in  2008  and  entered  into  force  in  2010,  the  “Création  et  Internet”  act  (Law 
2009/669 of 12 June 2009, amended on 15 September 2009, Journal officiel de la République 
francais) established an administrative authority (HADOPI) that was granted supervisory 
powers with regard to the implementation of so-called ‘three-strike’ procedures. As we will 
see more in depth below, this authority was originally given the power to order ISPs to 
disconnect subscribers who were suspected of repeat copyright infringement.  
170  As  explained  by  Barron  (2011),  ‘‘Graduated  Response’  à l’Anglaise:  Online  Copyright 
Infringement and the Digital Economy Act 2010’, 3(2) Journal of Media Law, pp. 305-310, these 
obligations affect all ISPs irrespective of their liability (i.e. simply by virtue of being ISPs), 
even though the Act anticipates that secondary legislation will limit their application to the 
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the behaviour and attitude of Internet users.171 The research stemmed from 
a  recommendation  made  in  the  2011  Hargreaves  Review.  The  study  is 
based on what is considered the best-available methodology (i.e. user self-
reporting behaviour). This study provides data collected through an online 
survey  involving  20,000  persons  (5,000  per  quarter).172  OFCOM  stressed 
that  data  referring  to  illegal  conduct,  due  to  the  adopted  methodology, 
might  be  affected  by  a  negative  bias.  The  study  points  out  that  15%  of 
Internet users and 29% of users consuming online content are involved in 
illegal activities. Music, films and TV programmes are the types of online 
content that trigger the highest rates of illegal activities. See Figures 2 and 3 
below. 
Figure 2. Percentage of Internet users in the UK using legal, illegal and mixed 
online content (Q3 2012) 
 
 
Source:  Author’s  elaboration  based  on  Kantar  Media  (2012),  Online  Copyright 
Infringement Tracker Benchmark Study Q3 2012, study prepared for OFCOM. 
                                                   
171 See Kantar Media, Online copyright infringement tracker benchmark study Q3 2012, study 
prepared for OFCOM and published on 20.11.2012 (http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk).  
172 Data refer to year 2012. 
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Figure 3. Legal, illegal and mixed use of online content by Internet users in UK 
(Q3 2012) 
 
 
Source:  Author’s  elaboration  based  on  Kantar  Media  (2012),  Online  Copyright 
Infringement Tracker Benchmark Study Q3 2012, study prepared for OFCOM. 
 
In terms of volumes, the top 20% of infringers account for 90% of 
infringements.  Interestingly,  the  study  stresses  that  top  infringers,  who 
combine both legal and illegal activities, spend more money in purchasing 
content  legitimately  (i.e.  digital  and  physical  copies).  According  to  the 
study, Internet users infringe copyright because of excessive costs, prices, 
and because of their limited financial resources. The study suggests that a 
cheaper access to legal services, along with a wider availability and a faster 
release of content, is the main factor that would encourage infringers to 
stop illegal activities and subscribe to online content services. According to 
the survey, UK Internet users consider warnings coming from ISPs about 
copyright infringements and possible sanctions (e.g. disconnection and/or 
reduction of connection speed) less effective than market-driven solutions 
based on a faster and cheaper supply of lawful digital content. Finally, the 
study also evidences the crucial role that education is deemed to play in 
fighting copyright infringement. Such conclusion is upheld by the fact that 
44% of Internet users have acknowledged their inability to clearly discern 
what  is  legal  and  what  is  not  when  navigating  the  web  and  accessing 
content online.  
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4.3.2  ISPs and website blockings: An example from the Netherlands  
In the last years the Netherlands has been one of the most interesting EU 
jurisdictions for the assessment of the impact of website blocking measures 
on  online  copyright  infringement.  From  a  legal  point  of  view,  these 
measures  are  undertaken  through  injunctions  obliging  ISPs  to  restrict 
access by their customers to infringing sites. Given the territorial character 
of copyright and of the related enforcement measures, website blockages 
can actually be obtained on a country-by-country basis under conditions 
and criteria that vary from one jurisdiction to another. Basically, this is a 
remedy  that  courts  have  normally  granted  when  standard  ‘notice-and-
takedown’ procedures would be ineffective because of the large volumes of 
infringing content that are made available through a given site. Copyright 
holders effectively define sites with an overwhelming majority of illegal 
content as ‘structurally infringing’ sites.  
To comply with their obligations under the safe harbour provisions 
created  by  the  Electronic  Commerce  Directive,173  in  2008  several  Dutch 
operators adopted a voluntary code of conduct establishing a procedure for 
intermediaries to deal with notices of unlawful content on the Internet. This 
code has helped ISPs to deal with removal of content from the Internet at 
the request of third parties. In 2010, BREIN (i.e. the anti-piracy body of 
authors, artists, publishers, record and film producers, and producers of 
games, interactive software and books in the Netherlands) sued Ziggo, a 
Dutch  ISP,  in  order  to  block  access  of  its  customers  to  ‘The  Pirate  Bay’ 
(TPB) website. After having being rejected by a first instance court,174 the 
request  of  copyright  holders  was  upheld  by  the  appeal  court,  which 
ordered Ziggo and XS4ALL (another Dutch provider) to  block access to 
TPB.175 The Dutch appeal court considered that this was the only effective 
measure to reduce infringements occurring on that site. In January 2012, 
Ziggo  appealed  the  decision  claiming  that  ISPs  should  not  be  forced  to 
police  the  Internet  and  that  the  decision  creates  a  dangerous  precedent, 
                                                   
173 See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L178/1 (17 July 2000), [hereinafter 
Electronic Commerce Directive]. 
174  Case  number:  365643/KG  ZA  10-573,  19  July  2010  –  LJN:  BN1445,  Rechtbank’s-
Gravenhage, 365643/KG ZA 10-573 (http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl). 
175 Case number: 374634/HA ZA 10-3184, 11 January 2012 – LJN: BV0549, Rechtbank’s-
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since  it  restricts  Internet  freedom  without  ensuring  effectiveness  of  the 
implemented measure. 
In the same way as Ziggo, all Dutch ISPs (i.e. Tele2, KPN, T-Mobile, 
UPC) have been forced to restrict access by their subscribers to The Pirate 
Bay  by  now.176  According  to  ISPs,  decisions  of  this  kind  favour  rights-
holders’ interests in the trade-off between access to information, freedom to 
run a business and copyright protection. As recalled in the discussion, the 
role of ISPs in fighting online infringement has been central in the Dutch 
political debate on copyright enforcement, along with issues such as net 
neutrality.  
A group of Dutch ISPs recently commissioned a study that gathered 
evidence on end-user behaviour in the Netherlands.177 In the same way as 
the OFCOM study, the Dutch study showed that infringers are also the 
main consumers of lawful content as well as the ones who are more likely 
to attend live performances, movie shows and to purchase hard copies of 
digital content. Moreover, the statistics reported in the study showed that 
the blockage of TPB has not affected Dutch end-user behaviour in accessing 
unauthorised  content  online,  whose  consumption  (at  least  as  regards 
audio-visual  content)  has  eventually  increased.  Considering  the  lack  of 
effectiveness of blocking measures, and the ease with which Internet users 
normally  circumvent  them,  representatives  of  telecommunications 
operators re-stated the view that the most effective solution to the problem 
of  copyright  infringement  would  seem  to  be  the  development  of  new 
business models fostering legitimate access to copyright materials. 
4.4  The existing legislative framework in the EU  
One  of  main  subjects  of  the  Task  Force  discussion  was  the  degree  of 
harmonisation  and  implementation  of  online  copyright  enforcement 
measures throughout the EU. Three Directives embody the most important 
provisions  that  member  states  are  required  to  transpose  in  their  legal 
systems  in  order  to  guarantee  an  effective  enforcement  of  copyright  in 
digital settings and, most importantly, on the Internet. These Directives are 
                                                   
176  Case  number:  413085/KG  ZA  12-156,  10  May  2012  –  LJN:  BW5387,  Rechtbank’s 
Gravenhage, 413085/KG ZA 12-156 (http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl).  
177  See  IViR  Institute  for  Information  Law  &  CentERdata  (2012),  File  sharing  2©12  - 
Downloading  from  illegal  sources  in  the  Netherlands 
(www.ivir.nl/publications/poort/Filesharing_2012.pdf).  COPYRIGHT IN THE EU DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET | 125 
the  2000  Electronic  Commerce  Directive,  the  2001  Information  Society 
Directive178  and  the  2004  Intellectual  Property  Rights  Enforcement 
Directive.179 As evidenced in the following sub-sections, the rules provided 
in these Directives are not perfectly coordinated with each other and their 
interplay  and  judicial  implementation  give  rise  to  uncertainties  and 
disparities in national jurisdictions.  
4.4.1  Liability of online intermediaries and duties to cooperate 
with copyright holders  
As  we  have  briefly  recalled,  the  phenomenon  of  large-scale  copyright 
infringement on the Internet is still rampant, even in those jurisdictions, 
like the UK, where on-demand offerings of lawful copyright works are well 
developed and highly diversified in terms of business models and price or 
subscription fee ranges. Available data show clearly that online ‘piracy’ is 
no  longer  based  just  on peer-to-peer  networking  (i.e.  fully  decentralised 
technologies of communication and data exchange among Internet users). 
The development and diffusion of broadband Internet access services and 
of Cloud-based platforms have made it easy for both large-scale copyright 
infringers and unauthorised users to access content made available through 
cyber lockers and other web-based platforms. This entirely new dimension 
of  copyright  infringement  has  inevitably  expanded  its  negative 
consequences on the business of creative industries targeting sectors such 
as the film industry, that ‘piracy’ had not affected dramatically before the 
advent of broadband Internet and of Cloud computing.  
In the Task Force debate, copyright owners, and in particular film 
producers,  claimed  that,  especially  in  today’s  technological  context,  the 
provision of Article 8(3) of the 2001 Information Society Directive should be 
implemented effectively and uniformly throughout the EU. This provision 
obliges  member  states  to  ensure  that  rights-holders  are  in  a  position  to 
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a 
third party to infringe a copyright or related right. Film producers stressed 
that Recital 59 in the preamble to the Directive clarifies that Article 8(3) 
should be applicable on the (sole) assumption that online intermediaries 
are best placed to bring infringing activities to an end. Moreover, the same 
recital states that the possibility of an injunction should be available even 
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where the acts carried out by an online intermediary are exempted from the 
scope  of  exclusive  rights  under  Article  5  of  the  Information  Society 
Directive. However, as concluded in the recital at issue, “[…] the conditions 
and modalities relating to such injunctions should be left to the national 
law of the member states […]”.  
Copyright owners claimed that, despite the clarity of this provision, 
ISPs and online intermediaries such as search engine operators have been 
very  reluctant  to  effectively  cooperate  in  activities  of  online  copyright 
enforcement.  As  a  result,  rights-holders  have  been  forced  to  start  legal 
actions before national courts and to request national law-makers to clarify 
the  meaning  and  scope  of  application  of  laws  that  implemented  Article 
8(3).  Major  film  producers,  who  have  started  many  infringement 
proceedings across Europe, advocated that injunctions (and a subsequent 
duty to cooperate with online intermediaries) should apply independently 
of the liability of intermediaries.  
The relevant case law of the CJEU and of courts in several member 
states have made it clear that the requested measures will have to pass a 
proportionality  test,  which  allows  courts  to  balance  fundamental  rights 
(e.g.  right  to  property  vs.  freedom  of  expression  or  the  user  right  to 
privacy)  and  justifies  the  issuance  of  website  blocking  measures  against 
‘structurally  infringing’  websites  (i.e.  those  sites  that  are  conceived  and 
designed to infringe copyright and to make profits from infringements). In 
general, when carrying out the proportionality test, national courts have 
constantly placed special emphasis on the review of key factual elements 
such as knowledge of the infringement by the website owner; the profit-
making character of the infringement and the active role and the intent of 
the  website  owner;  and  the  absence  of  voluntary  measures  that  are 
sufficiently effective and dissuasive. In response a claim of ISPs, finally, 
copyright owners also advocated that website blocking measures in these 
cases effectively reduce the popularity of structurally infringing websites, 
even if blockings do not eventually affect end-user conduct.  
The policy goals of balancing online copyright enforcement with the 
protection of other fundamental rights and ensuring proportionate results 
would  ideally  require  a  combined  set  of  measures  that  all  courts 
throughout the EU should have at their disposal. If courts embraced the 
approach  advocated  by  copyright  holders  in  the  context  of  online 
enforcement  proceedings,  standard  ‘notice-and-takedown’  procedures  – 
stemming from the transposition of the well-known liability exemption laid 
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of  content  hosting  –  would  be  complementary  to  exceptional  measures 
such as website blockings and would apply against websites with relatively 
modest amounts of illegal content.  
In  L’Oréal  v.  eBay,  the  CJEU  recently  shed  light  on  the  complex 
interplay  of  online  enforcement measures  and of  the  liability  exemption 
that the law grants to hosting service providers.180 In that specific case, the 
online  intermediary  was  a  very  well-known  operator  of  an  online 
marketplace (eBay) where users of the service were deemed to commit acts 
of trademark infringement. In assessing the scope of the exemption and 
considering whether or not eBay was aware of the infringements occurring 
on its online platform, the CJEU held that the online operator could have 
benefited from the safe harbour provision in so far as it confined itself to 
providing  that  service  neutrally  by  a  merely  technical  and  automatic 
processing of the content provided by its customers. This means that the 
exemption should not apply when the online intermediary plays an active 
role  that  would  imply  knowledge  of  (or  control  over)  such  content.  For 
instance, in that case the court mentioned, for example, the provision of 
assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the presentations of the 
customers’ sale offers or the promotion of these offers. Interestingly, after 
having reached that conclusion, the CJEU held that injunctions against an 
online service provider aimed at bringing the infringement of its users to an 
end, and also at preventing further infringement of the same kind, should 
be  admissible  under  national  law  irrespectively  of  the  intermediary’s 
liability. This conclusion may be very relevant also in the future of online 
copyright enforcement since the CJEU took such view on the grounds of a 
provision (i.e. Article 11 of IPRED) that re-states the principle of Article 8(3) 
of the Information Society Directive with regard to all intellectual property 
rights.  
It  goes  without  saying  that  the  above-mentioned  approach  and 
conclusion  raise  the  concerns  of  telecommunications  network  operators 
and Internet companies, which strongly reject an interpretation of EU law 
provisions  that  would  end  up  creating  a  duty  for  ISPs  and  online 
intermediaries  to  cooperate  with  rights-holders  in  bringing  copyright 
infringements to an end and, even more importantly, in preventing further 
infringements.  In  the  Task  Force  debate,  ISPs  advocated  that  the 
exemptions  embodied  into  the  Electronic  Commerce  Directive  are 
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milestones for a correct understanding of their liability regime and should 
not be subject to any modifications.  
From  an  impartial  point  of  view,  it seems  fair  to  observe  that  the 
CJEU is currently refining and adapting to a fast-changing technological 
context the interpretation of potentially conflicting provisions embodied in 
Directives that the EU adopted a long time ago. The Court’s aim is that of 
coordinating  and  making  these  provisions  compatible  and,  possibly, 
complementary, without undertaking any legislative changes. It should be 
borne  in  mind  that,  in  its  recent  case  law  on  online  enforcement  of 
intellectual property rights, the CJEU has firmly relied on the ‘milestones’ 
of the Electronic Commerce Directive, in particular the principle embodied 
in  Article  15  of  the  Directive,  according  to  which  member  states  (and 
national courts) cannot impose on online intermediaries general obligations 
to  monitor  the  content  they  store  or  transmit.  The  CJEU  has  fully 
recognised and applied this principle in all cases where national courts had 
to deal with requests of injunctions from copyright holders that, to prevent 
future infringements, would have required the installation of permanent 
filtering systems or technologies by ISPs and social network operators.181 In 
all  these  cases,  the  CJEU  has  constantly  held  that,  in  granting  online 
enforcement  measures,  the  protection  of  intellectual  property  should  be 
balanced against the protection of fundamental rights of individuals and 
companies  that  unlimited  filtering measures  would  inevitably  affect  (i.e. 
the  freedom  to  receive  and  impart  free  information,  the  protection  of 
personal  data  of  Internet  users,  freedom  of  ISPs  and  social  network 
devisers to conduct their online business: see §4.5 below).  
4.4.2  IPRED, its additional enforcement tools and blocking 
measures against payment system operators  
The Task Force discussion focused on the 2004 Intellectual Property Rights 
Enforcement  Directive  (IPRED),  which  aimed  at  harmonising  national 
systems  in  order  to  ensure  a high,  equivalent  and  homogenous  level  of 
protection of intellectual property rights in the Internal Market. In doing so, 
the Directive also intended to ensure that EU member states fulfilled the 
obligations  regarding  the  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights 
embodied  in  the  TRIPS  Agreement,  approved  and  concluded  in  the 
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framework of the WTO. Unfortunately, as acknowledged by the European 
Commission in a 2010 report on the application of IPRED, it has become 
apparent that the Directive was not designed to cope with the challenges 
that the Internet poses to the enforcement of intellectual property rights.182 
This character of the Directive has inevitably made its application in the 
digital environment problematic.  
At the time of the rejection of ACTA by the European Parliament, the 
Commission had started a review of IPRED, gathering data and observing 
how  member  states  had  concretely  implemented  it.  As  pointed  out  by 
Commission representatives in the Task Force discussion, IPRED has had 
relatively limited application in trials concerning online infringements. In 
addition, with specific regard to copyright, IPRED effectively works only 
for  infringements  occurring  within  the  EU.  Another  source  of 
dissatisfaction, according to the Commission, can be found in the high costs 
of access to justice for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. In this 
respect, EU policy-makers made it clear that a crucial step for any kind of 
review of the Directive would be that of finding an agreement among all 
member  states,  which  should  also  extend  to  the  harmonisation  of  the 
interface between online copyright enforcement and the protection of user 
personal data on the Internet (an issue about which member states do not 
seem to accept excessively stringent rules at EU level: see more in depth 
under § 4.5.4 below).  
Not  surprisingly,  EU  policy-makers  are  concerned  about  the 
potentially  negative  impact  of  the  ACTA  rejection  on  the  review  and 
possible  improvement  of  IPRED.  The  Commission  was  (and  still  is) 
convinced that the provisions embodied in the definitive version of ACTA 
dealing with enforcement in the digital environment were consistent with 
the European acquis. Moreover, the European Data Protection Supervisor 
confirmed  that  IPRED  is  fully  in  line  with  the  data  protection  acquis. 
Nevertheless, at a political level, the rejection of a treaty that would have 
extended  to  third  parties  a  set  of  rules  compatible  with  EU  law  might 
persuade some interest groups to lobby for a re-opening of IPRED aimed at 
                                                   
182 See Report from the Commission to the Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and  Social  Committee  and  to  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  Application  of  Directive 
2004/48/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29  April  2004  on  the 
enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights,  COM(2010)  779  final,  22  December  2010,  p.  9 
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reducing the scope of online enforcement measures that national courts are 
required to make available to rights-holders.  
As IPRED stands, one of the most important enforcement measures 
that  national  courts  are  requested  to  implement  is  the  disclosure  of 
information on the origins and distribution networks of infringing goods or 
services  in  response  to  a  justified  and  proportionate  request.183  This 
measure  grants  a  ‘right  to  information’  to  intellectual  property  rights-
holders  to  be  exercised  against  direct  infringers  and  any  person  who 
possesses, uses or provides infringing goods or uses services for infringing 
activities on a commercial scale. If this provision was implemented literally 
in  the  online  environment,  copyright  holders  would  be  entitled  to  ask 
national courts for information revealing names and addresses of persons 
involved  in  the  creation,  management  and  supply  of  ‘structurally 
infringing’ sites, gaining the ability to target their revenue sources.  
As  emphasised  in  the  Task  Force  debate,  what  is  missing  in  the 
IPRED framework is a provision giving copyright holders the possibility of 
blocking payments addressed to individuals and/or entities carrying out 
online infringing activities on a commercial scale. The underlying idea is 
that, by preventing structurally infringing sites and large-scale infringers 
from  collecting  payments  through  cooperation of  intermediaries  such  as 
payment system operators, incentives to infringe copyright would greatly 
be reduced.184  
In the United States, since 2006 the law has obliged payment system 
operators to stop providing their services to unlawful online casinos. At a 
later stage, in 2011, American Express, Discover, Mastercard, Paypal, and 
VISA (i.e. the five main operators in the US) made a further step in the 
development  of  this  policy  while  agreeing  on  best  practices  to  address 
copyright infringement claims and the sale of counterfeit products on the 
Internet.  Under  this  code  of  conduct,  rights-holders  can  notify  an 
infringement and ask that services provided to infringing websites should 
                                                   
183 See IPRED, Article 8(1).  
184  See  C. Manara (2012),  “Attacking  the  Money  Supply  to Fight  Against  Online  Illegal 
Content?”, EDHEC Business School, September (position paper commissioned by Google), 
pp. 9-11. The first attempt to implement this strategy was made against a Russian website 
“allofmp3”. In particular, in 2007 rights-holders asked VISA to stop providing its services to 
this infringing company. VISA accepted, but after a long lawsuit, a Russian court reversed 
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be terminated. As pointed out in the literature, the adoption of these best 
practices is confined to the US market, and their practical application has 
been very rare.185  
The EU scenario is different, since US major operators cannot easily 
adapt their best practices to different contract rules in the various member 
states. More generally, these best practices might create legal uncertainty 
considering that a finding about whether or not content and/or websites 
are lawful is not univocal. What happened to Wikileaks in a recent case is a 
good  example  that  received  great  attention  by  the  media:  the  Icelandic 
Supreme  Court  obliged  VISA  and  Mastercard  to  re-start  processing 
payments at a time when payment service operators had suspended their 
services  to  this  whistle-blowing  website,  consequently  blocking  users’ 
donations.186  
In the debate it was pointed out that copyright infringers can earn 
money through direct revenues (i.e. payments made by users) or indirect 
revenues  (i.e.  advertising).  The  advertising  business  involves  many 
operators all around the world. This means that there might be problems in 
regulating the operators’ conduct as a result of their disparate location at 
international  level.  Nevertheless,  providers  of  advertising  services 
generally  comply  with  a  code  of  conduct  and  today’s  most  powerful 
company  in  this  business  (i.e.  Google)  has  implemented  a  strict  policy 
against copyright infringement. Conversely, the payment business involves 
a very small number of operators (mainly credit card issuers).  
Here a policy question concerned the most viable strategy to block 
payments addressed to copyright infringers on a commercial scale. Due to 
its  ‘offline’  background,  IPRED  explicitly  mentions  orders  aimed  at 
blocking bank accounts and other assets of the alleged infringers within the 
set of provisional and precautionary measures that courts can take in the 
context of enforcement proceedings (in so far as the injured party evidences 
circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of damages).187 There is no 
reference  instead  to  the  possibility  of  blocking  payments  addressed  to 
accounts  of  infringers  through  injunctions  targeted  at  payment  system 
                                                   
185 Ibid., p. 11.  
186  See  for  instance  I.  Steadman,  Icelandic  court  declares  Wikileaks  donation  ban  ‘unlawful’, 
Wired,  26  April  2013  (www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-04/26/wikileaks-wins-visa-
case).  
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operators.  Nor  do  these  measures  seem  to  fall  within  the  scope  of 
injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party 
to infringe copyright under Article 11 of IPRED. In this case infringers use 
the intermediary’s services to receive the financial gains coming from an 
illegal activity, and not to commit the infringement itself.  
An  EU-wide  solution  that  could  facilitate  the  blocking  of  money 
transfers targeted at payment system operators could stem from either self-
regulation or a legislative evolution. Self-regulation might lead payment 
service providers to approve a code of conduct (like the one approved in 
the  US)  under  which  copyright  holders  would  have  the  possibility  of 
notifying  an  infringement  and  asking  service  providers  to  terminate  the 
account  of  infringers.  As  briefly  recalled  above,  differences  in  national 
contract laws would certainly raise problems in adopting a uniform code 
for the whole EU.188  
Another  contract-based  solution  would  be  to  apply  the  above-
mentioned account termination policy by means of copyright infringement 
clauses,  which  would  need  to  be  inserted  into  standard  agreements 
between  credit-card  owners  and  card  issuers.  An  alternative  to  self-
regulation would be a remedy based on a new legislative provision to be 
incorporated in a newer version of IPRED. As suggested in the discussion, 
this  provision  could  replicate  the  ‘notice-and-takedown’  mechanism 
adopted for ISP liability under the Electronic Commerce Directive. Under 
this scheme, rights-holders might be required to send a notice to a payment 
system  operator,  who  would  inform  their  clients  and  would  evaluate 
rights-holder notices. Funds deriving from illegal activities could be put in 
escrow accounts, whereas the accounts of infringing clients might be closed 
if such measure was found appropriate and/or justified.  
In conclusion, there is no doubt that enabling copyright owners to 
attack  the  money  supply  to  fight  against  online  illegal  content  would 
enhance  their  chances  to  reduce  online  ‘piracy’  significantly.  Still,  the 
adoption of this strategy might raise objections and cause problems. In the 
same way as with all types of blocking on the Internet, proceedings aimed 
at stopping payments might end up targeting websites that earn both from 
legal  and  illegal  activities.  This  means  that  a  right  to  fair  trial  for  the 
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affected parties should be incorporated into the enforcement mechanism. 
Moreover, attacking the money supply would also increase the degree of 
online  private  policing,  especially  if  ‘notice-and-takedown’  proceedings 
were based on self-regulation. Finally, this solution would inevitably have 
a  geographically  limited  scope  and  infringers’  reactions  might  greatly 
reduce its effectiveness. 
4.5  The enforcement of copyright and its compatibility with 
other fundamental rights 
The  complex  intersection  between  copyright  enforcement  and  the 
protection  of  competing  fundamental  rights  has  been  scrutinised  in  the 
recent  case  law  of  the  CJEU.  As  with  all  forms  of  intellectual  property, 
copyright enjoys the status of a fundamental right under Article 17(2) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,189 which refers to 
the  right  to  intellectual  property.  This  section  identifies  the  main  areas 
where copyright enforcement strategies and measures have to face limits 
raised  by  other  fundamental  rights protected under  the  Charter such as 
freedom of expression and information (Article 11) and the protection of 
privacy (Article 8). 
4.5.1  Copyright vs. freedom of expression 
As recently stated by the CJEU, injunctions that would end up imposing 
systematic  and  permanent  filtering  measures  on  online  intermediaries 
contradict the principle of freedom of expression and communication in so 
far as filtering tools cannot distinguish between transmissions of unlawful 
and  lawful  content.190  As  evidenced  in  the  discussion,  a  side  effect  on 
online freedom of expression (or even on the business of a website owner) 
and the risk of over-blocking is intrinsic in all measures based on content 
filtering, removal or disabling access to websites.  
Copyright enforcement on the Internet can easily lead to restriction of 
lawful content communications, especially when the target of measures is 
                                                   
189  See  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union,  OJ  2000/C  364/01,  18 
December 2000, [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
190 See C-70/10. Scarlet Extended v. SABAM. 24 November 2011, [hereinafter Scarlet Extended 
v.  SABAM],  and  C-360/10,  SABAM  v.  Netlog,  16  February  2012,  which  dealt  with, 
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an  entire  website  where some  lawful  content might  be  stored.  Even so-
called  ‘graduated  responses’  (or  ‘three-strike’)  schemes  –  like  the  one 
introduced  in  France  by  the  ‘Création  et  Internet’  legislation  –  raised 
serious concerns with regard to freedom of expression (and access to free 
information) in so far as an administrative body (and not a court) could 
issue the sanction of disconnection of repeat infringers from the Internet.191 
Through a well-known decision, in 2009 the French Constitutional Council 
held  that  the  protection  of  freedom  of  expression  and  communication 
under the French constitution includes the freedom to access the Internet 
and  censored  the  new  law  in  so  far  as  it  allowed  the  sanction  of 
disconnection to be taken by an administrative body.192 The Council held 
that this provision was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and 
the right to a fair trial.  
A similar tension with freedom to access information on the Internet 
can arise in the context of graduated response schemes put in place on a 
voluntary  basis  by  ISPs  on  the  grounds  of  agreements  concluded  with 
copyright owners. This is an issue that gained momentum in Brussels in 
2009, at the time of the extensive negotiations that led to the amendment of 
the so-called ‘Telecoms Package’, originally adopted in 2003.193 As a result 
of this reform, the ‘Framework Directive’ has a new provision that now 
obliges  member  states  that  implement  measures  with  the  potential  to 
restrict end-user access to (and use of) electronic communications networks 
(including  the  Internet)  to  impose  such  restrictions  only  if  appropriate, 
proportionate  and  necessary  within  a  democratic  society  and  subject  to 
adequate procedural safeguards.194 The Framework Directive now provides 
that, while imposing restrictive measures in communications networks – 
                                                   
191 See Law 2009/669 of 12 June 2009, amended on 15 September 2009, Journal officiel de la 
République francaise.  
192 See French Constitutional Council, Decision n. 2009-580DC, 10 June 2009, Journal officiel de 
la République francaise.  
193  See  Directive  2009/140/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25 
November 2008 amending amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services [hereinafter Framework Directive], 2002/19/EC 
on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
[hereinafter Access Directive], and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services [hereinafter Authorisation Directive], OJ L 337/37 (December 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter Directive 2009/140/EC]. 
194 See Article 1(3)(a) of the Framework Directive, as amended by Article 1(1)(b) of Directive 
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like  user  disconnection  from  the  Internet  in  the  context  of  graduate 
response regimes – member states should guarantee to the affected parties 
a prior, fair and impartial procedure and an effective and timely judicial 
review. As observed in the literature, even though this amendment does 
not seem to prohibit EU member states from introducing ‘three-strike’ laws 
without judicial supervision, the new Framework Directive guarantees at 
least  a  court  hearing  on  an  appeal  from  an  initial  (necessarily  fair  and 
impartial) ruling to disconnect.195  
As strongly evidenced by the global wave of protests against SOPA in 
the US and ACTA in the EU, arguments and policy goals such as ‘Internet 
freedom’ and net neutrality have been used very broadly by civil liberties 
organisations, activists and, sometimes, even by academics to criticise and 
reject  all  forms  of  online  content  blocking  for  reasons  of  copyright 
enforcement.  A  sort  of  equation  between  copyright  enforcement  and 
Internet  censorship  has  been  proposed  often  in  order  to  describe  the 
chilling  (or  side)  effects  stemming  from  content  bans  or  technical 
restrictions to information made available online.  
The recent global protest against legislation that would have allowed 
or facilitated copyright enforcement shows that, in addition to the complex 
legal issues that have to be settled in order to make copyright compatible 
with other fundamental rights, there is an additional problem for policy-
makers to solve, which is more political and sociological than legal. This 
big issue consists of how to explain and to justify to a very vocal part of 
public opinion the various forms of control and enforcement that copyright 
entails  in  order  to  make  professional  content  creation  and  distribution 
economically sustainable and, possibly, profitable. A strong argument of 
the  advocates  of  Internet  freedom  is  that  the  world  wide  web  was  not 
conceived to have sites blocked, and any blocking measure is intrinsically 
unacceptable since, in political contexts where real censorship exists, site 
blockings and other technical restrictions of the Internet architecture can be 
used  to  silence  dissenting  opinions  and  expression  of  individuals, 
companies  and  social  media  and  networks.  As  acknowledged  in  the 
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discussion,  the  architecture  of  the  Internet  is  certainly  an  invaluable 
resource  to  protect  in  order  to  ensure  freedom  of  expression  and 
information. It  is  also  in  light  of  this  fundamental  policy  goal  that  law-
makers  and  courts  should  strictly  comply  with  the  principle  of 
proportionality  in  shaping  and  implementing  copyright-related 
restrictions.  
4.5.2  Copyright vs. freedom to run a business 
Another kind of freedom that has been recently taken into consideration by 
the CJEU in its decisions on the limits that online copyright enforcement 
should deal with is the freedom to conduct a business (i.e. a fundamental 
right that is addressed under Article 16 Charter of Fundamental Rights). In 
the judgment on Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, in particular, the recognition 
of such freedom was a key part for the reasoning of the Court since the 
judges  found  that  the  broad  filtering  measure  requested  by  the  Belgian 
collecting society SABAM would have led to a  serious restriction of the 
freedom  of  the  ISP  to  conduct  its  business.  As  the  CJEU  held,  such  a 
measure would have obliged the ISP to put in place a complicated, costly, 
and permanent filtering technology at its own expense. 
Interestingly, in this landmark decision, the CJEU established a link 
between  Article  3  of  IPRED  and  the  freedom  of  an  ISP  to  conduct  a 
business,  holding  that  measures  enforcing  intellectual  property  rights 
should not be unnecessarily complicated and costly. This was clearly an 
unintended association (or mistake?) that the CJEU made in referring to a 
provision  that  the  IPRED  drafters  had  taken  verbatim  from  the  TRIPS 
Agreement to make it clear that enforcement measures should not be too 
costly or complicated for copyright owners, and not for ISPs (who are not 
taken into any consideration under the Agreement). Through this judgment 
the Court has broadened the meaning of this general obligation for member 
states,  extending  it  to  the  benefit  of  individuals,  entities  or  companies 
having to face copyright-related objections or requests. Obviously, if the 
freedom to do business of online actors was granted an excessively broad 
protection  under  Article  3,  this  provision  might  (paradoxically)  end  up 
raising obstacles to the implementation of site-blocking injunctions, content 
removals  undertaken  as  a  result  of  ‘notice-and-takedown’  proceedings 
(especially  where  the  volume  of  notices  might  seem  excessive  for  some 
ISPs) and, where applicable, forms of cooperation by ISPs under graduated 
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4.5.3   Right to a fair trial in enforcement proceedings 
A fundamental right that is potentially at odds with copyright enforcement 
measures, and has not been taken into consideration by the CJEU yet, is the 
right  to  a  due  process  (or  fair  trial).  For  injunctions  against  online 
intermediaries  and  ‘notice-and-takedown’  procedures  to  be  fair,  these 
remedies should be accompanied by the possibility for the hosting provider 
or  for  whoever  has  posted  supposedly  illegal  content  that  has  been 
removed  of  reacting  and  defending  herself  in  order  to  prove  that  the 
removed content is lawful.  
It was observed in the discussion that, unlike the US, the EU does not 
seem to require member states to grant judicial remedies in case of abusive 
or  mistaken  implementation  of  a  copyright  enforcement  measure  to  the 
benefit  of  the  addressee  of  the  measure.196  Among  the  stakeholders 
participating in the discussion, record producers, which make a very large 
use of infringement notices, claimed that at least in the field of music the 
rate of wrong notices in Europe has proven to be close to zero.  
Nonetheless, there are relevant online surveys and observatories that 
show  that  ‘notice-and-takedown’  procedures  have  had  chilling  effects 
because of the strong preference of content platform devisers to obey to 
infringement  notices  instead  of  running  the  risk  of  facing  copyright 
liability.197 Objections focused on the absence of a right to fair trial have 
                                                   
196 In this regard, it has to be seen how the previously mentioned 2009 reform of the EU 
Telecom Package, and the guarantee of due process created under the new version of Article 
1(3) of the Universal Service Directive (see Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services – Universal Service Directive -, OJEC L108/51 – 24 April 
2002), will impact on the implementation of restrictive measures affecting end-user access to 
(and use of) the Internet under national laws. The new version of Article 1(3) derives from 
the  amendment  made  by  Directive  2009/136/EC  (see  Directive  2009/136/EC  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC 
on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic  communications  sector  and  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  on  cooperation  between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, OJ L337/11, 18 
December 2009). 
197 A good example is the ‘Chilling Effects’ project at the Berkman Centre for Internet and 
Society, Harvard Law School, which keeps track of threats to online expression, cataloguing 
cease-and-desist  notices  and  helping  Internet  users  to  understand  their  rights.  This 
observatory receives submissions from individuals and from ISPs and hosting providers, 
which enable researchers to study the prevalence of lawful threats and to allow Internet 
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been  raised  in  France  in  the  context  of  ‘three  strike’  (administrative) 
procedures, where the law does not grant users the possibility to defend 
themselves by answering or reacting somehow to warnings that a given 
Internet connection was used to infringe copyright. Users need to go to 
court in order to be finally able to defend themselves.198  
From a more general perspective, a problem of lack of clarity under 
EU law about how a fair trial should be guaranteed by member states in the 
context of ‘notice-and-takedown’ proceedings undoubtedly exists. Article 
14 of the Electronic Commerce Directive does not specify how (i.e. by what 
type  of  notices)  hosting  service  providers  should  be  made  aware  (and 
acquire  knowledge)  of  the  storage  of  illegal  content  on  their  servers  in 
order  to  expeditiously  remove  or  disable  access  to  that  content.  In  the 
absence of clear guidance under EU law, national law-makers and courts in 
countries  like  Italy  have  ended  up  requiring  that  infringement  notices 
should  be  sent  through  a  judicial  order  so  as  to  ensure  fairness  and  to 
reduce  the  risks  of  potentially  abusive  or  mistaken  notices  and  content 
removals (and not also through informal notices, as the Directive allows).199 
The unintended consequence of this approach is that, in those countries, 
‘notice-and-takedown’  procedures  have  been  slowed  down  and  made 
excessively costly and complicated for copyright owners.  
4.5.4  Copyright enforcement vs. protection of Internet user privacy  
Online  enforcement  measures  can  easily  conflict  with  the  protection  of 
personal data of Internet users when copyright holders collect evidence of 
                                                                                                                                 
users  to  see  the  source  of  content  removals  (see 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research/chillingeffects#).  
198 As pointed out in the discussion, another problem of French law is that it presumes that 
the copyright infringer is the subscriber of the Internet connection service associated to the 
IP address from which an illegal content upload has been made. This has had some effects 
also on the presumption of innocence since, for instance, there have been cases in France 
where the subscriber receiving the warnings was a parent, whereas the infringer was a 
teenager.  
199 See Article 16 (Liability of hosting service providers) of Legislative Decree 9 April 2003 
n.70 that transposed the Electronic Commerce Directive into Italian law. The text of this 
provision differs from that of Article 14 of the Directive since it explicitly requires that 
hosting service providers should promptly remove or disable access to illegal content (only) 
after having gained knowledge about the infringement through a communication of the 
competent  authorities.  The case  law  so  far  has  held  that by  ‘competent  authorities’  the 
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alleged infringements and seek to obtain disclosure of information about 
the  identity  of  supposedly  infringing  users.  Collection  of  evidence  is 
usually based on monitoring of Internet users’ activities by rights-holders. 
This  activity  involves  the  monitoring  of  electronic  communications, 
extending to inspection of the content of those communications (through 
‘deep  packet  inspection’  technologies)  and  leading  to  the  gathering  and 
storage of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of alleged infringers.  
As recently acknowledged by the CJEU, user IP addresses should be 
treated as personal data under EU law, because these data allow users to be 
identified precisely.200 As a result, collecting such addresses on the Internet, 
processing them and identifying the persons acting behind each IP address 
represent a kind of personal data processing. This activity is not prohibited 
as  such,  but  there  are  some  key  obligations  to  fulfil  when  doing  it.  In 
particular, EU law obliges member states to provide that personal data can 
only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and any 
processing  should  be  relevant  and  proportionate  to  the  objective 
pursued.201  
The  CJEU has  admitted  that  copyright  enforcement  is  a  legitimate 
purpose that justifies the treatment of personal data, but such treatment has 
to  comply  with  a  proportionality  principle  ensuring  balance  in  the 
enforcement  of  conflicting  fundamental  rights.202  Hence,  whereas  a 
systematic collection and identification of users’ IP addresses and analysis 
of  all  content  exchanged  has  been  found  disproportionate,  a  request  by 
rights-holders  to  have  access  to  a  specific  set  of  user  personal  data  is 
admitted through judicial proceedings that aim at ensuring proportionality. 
Privacy problems emerge also in the so-called ‘three strikes’ laws, where 
ISPs have to process IP addresses, identify infringing users, and store and 
monitor infringers’ data.  
By  intervening  in  the  Task  Force  debate,  the  European  Data 
Protection  Supervisor  (hereinafter  ‘EDPS’)  made  it  clear  that,  in  this 
context, data protection authorities play a role of guarantors of lawfulness 
                                                   
200 See Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, para. 51.  
201 See Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, OJ L281/31 (November 23, 1995), [hereinafter Data Protection 
Directive]. 
202 See C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España 
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of data processing. Such authorities are entitled i) to review the conditions 
under which the monitoring and storage of personal data is conducted, ii) 
to provide recommendations and iii) to set out limitations. Furthermore, 
the  EDPS  emphasised  the  relevance  of  the  proportionality  test  that  the 
CJEU has relied on from the Promusicae v. Telefonica203 judgment onwards, 
arguing  that  a  specifically  targeted  activity  of  monitoring  should  be 
preferred to a generalised (and massive) monitoring and storage of Internet 
user data.  
Additional privacy-related problems may arise when disclosing the 
identity of supposedly infringing users. The fact that ISPs can technically 
identify users on the grounds of their IP addresses does not allow them to 
transfer personal data directly to copyright owners. As recalled in the Task 
Force  debate,  with  the  adoption  of  IPRED  EU  law-makers  intended  to 
encourage and facilitate purposes of effective enforcement targeted at users 
infringing  copyright  on  a  commercial  scale,  a  requirement  that  was 
borrowed from Article 61 of the 1994 TRIPS Agreement.  
If Article 8 of IPRED were applied fully in the digital environment, 
copyright holders would be entitled to ask courts throughout the EU to 
compel ISPs to disclose the identity of Internet users found in possession of 
infringing  goods  on  a  commercial  scale  or  providing  services  used  in 
infringing  activities.204  In  particular,  IPRED  seems  to  enable  judicial 
authorities, upon request of copyright owners, to identify and prosecute 
users who are caught to have knowingly allowed their computers to be 
used  as  high-volume  uploaders  of  infringing  materials  in  fully 
decentralised  peer-to-peer  architectures.205  However,  IPRED  creates  an 
interface  with  the  Directive  on  Protection  of  Privacy  in  Electronic 
                                                   
203 See Promusicae v. Telefonica. 
204 See IPRED, Article 8(1). 
205  See  IPRED,  Article  8(2),  which  makes  it  clear  that  information  on  the  origin  and 
distribution  networks  of  infringing  goods  comprises  the  names  and  addresses  of 
distributors  and  suppliers  of  infringing  goods  as  well  as  information  on  the  quantities 
delivered or received. After having identified direct infringers, copyright owners are given 
broad and prompt access to civil proceedings that grant interlocutory measures intended to 
prevent any imminent infringement or continuation of infringements and other measures 
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Communications  that  raises  an  almost  insurmountable  barrier  for 
copyright enforcement.206  
In the EU legal system, Directive 2002/58 regulates access to users’ 
confidential  communications  and  personal  data  and  their  retention  and 
processing.207 This Directive allows disclosure of personal data only under 
exceptional  circumstances  spelt  out  under  Article  15(1).  This  provision 
allows member states to adopt legislative measures to restrict user privacy 
rights  when  such  restrictions  constitute  a  necessary,  appropriate  and 
proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national 
security,  defence,  public  security,  and  the  prevention,  investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the 
electronic  communication  system.  As  emphasised  by  the  CJEU  in 
Promusicae  v.  Telefonica,  this  provision  does not  oblige  member  states  to 
establish  an  obligation  under  their  laws  to  force  ISPs  to  disclose  user 
personal  data  in  order  to  enable  an  effective  protection  of  copyright. 
According  to  the  CJEU,  the  only  obligation  created  under  EU  law  for 
member states and national courts is that of interpreting and transposing 
the  relevant  EU  directives  to  ensure  a  fair  balance  between  the  various 
fundamental rights and proportionality in the enforcement of these rights.  
The  Task  Force  widely  agreed  on  the  fact  that  the  Promusicae  v. 
Telefonica judgment was (and still is) a strong encouragement to EU law-
makers to adopt new legislation ensuring a better coordination between 
copyright enforcement and protection of users personal data in the context 
of civil proceedings. In the decision, the CJEU interpreted the exceptions to 
user privacy rights broadly, emphasising a reference that the 2002 Directive 
                                                   
206 See IPRED, Article 8(3)(e), which requires that the right to information should apply 
without  prejudice  to  other  EU  law  provisions  which  “[…]  govern  the  protection  of 
confidentiality of information sources or the processing of personal data.” 
207 See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  the  protection  of  privacy  in  the  electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L201/37 (31 July 
2002),  [hereinafter  Directive  on  Privacy  in  Electronic  Communications],  which  ensures 
confidentiality  of  communications  and  the  related  traffic  data  by  means  of  a  public 
communications  network  and  publicly  available  electronic  communications  services, 
through  national  legislation.  In  particular,  Article  5  provides  that  member  states  shall 
prohibit  listening,  tapping,  storage  or  other  kinds  of  interception  or  surveillance  of 
communications  and  the  related  traffic  data  by  persons  other  than  users,  without  the 
consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised to do so in accordance with 
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on  Privacy  in  Electronic  Communications  makes  to  the  1995  Data 
Protection  Directive.208  According  to  such  reference,  member  states  are 
given the option to restrict user privacy rights also in situations that may 
give rise to civil proceedings, in particular when the processing of personal 
data is necessary, inter alia, “[…] for the protection of rights and freedoms 
of others […]”.209 The CJEU concluded that, due to this reference, the two 
Directives  should  be  interpreted  as  expressing  the  intention  of  EU  law-
makers  not  to  exclude  from  their  scope  the  protection  of  the  right  to 
intellectual property or situations in which copyright holders seek to obtain 
protection through civil proceedings.210  
The  fact  that,  in  certain  jurisdictions,  the  purpose  of  user  privacy 
protection  systematically  prevails  over  judicial  requests  of  disclosure  of 
infringers’  identity  has  largely  frustrated  the  objective  of  copyright 
enforcement  against  large-scale  infringements  through  measures  made 
available by IPRED. The Task Force widely agreed on the urgent need to 
create  a  uniform  interface  at  EU  level  between  copyright  enforcement 
proceedings and the protection of privacy in electronic communications. 
This interface, which should ensure that copyright and user privacy are 
fairly  balanced  also  in  the  context  of  civil  proceedings,  could  either  be 
inserted into the new framework for EU data protection law, currently in 
preparation,  or  be  included  in  a  possible  revision  of  IPRED.211  If  this 
Directive was eventually re-opened, the Task Force widely agreed that its 
new version could also clarify the types of specific monitoring measures 
that would pass the above-mentioned proportionality test and the meaning 
of the crucial requirement of ‘commercial scale’ of an infringement.  
                                                   
208  Article  15  of  the  Directive  on  Privacy  in  Electronic  Communications  provides  that 
restrictions  to  user  privacy  rights  are  permissible  when  they  constitute  a  necessary, 
appropriate and proportionate measure to enable prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication 
system, as referred to in Article 13(1) of the Data Protection Directive.  
209 See Promusicae v. Telefonica, para. 52. Article 13(1)(g) of the 1995 Data Protection Directive 
provides that member states are allowed to restrict the right to privacy in relation to the 
processing of personal data where the restriction is necessary for “[…] the protection of the 
data subject and of the rights and freedoms of others […]”.  
210 See Promusicae v. Telefonica, para. 53.  
211  For  an  overview  of  the  various  issues  concerning  the  modernization  of  EU  data 
protection law, see K. Irion and G. Luchetta, Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data 
Protection Reform, Report of the CEPS Digital Forum, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
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ANNEX I. RETAIL PRICES FOR CONSUMER 
DEVICES IN 20 COUNTRIES AGAINST LEVY 
AND VAT RATES 
he following tables show that there appears to be a pan-European 
retail  price  point  for  consumer  devices  (i.e.  printers, 
music/video/game  devices  and  tablet  computers)  regardless  of 
divergent levy schemes (with only Scandinavian consumers willing to pay 
more). The data suggest that retail prices depend not only on the level of 
indirect  taxation  in  a  country,  but  also  on  market  conditions  and 
consumers’ willingness to pay. The United States generally has the lowest 
prices, whereas France and Germany are the EU countries with the highest 
rates for levies. Interestingly, in spite of high charges, German consumers 
seem to benefit from good deals for the products listed in the tables. 
The tables, which refer to online prices, are the author’s elaboration of 
data provided by Kretschmer (2011), Private Copying and Fair Compensation: 
An empirical study of copyright levies in Europe, study commissioned by UK 
Intellectual Property Office (IPO).  
Table A.1 Prices, levies and charges for printers (April 2011) 
  Officejet 4500 AIO   Color Laserjet M1132  
  Market 
Price 
VAT  Levy  Net 
Price 
Market 
Price 
VAT  Levy  Net 
Price 
Austria  € 68  € 11  € 4  € 54  € 173  € 23  € 37  € 113 
Belgium  € 89  € 15  € 5  € 70  € 131  € 13  € 57  € 62 
France  € 73  € 12  € 0  € 61  € 135  € 22  € 0  € 113 
Germany  € 68  € 9  € 12  € 47  € 174  € 21  € 40  € 113 
Ireland  € 89  € 15  € 0  € 74  € 139  € 24  € 0  € 115 
Italy  € 68  € 11  € 0  € 57  € 119  € 20  € 0  € 99 
Latvia  € 70  € 13  € 0  € 57  € 135  € 24  € 0  € 111 
Luxembourg  € 88  € 11  € 0  € 77  € 149  € 19  € 0  € 130 
Netherlands  € 70  € 11  € 0  € 59  € 141  € 23  € 0  € 118 
Poland  € 66  € 12  € 1  € 53  € 129  € 24  € 2  € 103 
Spain  € 69  € 9  € 8  € 52  € 166  € 24  € 10  € 132 
Sweden  € 101  € 20  € 0  € 81  € 154  € 31  € 0  € 123 
UK  € 68  € 11  € 0  € 57  € 144  € 24  € 0  € 120 
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Canada  € 69  € 5  € 0  € 64  € 105  € 8  € 0  € 97 
India  € 117  € 13  € 0  € 104  NA  NA  € 0  NA 
Japan  € 132  € 6  € 0  € 126  NA  NA  € 0  NA 
Korea  € 79  € 7  € 0  € 72  € 105  € 10  € 0  € 95 
Norway  € 120  € 24  € 0  € 96  € 152  € 30  € 0  € 122 
Switzerland  € 78  € 6  € 0  € 72  € 124  € 9  € 0  € 115 
US  € 49  € 3  € 0  € 46  € 87  € 5  € 0  € 82 
 
Table A.2 Prices, levies and charges for music/video/game devices (April 2011) 
  iPod Touch 8 GB  iPod Touch 32 GB  iPod Touch 64 GB 
 
Market 
Price 
VAT  Levy 
Net 
Price 
Market 
Price 
VAT  Levy 
Net 
Price 
Market 
Price 
VAT  Levy 
Net 
Price 
Austria  € 195  € 32  € 6  € 158  € 269  € 44  € 7  € 218  € 355  € 58  € 8  € 289 
Belgium  € 229  € 39  € 3  € 187  € 299  € 51  € 3  € 245  € 379  € 65  € 3  € 311 
France  € 205  € 32  € 7  € 166  € 265  € 42  € 10  € 213  € 353  € 55  € 15  € 283 
Germany  € 199  € 32  € 0  € 167  € 219  € 35  € 0  € 184  € 299  € 48  € 0  € 251 
Ireland  € 205  € 36  € 0  € 169  € 278  € 48  € 0  € 230  € 359  € 62  € 0  € 297 
Italy  € 212  € 35  € 5  € 173  € 276  € 45  € 6  € 225  € 368  € 60  € 6  € 301 
Canada  € 179  € 13  € 0  € 166  € 229  € 17  € 0  € 212  € 301  € 22  € 0  € 279 
Latvia  € 193  € 35  € 1  € 157  € 270  € 48  € 1  € 220  € 290  € 52  € 1  € 237 
Luxembourg  € 209  € 27  € 0  € 182  € 276  € 36  € 0  € 240  € 391  € 51  € 0  € 340 
Netherlands  € 209  € 33  € 0  € 176  € 279  € 45  € 0  € 234  € 349  € 56  € 0  € 293 
Poland  € 210  € 38  € 6  € 166  € 280  € 51  € 8  € 221  € 362  € 66  € 11  € 285 
Spain  € 195  € 29  € 3  € 163  € 275  € 41  € 3  € 230  € 319  € 48  € 3  € 268 
Sweden  € 266  € 53  € 3  € 210  € 347  € 67  € 12  € 268  € 459  € 88  € 19  € 352 
UK  € 190  € 32  € 0  € 158  € 244  € 41  € 0  € 203  € 301  € 50  € 0  € 251 
India  € 179  € 20  € 0  € 159  € 220  € 24  € 0  € 196  € 309  € 34  € 0  € 275 
Japan  € 158  € 8  € 0  € 150  € 210  € 10  € 0  € 200  € 278  € 13  € 0  € 265 
Korea  € 193  € 18  € 0  € 175  € 271  € 25  € 0  € 246  € 359  € 33  € 0  € 326 
Norway  € 236  € 47  € 0  € 189  € 304  € 61  € 0  € 243  € 406  € 81  € 0  € 325 
Switzerland  € 184  € 13  € 4  € 166  € 229  € 16  € 9  € 203  € 322  € 23  € 15  € 285 
US  € 139  € 9  € 0  € 130  € 191  € 12  € 0  € 179  € 253  € 16  € 0  € 237 
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Table A.3 Prices, levies and charges for tablet computers (April 2011) 
  iPad 16 GB  iPad 2 16 GB  Samsung Galaxy  Tab 16 GB 
 
Market 
Price 
VAT  Levy 
Net 
Price 
Marke
t Price 
VAT  Levy 
Net 
Price 
Market 
Price 
VAT  Levy 
Net 
Price 
Austria  € 389  € 65  € 0  € 324  € 639  € 107  € 0  € 533  € 399  € 67  € 0  € 333 
Belgium  € 448  € 78  € 0  € 370  € 662  € 115  € 0  € 547  € 499  € 87  € 0  € 412 
France  € 429  € 69  € 8  € 352  € 489  € 79  € 8  € 402  € 441  € 71  € 8  € 362 
Germany  € 379  € 59  € 12  € 308  € 419  € 65  € 12  € 342  € 371  € 57  € 12  € 302 
Ireland  € 423  € 73  € 0  € 350  € 479  € 83  € 0  € 396  € 430  € 75  € 0  € 355 
Italy  € 379  € 63  € 2  € 314  € 551  € 92  € 2  € 458  € 408  € 68  € 2  € 338 
Latvia  € 346  € 62  € 0  € 284  € 556  € 100  € 0  € 456  € 368  € 66  € 0  € 302 
Luxembourg  € 429  € 56  € 0  € 373  € 610  € 80  € 0  € 530  € 399  € 52  € 0  € 347 
Netherlands  € 379  € 61  € 0  € 318  € 479  € 76  € 0  € 403  € 439  € 70  € 0  € 369 
Poland  € 423  € 79  € 0  € 344  € 607  € 114  € 0  € 493  € 384  € 72  € 0  € 312 
Spain  € 429  € 65  € 0  € 364  € 479  € 73  € 0  € 406  € 385  € 59  € 0  € 326 
Sweden  € 390  € 78  € 0  € 312  € 502  € 100  € 0  € 402  € 538  € 108  € 0  € 430 
UK  € 374  € 62  € 0  € 312  € 409  € 68  € 0  € 341  € 455  € 76  € 0  € 379 
Canada  € 414  € 31  € 0  € 383  € 486  € 36  € 0  € 450  € 367  € 27  € 0  € 340 
India  € 420  € 47  € 0  € 373  € 694  € 77  € 0  € 617  € 366  € 41  € 0  € 325 
Japan   € 371  € 18  € 0  € 353  € 603  € 29  € 0  € 574  € 587  € 28  € 0  € 559 
Korea  € 400  € 36  € 0  € 364  € 404  € 37  € 0  € 367  € 612  € 56  € 0  € 556 
Norway  € 508  € 102  € 0  € 406  € 521  € 104  € 0  € 417  € 503  € 101  € 0  € 402 
Switzerland  € 357  € 26  € 0  € 331  € 422  € 31  € 0  € 391  € 347  € 26  € 0  € 321 
US  € 256  € 16  € 0  € 240  € 458  € 28  € 0  € 430  € 339  € 21  € 0  € 318 
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